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It has become a commonplace observation in recent years that Russian democracy is in 
remission.  Indeed there is a significant difference between the struggling democratic 
performance of Russia and that of a consolidated democracy such as France.  The modern French 
and Russian states are both semi-presidential states, meaning that in each country executive 
power is shared between an elected president and an appointed prime minister who can (at least 
in theory) be voted out of office by the legislature.  Despite this broad similarity, semi-
presidential institutions are organized in significantly different ways in each country.  This paper 
examines those differences in order to understand how they can help account for poor democratic 
performance in Russia and strong democratic performance in France. 
 Four political institutions will be examined in each country: presidents, prime ministers, 
parliaments, and political parties.  By comparing these institutions across two semi-presidential 
states, important differences can be unearthed and their implications for democratic performance 
analyzed. 
 This paper concludes that, if anything, the Russian legislature is more independent than 
the French National Assembly, and more capable of influencing independent policies and laws.  
However, a weak vote of no-confidence means that the Russian legislature has little control over 
the selection of the prime minister and cabinet.  This severely hobbles Russian political parties 
and creates a leadership class that is not dependent on party support for its position.  These non-
partisan leaders are therefore free to create the clientelistic ‘parties of power’ that have become 
characteristic of the Russian system.  By contrast, the strong vote of no-confidence in the 
National Assembly obliges French national leaders to cultivate and reward political parties in 
order to build a supportive majority in the legislature.  As a result, French parties are able to act 
as links between the state and society, while Russian society remains alienated from its leaders. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
  
At the close of the year 2000, President Vladimir Putin signed into law a parliamentary bill 
establishing the state symbols of Russia.  Along with a new national anthem, the law provided 
for a national emblem:  a two-headed, golden eagle with wings outstretched.  The symbol 
harkens back to Russia’s imperial history, having been employed by the grand dukes and tsars as 
far back as Ivan III.  Before that, the double-headed eagle had been the emblem of the 
Byzantium, symbolizing that great empire’s power over both East and West.  For Russia, which 
straddles two continents, the same symbolism is still apt.   
 Yet the double-headed eagle is also an appropriate symbol for the form of government 
Russia has chosen for itself, known to political scientists as semi-presidentialism.  Semi-
presidential systems blend the characteristics of presidential and parliamentary republics, the two 
primary archetypes of democratic government.  Specifically, a semi-presidential system includes 
a president who is elected by the voters and a prime minister who is accountable to the 
parliament.  Power must be divided in some way between the two figures.  A semi-presidential 
state, like the state emblem of Russia, has two executive ‘heads.’ 
The modern French and Russian states are two of the most prominent semi-presidential 
states in the world.  Established in 1958 under the aegis of Charles de Gaulle, the French Fifth 
Republic was one of the first such systems and has been perhaps the most stable and effective 
political arrangement of post-revolutionary France.  Several of the states which emerged from 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, including Russia, looked to the Fifth Republic as a model when 
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 drafting new constitutions.  While the two systems are broadly similar, there are significant 
differences in the details.  Yet direct comparisons of the form semi-presidentialism has taken in 
France and Russia are scarce, despite the international importance of the countries in question.   
Practically no one questions the democratic credentials of the modern French state.  The 
rights and freedoms of citizens are respected, and voters are able to choose their leaders in 
elections that are free and fair.  The media is free to criticize the government, and the rule of law 
is pervasive.  Like any government, the Fifth Republic is imperfect, but no one suggests that it is 
not a democracy.  By contrast, outside observers increasingly lament the state of affairs in 
Russia.  Many journalists, academics, and politicians have described Russia during the tenure of 
President Putin as a democracy in remission, if not an outright authoritarian state.  The Russian 
leadership itself speaks of ‘managed’ or ‘sovereign’ democracy, forgetting that it is rarely a good 
thing when leaders feel obliged to qualify the state of democracy in their country with an 
adjective.  Russia is not the Soviet Union of days past; its citizens enjoy substantially more 
freedom than they did under any Soviet government.  Yet the national media is firmly controlled 
by the state, and the most recent presidential election had all the elements of a farce. 
The goal of this paper is to determine, by comparison, whether the differences in 
institutional arrangement present in each country can account for the disparity in democratic 
performance.  In other words, while France and Russia fall under the same broad political 
category, can the differences in how power is embodied and arranged in the two systems explain 
why Russia appears less democratic than France? 
In Chapter II of this paper, I will examine the relationship between the legislature and the 
executive in each country.  This relationship is critical to democratic performance in any state.  
Legislatures, with their numerous members, are more representative of the society as a whole 
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 than majoritarian executives and provide opportunities for the opposition to criticize the majority 
and influence policy.  An independent parliament is also necessary to provide oversight of the 
executive.  A too-powerful executive with few checks on its ability to determine policy is 
detrimental to democratic performance.  
 I conclude in Chapter II that the crucial distinction between the French National 
Assembly and the Russian State Duma is one of institutional independence from the executive.  
Unlike the Assembly, the Duma has the authority to direct the legislative process on its own.  
The Duma establishes its own committees and chairpersons, and determines which bills get sent 
to which committees.  The French executive can ram bills through parliament in whatever form it 
likes, due to constitutional provisions that enable it to cherry-pick amendments and pass 
legislation without an affirmative vote in the assembly.  The Russian government has none of 
these advantages.  As a result, the procedural rules of the Duma create more room for negotiation 
between the executive and the legislature, both when the majority in the Duma is supportive of 
the government, and when it is not.  By contrast, the French government has less need to pursue 
conciliation with the Assembly since it can pass legislation without time-consuming negotiation 
and coalition-building.  Consequently, I argue that the Russian legislature has more influence 
over the formation of individual policies than does the French National Assembly.  The Russian 
constitution, therefore, better establishes a legislative check on executive power than does the 
French constitution. 
 However, the Duma has one important weakness when compared to the Assembly: it is 
exceedingly difficult for the Duma to reject the president’s nominee for prime minister.  This has 
important ramifications not only for executive-legislative relations, but also for the political party 
system in each country.  In Chapters III and IV, I argue that the weak no-confidence mechanism 
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 in Russia keeps genuine, interest-based political parties in disarray by denying them access to 
executive power.  Since political parties do not offer a viable route to the executive, aspiring 
national leaders do not need to rely on parties in the same way that French politicians do.  The 
strong vote of no-confidence in France means that parties control the prime minister’s office.  
French leaders need their parties in order to win elections, but they also need a supportive 
majority in the legislature in order to govern.  Parties in France are, as a result, partners in 
governance.  French presidents have always emerged from political parties, as have most 
ministers.  Parties are extremely successful at colonizing the state through presidential patronage.   
 The inability of Russian parties to capture the apex of state power creates a vacuum.  This 
vacuum has been filled by the ‘party of power,’ a characteristic element of the Russian party 
system.  Parties of power have close ties with the elite, often having been created by the ruling 
cadre in order to win the next election.  As such, they have de facto access to the executive, with 
the implied the connections and influence.  Even a party of power with a modest parliamentary 
delegation can become the key majority-maker in the legislature, due to its connection with the 
executive.   
The purpose of a party of power is to aggregate votes in favor of the current regime 
without limiting that regime’s freedom of action.  Consequently, parties of power assiduously 
avoid issuing policy programs, even in advance of elections.  They rely instead on vague appeals 
and their close association with the national leadership.  As a result, such parties are not interest-
based in the way that Western parties typically are; they do not emerge organically from the 
cleavages present in society.  They fail, therefore, to perform the functions that make parties vital 
to a healthy democracy.  They are poor channels for political communication from society to the 
state, and they do not check the executive’s freedom of maneuver.  The weak confidence 
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 mechanism in Russia provides fertile ground for parties of power to develop, while it prevents 
interest-based parties from gaining real influence.  Democratic performance in Russia suffers 
accordingly. 
In sum, this paper concludes that the State Duma is capable of challenging the executive 
and influencing individual policies in a way that the National Assembly cannot.  However, the 
Duma is most effective in this capacity when the opposition is in the majority.  The Duma’s 
weak power of no-confidence makes this unlikely, as it promotes parties of power at other 
parties’ expense.  The executive is therefore advantaged in the parliament without being 
connected to society by an interest-based political party.  Majorities in opposition to the 
executive are less likely to form.  This explanation accounts for the rise of United Russia and the 
diminution of virtually every interest-based party in Russia.  Interest-based parties will be 
beating against the wind so long as executive power remains inaccessible to them.  It also 
accounts for the central flaw in Russian democracy—an executive with few checks on its 
authority and few connections with the electorate. 
  
 
A. DEFINING DEMOCRACY 
 
 
In order to pursue this comparison, it is necessary to establish an adequate definition of 
democracy.  There are numerous competing definitions which emphasize different aspects of the 
democratic state.  Larry Diamond provides a definition that encompasses a variety of provisions 
that must be present for a political system to be fully democratic.  I will reprint Diamond’s full 
ten-point definition here. 
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 1. Control of the state and its key decisions and allocations lies, in fact as well as in 
constitutional theory, with elected officials (and not democratically unaccountable 
actors or foreign powers); in particular, the military is subordinate to the authority 
of elected officials. 
2. Executive power is constrained, constitutionally and in fact, by the autonomous 
power of other government institutions (such as an independent judiciary, 
parliament, and other mechanisms of horizontal accountability. 
3. Not only are electoral outcomes uncertain, with a significant opposition vote and 
the presumption of party alteration in government, but no group that adheres to 
constitutional principles is denied the right to form a party and contest elections 
(even if electoral thresholds and other rules exclude small parties from winning 
representations in parliament). 
4. Cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups (as well as historically 
disadvantaged majorities) are not prohibited (legally or in practice) from 
expressing their interests in the political process or from speaking their language 
or practicing their culture. 
5. Beyond parties and elections, citizens have multiple, ongoing channels for 
expression and representation of their interests and values, including diverse, 
independent associations and movements, which they have the freedom to form 
and join. 
6. There are alternative sources of information (including independent media) to 
which citizens have politically unfettered access. 
7. Individuals also have substantial freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, speech, 
publication, assembly, demonstration, and petition. 
8. Citizens are politically equal under the law (even though they are invariably 
unequal in their political resources). 
9. Individual and group liberties are effectively protected by an independent, 
nondiscriminatory judiciary whose decisions are enforced and respected by other 
centers of power. 
10. The rule of law protects citizens from unjustified detention, exile, terror, torture, 
and undue interference in their personal lives not only by the state but also by 
organized non-state or anti-state forces.1 
 
 Present-day Russia, if held up to the standard of these ten criteria, falls considerably short 
of a fully democratic state.  Executive power is very broad.  The outcome of the 2007 
parliamentary and 2008 presidential elections was never seriously in doubt, and the opposition 
has for the most part been tamed.  Ethnic, regional, religious, and occupational groups are 
prohibited from forming political parties.2  The hurdles for forming a political party in the first 
place are lofty and complex, while the threshold for gaining seats in parliament is an unusually 
high seven percent of the national vote.  While the print media remains relatively unfettered, and 
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 the internet is uncensored, the national television media toes the Kremlin line.  Justice can be 
arbitrary; corruption rampant.   
 The situation in France is of course quite different.  Political parties are easier to form, 
the media is freer, and the outcome of elections is uncertain.  The opposition has not been routed 
as it has in Russia.  The annual Freedom House reports on political and civil liberties in countries 
around the world provide another means of comparing democratic performance in the two 
countries.  While it is important to take Freedom House’s conclusions with the proverbial grain 
of salt, they are a useful guide to general democratic performance in a given country.  
 Freedom House releases a detailed examination of the level of freedom found in each 
country, accompanied by a rating between 1 and 7 in both political and civil liberties, with a 
score of 1 representing the best performance3.  Each state is also given an overall label ranging 
from ‘free’ to ‘not free.’  The Freedom House website states that the organization ranks states 
based on the availability of political and civil rights as detailed in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.4   According to Diamond, “The ‘free’ rating in the Freedom House survey is the 
best available empirical indicator of liberal democracy.”5  That said, we should not take the 
Freedom House survey as an absolute indicator of democratic performance.  Indeed, it seems to 
overstate the presence of anti-democratic developments in Russia.  Nevertheless, the survey finds 
a wide disparity between the democratic performance of France and Russia.   
 The Freedom House 2007 report on world freedom holds a fairly bleak opinion of civil 
and political liberty in Russia.  Russia rates a 5 in its protection of civil liberties and a 6 with 
regard to political rights, just one step shy of the worst-possible rank of 7.  Overall, Freedom 
House places the Russian political system in the ‘not free’ category, in the company of China, 
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 Libya, and Iran.  In fact, the 2006 report bluntly states that, “Russians cannot change their 
government democratically.”6  The report provides the following summary: 
During 2005, President Vladimir Putin took further steps toward the consolidation of 
executive authority by increasing pressure on the opposition and civil society, 
strengthening state control over the economy, and pursuing politically driven 
prosecutions of independent business leaders. The government introduced legislative 
changes making governors appointed rather than elected officials, as well as electoral 
system reforms making it almost impossible for parties outside the control of the Kremlin 
to enter the State Duma (lower house of parliament). New media legislation adopted in 
2005 further restricted freedom of speech.7 
 
It is misleading to suggest that ‘parties outside the control of the Kremlin’ cannot enter in the 
State Duma.  The Communist Party of the Russian Federation, while increasingly pliant, is not 
under the Kremlin’s control.  Furthermore, Freedom House reserves a political score of 6 for 
“military juntas, one-party dictatorships, religious hierarchies, or autocrats.”8  In fact Russia’s 
predecessor, the Soviet Union, received a political score of 6 as early as 1973, the height of the 
Brezhnev years.  To equate the current regime with the hegemony of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union is an exaggeration of the political consolidation that has occurred under Putin.  A 
score of 4 or 5 might be more appropriate, referring as they do to systems characterized by 
“unfair elections [or] one-party dominance.”9 
 The 2005 edition of the Freedom House report on transitional states, Countries at the 
Crossroads notes that “All persons in Russia are not treated equally before the law.  For 
example, Russian public officials suspected of crimes are not commonly prosecuted, although 
exceptions do exist.”  In contrast, there is the famous case of oil magnate Mikhail 
Khordorkovsky, who was arrested and convicted of tax evasion in October 2003.  According to 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Khordorkovsky’s arrest, and others: 
put into question the fairness, impartiality, and objectivity of the authorities [in 
Russia]…[T]he interests of the State’s action in these cases goes beyond the mere pursuit 
of criminal justice, to include such elements as to weaken an outspoken political 
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 opponent, to intimidate other wealthy individuals and to regain control of strategic 
assets.10 
 
That Khordorkovsky and others implicated in financial crimes may in fact be guilty is somewhat 
beside the point.  It is more important that law enforcement is often arbitrary and selective, 
sparing oligarchs loyal to the Kremlin while targeting those seen as oppositional.  Even jury 
decisions have been overturned when they ran contrary to the Kremlin’s wishes.11 
 France, by contrast, rates the best possible marks from Freedom House—1/1—in the 
company of countries like Great Britain, the United States, Norway, and Canada.  Freedom 
House notes that “[political] parties organize and compete on a free and fair basis,” and “the 
French media operate largely freely and represent a wide range of political opinion.”12  Though 
the degree of difference between democratic performance in France and Russia is open to 
discussion, the fact that a significant gulf exists is beyond debate.   
 In making my comparisons, I will emphasize two elements of a healthy democracy in 
particular.  A strong legislature, capable of challenging the executive and influencing policy on 
its own is an essential element of a democratic order.  The parliament must be able to exert a will 
that is independent of the executive, in order to not simply rubber-stamp executive proposals.  
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, there must be a strong and vibrant system of political 
parties.  Parties serve as channels for expression of people’s demands and as media for 
communication between state and society.13  A weak political party system divorces the rulers 
from the ruled, and reduces citizens’ ability to communicate their interests to the elite.  Both of 
these preconditions—strong parties and a strong legislature—provide horizontal accountability 
for the executive (and for each other), as well as enhancing the vertical connection between the 
state and voters. 
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B. SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM 
 
One final term that must be defined is ‘semi-presidentialism,’ the target set of institutions for this 
study.  As the name implies, semi-presidential systems attempt to strike a balance between the 
two basic forms of democratic government, that is, presidential and parliamentary systems.  
Maurice Duverger provides the classic definition. 
[A] political regime is considered as semi-presidential if the constitution which 
established it combines three elements: (1)  the president of the republic is elected by 
universal suffrage; (2)  he possesses quite considerable powers; (3)  he has opposite him, 
however, a prime minister and ministers who possess executive and governmental power 
and can stay in office only if the parliament does not show its opposition to them.14 
 
Here we have the essential elements of semi-presidentialism—a president whose electoral 
legitimacy is derived from the electorate at large and a prime minister who is dependent on 
parliament, with executive power split between them.  However, there is some ambiguity in 
Duverger’s second criterion.  What exactly constitutes “quite considerable powers?”  To answer 
this question, it is helpful to look at the two traditional archetypes of democratic governance, that 
is, pure presidential and parliamentary regimes.   
In a presidential regime, the executive is elected by the voters themselves, and is not at all 
responsible to the legislature.  In a parliamentary regime, the executive is chosen by the 
legislature, and can be made to fall by a vote of no-confidence.  In a properly semi-presidential 
regime, I argue, the government is responsible to both the legislature and the president—hence, 
semi-presidential.  In other words, the president must be able to dissolve the legislature and 
thereby cause the government to fall.  He must have the constitutional authority to do this on his 
own discretion, rather than on the advice of the prime minister.  Consequently I amend 
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 Duverger’s second criterion to read “he possesses quite considerable powers, chiefly, the right to 
dissolve the legislature to which the government is responsible.” 
 One characteristic that semi-presidential systems share with presidential systems but not 
parliamentary systems is the potential for divided government.  Unlike a presidential system, 
however, a majority in parliament that is in opposition to the president can create an ideological 
split in the dual executive.  The possibility of a no-confidence vote in the parliament gives the 
parliamentary majority some influence in the naming the prime minister, and creates the 
possibility of a divided executive.  Consequently, this situation is not referred to as simply 
divided government, but rather ‘cohabitation.’  This term indicates that not only are the executive 
and legislature divided, but the executive itself is split.  Such a phenomenon is unique to semi-
presidential states.  Cohabitation differs from coalition government in that coalitions are 
engineered to ensure majority support for the executive in the legislature.  During cohabitation, 
one part of the executive remains opposed to the parliamentary majority. 
 According to these definitions, both France and Russia qualify as semi-presidential states.  
In each state a popularly elected president shares power (to varying degrees) with a prime 
minister who is dependent on the parliament.  Therein lies the academic value of this 
comparison.  While Russia and France share very similar formal institutional structures, the 
democratic performance of the two countries varies widely.    What can account for this 
difference? 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
  
 
II. EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
 
 
A. THE CASE IN FRANCE 
 
 
We will now turn to an examination of the French dual executive.  The constitution stakes out 
areas where the president and prime minister may act independently, as well as an area of shared 
responsibility.  Additionally, each executive has a different source of democratic legitimacy.  
The combination of these factors—constitutional responsibility and electoral legitimacy—
determine where the balance of power is found between the two officials. 
 Most importantly, the constitution gives the prime minister a battery of provisions with 
which to control the parliament.  As a result, parliamentarians have little influence over 
individual policies.  Nevertheless, a strong vote of no-confidence ensures that the prime minister 
will be someone of the parliament’s choosing, making the composition of the National Assembly 
vitally important in national politics. 
 
 
 
1. Presidential Powers 
 
 
The discretionary powers of the president, those areas where the constitution empowers him to 
act without reference to the prime minister, are limited in number and scope.  In fact, the 
constitution defines only seven powers the president may utilize on his own authority alone.  
They are a) the appointment of the prime minister (Article 8), b) dissolution of the National 
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 Assembly (Article 12), c) the right to chair the Council of Ministers (Article 9), d) the right to 
have a message read in parliament (Article 18), e) the right to ask the Constitutional Council to 
consider the constitutionality of a bill (Article 61), f) the appointment of three members of the 
Constitutional Council, one of whom is the president of that body (Article 56), and g) the 
assumption of emergency powers (Article 16).  Additionally, the president has the power to 
resign and thereby provoke a new presidential election (Article 7). 
Most strikingly, Article 16 of the constitution empowers the president to assume full 
emergency powers when the republic faces a “serious and immediate threat.”  While this 
provision has been used only once, it remains controversial.  April of 1961 saw an attempted 
coup in Algeria, a French colony heading toward independence, by factions of the military 
opposed to the process of decolonization.  In response, the Fifth Republic’s first president, 
Charles de Gaulle, assumed emergency powers under Article 16.  While the rebellion lasted only 
a few days, de Gaulle did not relinquish his decree powers for a full five months.  The prolonged 
and unjustified use of Article 16 by a president who lacked de Gaulle’s personal authority would 
probably provoke some sort of constitutional crisis.  However, that the provision makes the 
president the sole judge of what constitutes a dire emergency, and provides no legal recourse for 
the termination of emergency presidential rule, is troubling. 
 While these powers can be exercised unilaterally, very few of them are decisive.  Instead, 
they pass an issue on to another set of authorities, who then make the final decision.  The 
appointment of the prime minister must be confirmed by the National Assembly.  Referring a bill 
to the Constitutional Council places the matter in question before the nine judges of that body.  
Dissolving the Assembly puts the matter in the hands of the voters.  In all of these cases, the final 
decision-making power lies beyond the presidency.  The constitution envisions the president as a 
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 referee between the other organs of government, a sort of governmental traffic cop who is above 
the political fray.   
 The situation is predictably different, however, if the president has the support of a 
parliamentary majority or a majority of the voters.  Under these conditions the power of 
appointment becomes much more important from the president’s perspective.  Indeed, 
Successive Presidents have been able to use Article 8 to appoint loyal and indeed 
sometimes deferential Prime Ministers.  Notable examples in this regard include de 
Gaulle’s appointment of Pompidou and Couve de Murville, Pompidou’s appointment of 
Messmer, Mitterrand’s appointment of Cresson and Bérégovoy, and Chirac’s 
appointment Juppé and Raffarin.15   
Such examples indicate that when backed by a loyal majority in the Assembly, the president can 
become the dominant force in the French political arena, appointing a loyal prime minister and 
controlling the course of national policy.  Yet there is no constitutional guarantee of this 
preeminence.  Much of the president’s power rests on shifting political conditions. 
 
 
2. Powers of the Prime Minister 
 
The powers of the prime minister are somewhat more expansive than the president’s, as 
envisioned by the constitution.  The premier is charged with directing the operation of the 
government, which is responsible for determining and conducting national policy (Articles 21 
and 20).  The constitution puts both the armed forces and the civil service at the government’s 
disposal (Article 20).  The prime minister and cabinet are responsible for dealing with parliament 
(notably Articles 37-39, 41, 43-45, and 47-50).  The prime minister may issue decrees 
concerning subjects outside of parliament’s jurisdiction, which have the force of law (Article 
21). 
 The constitution of the Fifth Republic, interestingly, limits parliament’s legal domain 
(Article 34).  Unlike traditional parliaments, which can legislate on any subject without 
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 limitation, the French constitution sets down in fourteen bullet points the subjects on which the 
parliament may deliberate.  While these fourteen points encompass taxation, social services, the 
criminal code, labor relations, property ownership, and other typical subjects of legislation, 
excluding some subjects from parliament’s authority is a striking step away from parliamentary 
sovereignty.  Those subjects which fall outside of parliament’s jurisdiction are subject to the 
decree power of the prime minister.  This arrangement allows the government to quickly pass 
laws without debate in the legislature.  So while parliament passes approximately 70 laws each 
year, the prime minister issues around 8,000-9,000 interministerial decrees16.  As such, the office 
of the prime minister is closely involved with the day-to-day governance of the nation. 
 Only the prime minister and members of parliament themselves have the right to 
introduce legislation in parliament (Article 39).  Neither the president nor the individual 
ministers have this right, although government bills must be discussed in the Council of 
Ministers prior to their introduction.  Consequently the president is almost entirely excluded 
from the legislative process, at least formally.  He has no power to introduce legislation and no 
power to veto enacted bills.  He may only delay the passage of a bill, by asking parliament to 
reconsider it (Article 10), withholding his signature for fifteen days (Article 10), or referring the 
bill to the Constitutional Council.  These are all ultimately only delaying tactics, and indicate 
how little influence the president has over legislation during a period of cohabitation, when the 
parliamentary majority is opposed to him.  The situation is quite different, however, if the 
president has the backing of a majority in the Assembly.  In this case, the president will be able 
to use his power of appointment to install a loyal prime minister, sealing the rupture between 
president and parliament.  The president may broadcast legislative proposals to the parliament 
through the prime minister, and can use his influence to kill bills he finds unacceptable. 
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  Articles 43, 44, and 45 allow the government to steer legislation through the houses of 
parliament with relative ease.  The government is responsible for directing bills to the 
appropriate committees, and is given the power of amendment and the power to table discussion 
and call for a vote on a particular bill.  The government is also responsible for resolving disputes 
between the upper and lower houses of parliament.  It is the prime minister’s prerogative to form 
joint committees of the two houses in order to reach a compromise, and this prerogative is 
exercised at his sole discretion.  If, even after calling for a joint committee, the issue proves 
intractable, the prime minister may direct the National Assembly to make the final decision at the 
expense of the Senate.  The prime minister may also skip the joint committee phase by declaring 
a bill urgent, referring it immediately to the National Assembly.  Given that the prime minister 
enjoys by definition the support of the National Assembly, it is likely that the version of the bill 
most favorable to the government will emerge from that body.  Article 47 grants the government 
the power to pass financial and budgetary acts by decree, if the parliament cannot reach a 
decision by a specified time.  Article 48 gives precedence on the parliamentary agenda to 
government bills and members’ bills supported by the government.  The Assembly cannot refuse 
to consider government bills, and private lawmakers will find their bills farther down on the 
docket.  Lastly, Article 49 permits the prime minister to make the passage of a bill “an issue of 
the Government’s responsibility before the National Assembly.”  This provision will be 
discussed in detail in Section 7 of this chapter.   
 The end result of all these provisions is that, while the government remains responsible to 
the Assembly and vulnerable to censure, the government (headed by the prime minister) is in 
firm control of the legislative process.  It can initiate legislation, and directs the operation of 
committees.  It can determine which amendments succeed, and which fail.  It controls the pace of 
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 debate and keeps a firm grip on the agenda.  “In fact,” Elgie writes, “in the absence of an 
opposition majority, the government can pass any bill that it wants in whatever form it wants.”17  
The government’s many advantages diminish the space available for parliamentarians to 
negotiate with the executive.  Since the parliament does not control its own agenda, it cannot 
hold up the passage of important bills in order to gain concessions.  Even the budget can be 
passed by decree if parliament delays too long.  The government can pick and choose which 
amendments to accept and can, if necessary, force the passage of legislation without taking a 
vote in the parliament.  The legislative process is dominated, as a result, by the executive.    
 
 
3. Shared Powers 
 
 
Additionally, there are areas where the constitution obliges the prime minister and president to 
share power.  In some areas, notably foreign policy and defense, the president has emerged as the 
dominant figure.  While the constitution places the armed forces at the disposal of the 
government, it also names the president as commander-in-chief (Article 15), proclaims him the 
guarantor of national independence and territorial integrity (Article 5), and places him at the 
head of “the higher national defense councils” (Article 15).  A 1962 decree further reinforces the 
president’s authority over defense policy, by making the president “responsible for ‘the conduct 
of operations’ in the event of war.”18  While this decree is not part of the constitution, and could 
be revoked, a precedent for presidential leadership in matters of defense is well-established. 
 Presidents have also been assertive in the area of foreign policy.  The constitution states 
that “The President shall negotiate and ratify treaties” (Article 51).  However, any treaty which 
concerns a subject under parliament’s normal legislative domain can only be approved by an act 
of parliament (Article 53).  Considering the prime minister’s intimate involvement with the 
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 legislative process, any parliamentary ratification would have to first meet with ministerial 
approval.  Nevertheless, owing to their direct election by the nation as a whole, each president 
has claimed the right to speak as the voice of France in the international arena.19  Even during 
unified government, when president and prime minister hail from the same party, the ministers 
have had little input in the determination of foreign policy, playing only “bit parts.”20  During 
cohabitation, the government may have some delaying power over the ratification of treaties. But 
it is a constitutional reality that in foreign policy the president acts and the ministers react. 
 While defense and foreign policy are largely controlled by the president, there are times 
when presidential decisions are subject to veto by the prime minister, and vice versa.  This 
mutual veto increases the likelihood of friction and government gridlock, but also obliges the 
two executives to work more closely together, and encourages negotiation and compromise.  For 
example, the president is empowered to call national referendums, but only on the proposal of 
the prime minister or a joint resolution of the houses of parliament (Article 11).  Both players, 
then, have an effective veto over a proposed referendum.  The president may decline to formalize 
a referendum proposed by the prime minister, and the prime minister may refuse to propose a 
referendum desired by the president.  The appointment of the various ministers is another area of 
shared responsibility.  It is the president who appoints and dismisses the government ministers, 
but only on the proposal of the prime minister himself (Article 8).  So again there is room for 
negotiation.  Furthermore, some decisions of the prime minister must first be discussed in the 
Council of Minister, which the president chairs, before taking effect.  This includes all 
government bills before they are sent to the legislature.  The president, by virtue of his right to 
set the agenda of the Council, holds some administrative power over government business. 
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 4. Presidential Strength and Shifting Majorities 
 
 
So far this examination does not explain how, in David Bell’s words, “the President became one 
of the most powerful Western executives (more so, in fact, than the President of the United 
States).”21  The powers and responsibilities that we have now surveyed weigh heavily in the 
prime minister’s favor.  In a literal reading of the constitution, the prime minister directs the 
operation of the government, which determines the policy of the nation, while the responsibilities 
of the president are mostly that of a political policeman, directing policy proposals from one 
authority to another.  Yet the president has consistently been at the forefront of politics and 
policy-making.  How has this come to be? 
The secret to the riddle is the direct election of the president, established by referendum 
in October 1962.  Prior to this reform, the constitution stipulated that the president be chosen by 
an electoral college made up of parliamentarians and local notables.  After the referendum of 
1962, which was passed by 62 percent of voters, the president has been elected by direct and 
universal suffrage.  The effect of this change on the institution of the presidency cannot be 
underestimated.  It is this direct election which erects the second tier in the political system, after 
parliamentary elections, and makes the president democratically legitimate in his own right.  It 
gives him a mandate to govern that is entirely separate from that of parliament.  As the only 
single individual elected to office by the nation as a whole, he boasts democratic credentials no 
other official can match.  Due to French electoral law, any presidential candidate must win at 
least fifty percent of the vote to win office.  This transforms the president’s campaign promises 
into the leading political agenda in the country, and turns the president into a coalition-builder 
who must reach beyond his own political base.  As such, he becomes a truly national figure in a 
way that the prime minister cannot equal.  So, while the president’s constitutional power is 
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 somewhat limited, his constitutional authority is very broad.  It is the president, after all, who 
appoints the prime minister and dissolves the National Assembly.  His is the highest office in the 
land, and the national character of presidential campaigns only confirm this.  Ezra Suleiman 
writes that “The activity, strategy, and ambitions of parties and politicians are all directed toward 
presidential elections.”22  Furthermore, the prime minister is always liable to eviction from office 
by a vote of censure from the Assembly, dismissal by the president, or the dissolution of the 
Assembly.  The president, once elected, is secure for a five-year (formerly seven-year) term.  As 
a figure whose electoral program garnered the endorsement of more than half of the electorate, 
and whose legitimacy is enduring over a long period of time, a newly-elected president is the 
driving force in French politics.  The government of the day must treat the president’s campaign 
platform as the nation’s business, approved by the majority.  French presidents are quick to 
capitalize on this momentum.  President Mitterrand went so far as to dissolve conservative 
Assemblies, hoping (correctly) that his own victory would usher in a more supportive, left-
leaning majority.  The combination of the president’s constitutional majesty and national 
democratic legitimacy make him potentially the most powerful figure in French politics. 
 
5. Cohabitation 
 
 
For most of the Fifth Republic’s history, there have been two fundamental political possibilities.  
Either the majority in the National Assembly supports the president, or it does not.  If it does, the 
entire political edifice comes into alignment, with the president at its apex.  The president may 
appoint a loyal prime minister, and through him, exercise power over parliament.  If it does not, 
the president must contend with an empowered and independent prime minister.  Losing the 
Assembly is a political disaster for any president.  It indicates that the policy program of the 
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 opposition has been endorsed by the electorate, and gives the prime minister free reign to oppose 
the president and enact his own policies.  Parliament is sealed off from the president’s influence, 
and the president’s ability to control domestic policy is erased.  Foreign policy and defense 
remain his prerogative, but a president without the support of the Assembly is a president 
severely hobbled.   
Backed by the newly-elected majority, the prime minister becomes the leading political 
figure during cohabitation.  It is his responsibility to turn the new majority’s campaign promises 
into law, and it his political future that is staked on their success.  Liberated from presidential 
influence, the prime minister is in control of parliament, thanks to his constitutional privileges.  
The power to set the agenda passes to the prime minister, while the president is largely sidelined.  
During cohabitation, “there is no doubt that Prime Ministers have exercised policy leadership,” 
while presidents “have been relatively powerless.”23   
This interplay of shifting electoral majorities is aptly demonstrated by the period 1981-
1986, which saw the left in the majority for the first time in the Republic’s history, and 1986-
1988, during which time the right recaptured the parliament and ushered in the first period of 
cohabitation.  Following his election in 1981, President Mitterrand immediately dissolved the 
Assembly.  The subsequent election returned an outright majority for Mitterrand’s Socialist Party 
(285 seats out of 490), and allowed Mitterrand to select a socialist prime minister.  With the 
presidential and parliamentary majorities in alignment, the president “dominated the government, 
and through the government and the party he dominated the parliament.”24  Thus enthroned, 
Mitterrand and his supporters began to enact an extensive social reform package.  One major 
element of this socialist reformation was a series of nationalizations, including five major 
industrial concerns, two financial companies, thirty-six banks, and numerous smaller ventures.  It 
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 has been calculated that this nationalization program increased the size of the public sector from 
ten percent of French industrial capacity to twenty-five percent.  Other reforms included the 
extension of paid holidays, and the implementation of a wealth-tax aimed at the wealthiest 
citizens.  The Mitterrand government also abolished the death penalty, devolved more authority 
to the localities, granted amnesty of 130,000 illegal immigrants, and increased the minimum 
wage. 25  The extent of these reforms, particularly the nationalization effort, indicates the 
sweeping power available to a president who has the backing of the Assembly.   
The only check on presidential power in this circumstance is a significant show of 
popular opposition to the president’s policies, and the associated fear of losing the next election.  
Mitterrand’s presidency faced just such a display when the conservative opposition, lead by 
Jacques Chirac, pounced on Mitterrand’s proposed education reform in 1984.  The Savary Bill, 
named after education minister Alain Savary, would have brought France’s Catholic schools 
under the authority of the Ministry of Education.  A crowd one million strong gathered in the 
streets of Paris to protest a policy that conservatives had labeled an attack on choice in education.  
The bill was quickly scuttled, and Mitterrand was forced to accept the resignation of both his 
prime minister and minister of education.26 
The euphoria surrounding Mitterrand’s election had fully ebbed by the parliamentary 
elections of 1986, and a conservative coalition emerged with control of the Assembly.  The new 
government, headed by Chirac, practically reversed the policies enacted by the Socialists five 
years earlier.  Under Chirac, sixty-five state-held companies were put on auction, including one 
national television channel, an arms and electronics manufacturer, and several banks.27  That the 
policies of the government of the day, backed by their legislative majority, could run so counter 
to the policies of a president still in office help to demonstrate how effective is the prime 
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 minister during cohabitation, and how isolated is the president.  Mitterrand, Atkin writes, 
“recognized that the voters had spoken,” and adapted himself to a more limited role by asserting 
his rights in the reserve domain of defense and foreign policy, actively criticizing the Chirac 
government, and applying presidential leverage to negotiate the composition of the cabinet and 
to secure political patronage.28  Mitterrand’s astute reading of the new political situation played 
well with the voters, who returned him for a second term in 1988.  Five days later, the president 
dissolved the Assembly.  The Socialists won in the elections that followed, bringing the first 
period of cohabitation to an end. 
The experience of the 1980s demonstrates the key features of the French model.  When 
backed by a loyal majority in the Assembly, President Mitterrand was able to exert tremendous 
influence on the system and enact wide-ranging policies.  However, when Mitterrand lost the 
Assembly to the conservatives, policy-making initiative passed to that new majority headed by a 
conservative prime minister.  The policy actions of the Chirac government were similar in scale 
to Mitterrand’s, indicating that the ability of the two executives to realize their political will 
when supported by the Assembly is roughly equal.  Nevertheless, Mitterrand remained in office, 
still able to act independently in the reserve domain and to serve as a rallying point for the 
opposition.  He was quick to seize on political opportunity to bring the Assembly back in line 
following his own reelection. 
 
6. Presidential Control during Unified Government 
 
 
As previously noted, when the president has a legislative majority, he is able to install a loyal 
prime minister and control the parliament.  But why do parliaments submit to this kind of 
treatment?  After all, presidents and parliaments are elected by different constituencies and 
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 represent different interests.  Inter-branch competition of the kind seen in the United States is not 
unimaginable.  What forestalls parliamentary mutinies?  Why do parliaments not clamor for 
more independence—in particular, why do they not insist on prime ministers less deferential to 
the president?  A political answer is most relevant.  Successively denying the president’s 
appointee to the premiership exposes a rift between the president and the rank and file of his 
party or coalition.  The political opposition would be quick to pounce on this rift and exploit it to 
their advantage.  Ultimately, the parliament would be faced with either accepting the president’s 
nominee or submitting to dissolution.  Dissolution, as ever, carries with it the threat of the 
majority party losing its dominance in the legislature.  If conservative parliamentarians are 
forced to choose between serving under a conservative president or a socialist prime minister, it 
should surprise no one if they choose the former.  This acts to prevent parliamentary rebellions, 
by pinning the majority’s political future to the president’s political successes 
Indeed, in all the Fifth Republic’s history, the National Assembly has passed a motion of 
no-confidence in the government exactly one time.  In response to de Gaulle’s proposed 
referendum establishing the direct election of the president, the National Assembly passed a vote 
of censure against the Pompidou government.  De Gaulle, in a move that probably contradicts 
the spirit of the constitution, dissolved the legislature and asked Pompidou to remain in office.  
The president stipulated that the new round of parliamentary elections would occur after the 
referendum.  De Gaulle’s referendum was passed by a sizeable majority (62 percent), somewhat 
marred by a low turnout (42 percent of the electorate), and his party, the UNR, won control of 
the Assembly in the following elections.  De Gaulle duly reappointed Pompidou prime 
minister.29  The one and only vote of censure in the Republic’s history is not a very auspicious 
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 episode for the institution of the National Assembly.  Pompidou remained in office, the 
Assembly was dissolved, and new elections returned a pro-presidential majority. 
In addition, presidents have extrapolated from the constitution the authority to dismiss the 
prime minister, leaving aside that the text of the constitution itself provides no means of 
removing a premier from office other than the legislative vote of censure.  President de Gaulle, 
whose extra-constitutional authority allowed him to inaugurate such a practice, went so far as to 
demand undated letters of resignation from his nominees to the premiership.30  De Gaulle was 
clear in his memoirs that, constitution aside, “when one is a minister, it is to de Gaulle and to him 
alone that he is responsible.”31  Presidents of lesser stature have followed the General’s spirit, 
but have instead relied on their political primacy, outside of cohabitation, and merely requested 
their prime ministers to resign.  Seven premiers (Debré, Pompidou, Chaban-Delmas, Mauroy, 
Rocard, Cresson, and Raffarin) have been thus removed from office. 
 
 
7. Government and Parliament 
 
   
Any analysis of the French legislature must contend with two facts.  First, governments have 
been extraordinarily successful in passing legislation.  According to Elgie, “It is virtually 
unknown for majority deputies to defeat government legislation.”32  During the Socialist 
majority of 1981-86, the government won 99.2 percent of votes in the Assembly and passed 100 
percent of its legislation 33.  Secondly, it must be noted that the Assembly has brought down only 
one sitting government in the entire history of the Fifth Republic.  From these premises it is easy 
to deduce that governments, once approved, can be assured of support in the Assembly.  
However, the source of this legislative obedience is as much political as it is institutional.  I will 
deal with the institutional aspect first. 
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 A variety of provisions curb the power of the individual deputies to the government’s 
advantage.  Bills and amendments proposed by members of parliament are inadmissible if they 
would result in either an increase in government expenditures or a decrease in revenue (Article 
40).  As a result, only the government participates in budgetary decisions, with the deputies 
themselves voting either yes or no on a package they cannot amend without the government’s 
consent.  Deputies’ amendments in general must first be approved by one of the Assembly’s 
committees before being discussed on the floor (Article 44).  In addition, the constitution gives 
automatic precedence to the government’s bills at the expense of those of private members, 
meaning the parliament cannot delay or avoid considering the government’s proposals (Article 
48).  And of course, members’ amendments must fall within parliament’s legal jurisdiction, and 
not in the government’s domain of regulation (Articles 34 and 41).   
Finally there are the government’s two most powerful weapons—the vote bloque and the 
so-called ‘guillotine,’ a poetic reference to Article 49 of the constitution.  The vote bloque, or 
package vote, allows the government to call for a single vote “on all or part of the text under 
discussion, on the sole basis of the amendments proposed or accepted by the Government” 
(Article 44).  This provision allows the government to nullify amendments it objects to, even if 
they have made it past the other procedural hurdles present in the Assembly.   
The 1986 Chirac government, whose majority was wafer-thin, used the package vote 43 
times during its two years in power.  The previous Socialist government, in power for five years 
and with a larger majority, used the provision only three times.  Before that, the government of 
Raymond Barre (whose party was the ‘minority of the majority’) used the package vote eighteen 
times. 34  The package vote allows more vulnerable governments to successfully steer their bills 
through a less hospitable Assembly, safeguarding it from unwanted amendments.  This 
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 highlights the parliament’s inability to influence individual policies, even under a minority 
government.   
The government’s last and most potent weapon, Article 49, empowers the government to 
make the passage of a bill an issue of the government’s responsibility to the National Assembly.  
In this case, a bill is considered passed unless a motion of censure is signed by at least ten 
percent of deputies, and approved by a majority of the Assembly, within 24 hours.  By making 
use of this article, the government can pass a bill into law without it ever being voted on by the 
Assembly, so long as a majority cannot form in favor of dismissing the government.  Article 49 
can be used to circumvent debate, avoid potentially embarrassing (for the government) votes, 
and to pass legislation that might not command the support of the full house.  Even governments 
with comfortable majorities have resorted to Article 49 to pass controversial bills35 or to speed 
up legislation.36  Article 49 was most frequently invoked, however, in the period 1988-1993, 
years when the sitting governments did not enjoy the support of a full majority in parliament.  In 
fact, Article 49 was used no fewer than 39 times in this period, more than in the previous thirty 
years put together.37  During this time, motions of censure were successfully tabled only fourteen 
times, and of those, none were passed by the full Assembly.   
It is clear, then, that Article 49 helps to keep minority governments in office, and can 
bring about the passage of legislation that would not ordinarily garner the support of a full 
majority.  Yet there is something counterintuitive about this conclusion.  Why would minority 
governments, already vulnerable, invite censure upon themselves?  The answer has less to do 
with the institution of Article 49 than with normal party politics.  The minority governments of 
1988-1993 survived because a diverse parliamentary majority comprised of such unusual fellow-
travelers as communists, centrists, and the right failed to coalesce against the socialist 
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 government.  In 1989, for example, Prime Minister Rocard deployed Article 49 to pass the 
annual budget, to which both the communists and centrists were opposed, secure in the 
knowledge that the communists would not join the right in bringing down a left-leaning 
government.  Article 49 served in this period not as a survival tactic, but rather as a means to 
pass legislation in the absence of a legislative majority.  A disciplined majority can dismiss a 
government at any time, despite the government’s legislative arsenal.  A fractious majority, 
though opposed to the government’s program, may be unable to coalesce around a motion of 
censure.  What is remarkable in the French parliament is not that minority governments can 
survive, but that they can legislate so effectively. 
This point illustrates the political nature of the government-parliament relationship.  The 
distinction between government and parliament obscures another, perhaps more important 
distinction, that of majority and opposition.  The majority is composed of the government and its 
supporters in the legislature, with parliamentary deputies opposed to the government constituting 
the opposition.  The government wishes to remain in office and enact its policies, while the 
opposition hopes to defeat the opposition in the next election.  Each side seeks to maximize 
political gain.  As a result, there is little incentive for the majority to include the opposition in 
policy-making.  Not only is each side liable to disagree on basic issues, but the opposition is sure 
to attempt to create political capital out of any influence it might have over policy.  By the same 
token, the majority is little inclined to allow the opposition any oversight of the government, as 
the opposition will only be too happy to point out mistakes in order to discredit the majority.  
Along with the constitutional provisions that protect the government, this parliamentary game 
helps explain why governments have been so successful and so secure.  Majority deputies are 
inclined to defend the government in the interest of their own political future. 
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8. Amendment and Oversight 
 
Since the institutions of the Fifth Republic give the government a firm hand at the legislative 
rudder, deputies’ influence on legislation is modest.  During the period of 1958-1988, private 
members’ bills (that is, bills not originating from the government) made up an average 16 
percent of final legislation.38  Private bills originating from within the majority are far more 
likely to succeed than bills originating in the opposition.  From 1978-1981, only four opposition 
bills were passed by the Assembly.  Similarly, only two were passed from 1986-1988 (plus one 
from the far-right National Front).  In both cases, conservative majorities prevented the passage 
of private bills proposed by leftist deputies.  Conservative deputies had remarkable success in 
passing private bills during the Socialist government of 1981-1986.  They were able to pass 
eighteen private bills, eclipsing the Socialists’ thirteen, and the Communists’ six.  In all cases, 
however, private bills accounted for a small share of total legislation:  16% of all laws from 
1978-1981, only 9% from 1981-1986, and a record high 24% from 1986-1988.39  
As far as the passage of amendments is concerned, those originating from within the 
parliamentary majority are heavily favored.  Seventy-five percent of amendments proposed by 
the standing committees of parliament, which have pro-government majorities, are passed into 
law.  During the Socialist government of 1981-86, amendments proposed by Socialist deputies 
were adopted 61% of the time.  Meanwhile, the center-right saw only four percent of its 
amendments passed into law.  The Chirac government (1986-88), which made frequent use of 
the package vote and Article 49, passed into law only 21% of its own backers’ amendments, and 
only three percent of Socialist amendments.40  This demonstrates how effectively the 
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 government can protect its bills from amendment, even though the majority party usually does 
wield some influence in crafting legislation. 
Forgetting success rates entirely for a moment, the sheer number of proposed 
amendments shows that majority and opposition lawmakers alike take their parliamentary 
responsibilities quite seriously.  From 1981 to 1986, a staggering 34,932 amendments were 
proposed by the committees and deputies from all parties.  The Senate, which can be overridden 
by the National Assembly, produced a further 25,000 amendments.41  This demonstrates that the 
Assembly actively reviews, amends, and in some cases even successfully proposes legislation on 
its own, rather than blindly approving the government’s proposals.  That the majority passes its 
legislation more frequently than the opposition should not be troubling to democrats.  What is 
somewhat troubling, however, is that the government’s procedural tools allow it to pass 
legislation without an affirmative vote by a majority of the Assembly. 
The aging of the Fifth Republic has seen a resurgence in the parliament’s institutional 
strength.  While a variety of small reforms have contributed to this resurgence, it is chiefly due to 
a 1974 reform initiated by President Giscard, allowing any sixty deputies or senators to refer a 
proposed law to the Constitutional Council.  Prior to 1974, the Council comported itself as “a 
self-effacing guard dog of the executive and its prerogatives,” ensuring that the parliament never 
overstepped its bounds.42  From 1959 to 1974, the right to refer bills to the Council was limited 
to the president, the prime minister, and the presidents of the two assemblies—in other words, 
the majority.  Consequently during that period only 9 laws were referred to the Council, and only 
once did the Council rule against the executive.43  The 1974 reform opened the Council to 
opposition deputies in the legislature, and as a result the number of bills referred surged.  By 
1981, 45 bills had been referred to the Council by the parliament.  During Mitterrand’s first term, 
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 another ninety-two laws were sent to the Council, forty-nine of which were at least partially 
annulled.44  The 1974 reform provides an important tool for the opposition to challenge the 
majority, and to help frame the debate.  The opposition’s right to refer draft laws to the Council 
leads to self-restraint on the part of the executive, which hopes to minimize referrals and avoid 
annulments.   
Other institutional reforms have increased the parliament’s powers of oversight.  The 
procedures for ‘questions to the government,’ weekly confrontations between the ministers and 
the deputies, have been modified for increased transparency and spontaneity.  The committees of 
the National Assembly have received the right to monitor the implementation of legislation and 
to hold public hearings with the relevant ministers.  Committees of inquiry, ad hoc committees 
established to investigate a particular issue, now sit for six months instead of four.  A 1995 
reform reserves one day per month for parliamentary business, rather than the government’s, 
allowing opposition deputies to circumvent the government’s priority on the agenda.  While 
much of these sittings are dominated by majority deputies, the reform cleared the way for the 
passage of twenty bills in its first two years.  Additionally, 1995 saw parliament’s two three-
month sessions replaced by a single nine-month period, limiting the amount of time per year the 
government operates without immediate oversight.45  These reforms, particularly the ability to 
refer bills to the Council, have given the legislature a much-needed boost as an agent of 
accountability. 
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 9. The French Case in Sum 
 
 
The French system, like the American system, is one of dual majorities elected by different 
constituencies.  One majority is represented by the presidency, and the other by the legislature.  
However, in France both institutions have access to executive power.  The most important facts 
of the system are:  that the president, once elected, cannot be removed from office before his 
term expires; that the president cannot override a determined legislative majority when 
appointing the prime minister; and that the president can dissolve the National Assembly.  This 
means that the president is unassailable in a way that the government and Assembly are not, and 
that he potentially occupies the most politically powerful space in the system.  Nevertheless it is 
the National Assembly that has the final say over who sits in the prime minister’s office, and as a 
result the two majorities do not always coincide. 
When the Assembly backs the president, the two majorities are in alignment.  Here the 
president will be the dominant figure because of his constitutional prerogatives (appointment and 
dissolution), his political strength (directly elected by the nation at large), and the august nature 
of his office (the guarantor of national integrity).  The power of the government to direct 
legislation will serve to put the parliament under the thumb of the president, since the prime 
minister is the president’s man.  The united majority will carry out its program for a full five 
years until the next election.  But during cohabitation, preeminence will pass to the legislative 
majority and policy direction will be the province of the prime minister.  The electoral success of 
the legislative majority will be portrayed as a mandate to enact its own policies and as a 
repudiation of the president.  With the support of the majority in the legislature, the government 
will be able to enact those policies relatively unhindered, while the president will be cut off from 
the legislative process.  Yet the president will remain an independent power center, influential in 
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 foreign and defense affairs, and the central figure in the opposition to the new majority.  The 
prominence of his office will allow him to criticize the government of the day in a very public 
way.  And, the president will vigilantly observe public opinion, ready to dissolve the Assembly 
should the government proceed too aggressively or its programs founder. 
The institutions of the Fifth Republic, therefore, establish an elaborate, oscillating system 
that moderates periods of unbridled majoritarianism with periods of divided goverment.  If a 
single majority captures both the presidency and the Assembly, that majority can enact its 
policies almost without hindrance.  There is little opportunity for the opposition to influence 
policy in the legislature, and almost no opportunity in the executive.  This sort of runaway 
majoritarianism is not inherently undemocratic, but it does offer little incentive for consensus-
building and negotiation across party lines.  Periods of cohabitation provide opportunities for 
negotiation without unduly hamstringing the majority in power.  When presidential and 
legislative majorities are split, the government can enact the policies newly endorsed by the 
voters.  Yet the president remains in power, able to delay the government somewhat, but, more 
importantly, ready to create and exploit political opportunities.  In this way, cohabitation 
provides extra avenues of horizontal accountability. 
That same referendum which approved the five-year presidential term may also spell the 
end of French cohabitation, at least temporarily.  Previously, presidential and parliamentary 
terms had been staggered—seven years for presidents, and five years for parliaments (if they 
lasted that long).  The uneven terms created a situation where parliaments would come up for 
election two or four years into a president’s term—enough time for that president’s policies to 
become unpopular, to the opposition’s benefit.  This provided fertile ground for cohabitation to 
occur.  Now, with the reduced presidential term, presidential and parliamentary terms have been 
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 more or less synchronized, much reducing the possibility for cohabitation.  How many voters, 
after all, will cast votes for a conservative president and a socialist parliament within the space of 
a few days?  France is likely to be on a more majoritarian track for the foreseeable future, as 
presidents are all but assured of a like-minded parliament.  Unified majorities, which the 
synchronization of terms will produce regularly, do create a monarchical presidency which can 
all but shut out the parliamentary opposition.  The only real check on the president’s policy-
making power is the voters at the next presidential election—five years away.  Of course, should 
a president die in office, resign, or dissolve parliament early, the two terms will again become 
staggered. 
 The French parliament has serious weaknesses in its relationship with the executive.  The 
Assembly is hobbled by a battery of imaginative provisions, enshrined in the constitution itself, 
which advantage the executive throughout the legislative process.  The government can 
determine the final shape of a bill, by using the package vote to disregard any objectionable 
amendments.  It can pass the budget by decree, if the Assembly does not pass it within seventy 
days.  It can shut out the Senate, by declaring a bill urgent.  It can pass legislation without an 
affirmative vote, by making the bill an issue of confidence.  And, it can shut out opposition bills 
by refusing them a place on the agenda.  Deputies are not even permitted to propose legislation 
that would involve public expenditures.  In two cases*, the government passed the entire federal 
budget as an issue of responsibility, meaning that deputies had no opportunity to vote up or down 
on a document they had no authority to propose or even to amend—a document which, it is 
worth pointing out, defined the structure and priorities of the national government for the year to 
come.   
                                                 
* Barre’s budget in 1979, and Rocard’s in 1989. 
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 Deputies have little influence over particular policies since the government can draft a 
proposal, shield it from amendment, and pass it as a law without a vote in the Assembly.  Of 
course, governments do not always behave this way.  However, even a supportive majority in the 
Assembly will be more pliant in negotiation with the executive, knowing that the government 
has the power to shape and pass a law without parliamentary input.  Nevertheless the National 
Assembly has great influence over the broad, strategic orientation of national policy.  The 
Assembly is therefore crucially important to any president, who cannot govern without a 
supportive majority there.  This has important implications for the party system, which will be 
discussed in Chapter IV. 
 
 
 
 
B.  THE RUSSIAN CASE 
 
 
While the Russian constitution is often said to establish an over-powerful executive (the term 
‘superpresidential’ has been suggested), such a characterization overlooks important subtleties in 
the Russian political system.  The much-criticized State Duma, Russia’s lower house of 
parliament, shows surprising institutional resilience, despite sharing power with a 
constitutionally powerful executive.  Unlike the French National Assembly, where the agenda is 
set by the government as per the constitution and standing committees are limited to six, the 
State Duma has the authority to set its own rules, determine its own agenda, and name its own 
committees.  The Duma is therefore more capable than the National Assembly of determining 
which legislation to pass and which legislation to reject.  As a result, it is better able to influence 
national policy making between elections, which makes it a more effective check on executive 
control of the system. 
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1. The President 
 
 
In describing the role of the president, the language of the constitution is quite clear.  The 
president is explicitly called “the Head of State,” and “the guarantor of the Constitution;” he is 
called upon to “adopt measures to protect the sovereignty of the Russian Federation…and [to] 
ensure the coordinated functioning and interaction of State government bodies,” and he is 
empowered to “determine the basic objectives of the internal and foreign policy of the State” 
(Article 80).  Already the authority of the president and the boundaries of political power are 
much clearer in the Russian constitution than in the French.  The constitutional responsibility for 
directing the basic objectives of the government lies not with the prime minister, as in France, 
but with the president. 
The powers and responsibilities of the president of the republic include: a) the appointment 
of the prime minister with the consent of the lower house of parliament; b) the right to chair 
cabinet meetings; c) the right to decide on the resignation of the government; d) the appointment 
and dismissal of ministers; e) the nomination of judges to Russia’s three supreme courts; f) the 
right to head security councils and to decide military strategy; g) the right to form the 
presidential administration (Article 83); h) the right to dissolve the lower house under certain 
circumstances; i) the right to call referendums; j) the right to introduce draft laws to the 
legislature (Article 84); k) the power to veto a law, which may be overridden only by a two-
thirds vote in each house of parliament (Article 107); l) the right to suspend the acts of regional 
governments if such acts conflict with the constitution or federal law (Article 85); m) the right to 
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 declare martial law and states of emergency (Articles 87 and 88), and n) the right to issue 
binding decrees as long as they do not contradict federal law (Article 90).   
Clearly, the formal powers of the Russian president as laid out in the constitution far outstrip 
those of his French counterpart.  In particular, the French president lacks both the power to 
introduce legislation into the legislature and the power to veto laws.  Consequently, the president 
of France has very little influence over the framing of legislation if he loses the support of the 
prime minister.  In Russia, even a president facing a very hostile parliament will still be able to 
influence legislation by making use of his veto and decree powers. 
 
 
2. Government and Parliament 
 
 
The Russian parliament is, like the French parliament, bicameral.  It is composed of the 
Federation Council and the State Duma.  The Council is comprised of two representatives from 
each of Russia’s 89 regions, while the Duma is made up of 450 elected deputies.  As in France, it 
is the lower house, the Duma, which has the power to vote no-confidence in the government.  
Despite these similarities, however, the Russian legislature differs significantly from its relative 
in France.  The Federation Council is a stronger body institutionally than the French Senate.  
Firstly, a specific body of issues pertain solely to the Council and not to the Duma.  These 
include the approval of martial law and states of emergency, border changes, the use of the 
armed forces outside Russia, and the impeachment of the president.  Furthermore, the Council 
has veto power over any law passed in the Duma.  A veto from the Council can only be 
overridden by a two-thirds vote in the Duma, rather than the simple majority necessary in France 
(Article 102).  This gives the Federation Council a greater say in the legislative process than the 
French Senate, which can be more easily overridden by the lower house. 
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 The Duma also has an area of particular responsibility.  Most importantly, all draft laws 
begin their legislative journey in the Duma.  The Duma must decide on the appointment of the 
prime minister and on issues of confidence in the government.  The Duma also has authority 
over the appointment and dismissal of the chairman of Russia’s central bank, half the auditors of 
the Accounts Chamber, and over the granting of amnesty.  Impeachments proceedings also begin 
in the Duma, before being referred to the Council.  (Article 103) 
Two major differences help define the operation of the State Duma and the Federation 
Council.  The Duma is a much more active body, a full-time legislature.  The Federation 
Council, by contrast, holds less than half the number of sessions held by the lower house.46  
Even more importantly, political parties are absent from the Federation Council, while the State 
Duma is practically defined by them.  Prior to the 2007 election, half of the Duma’s 450 deputies
were elected from party lists in a system of proportional representation.  In other words, at least 
half of the Duma’s membership was drawn from national parties.  The other half were elected
from single-member districts and need not necessarily be affiliated with any party.  Beginning 
with the 2007 election, all the deputies were elected by pa
 
 
rty list. 
The right to introduce legislation belongs to the president of the republic, the government, 
regional legislatures, members of the Federation Council and Duma, as well as the Constitutional 
Court, Supreme Court, and Supreme Arbitration Court.  Bills concerning the state’s finances—
including the introduction or cancellation of taxes, government loans, or any bills involving 
expenses to be paid from the federal budget—can only be initiated by the government (Article 
104).  Statutes that are purely regulatory can originate from outside the government, giving 
private deputies more liberty to contribute to the legislative process.  Furthermore, the Russian 
government lacks the ability to disregard amendments it disapproves of, as is possible in France.  
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 A 2001 law on political parties, for example, was amended more than a thousand times before it 
finally passed the Duma.47 Since the government cannot invalidate amendments, the government 
may propose an important bill only to have it radically amended by the Duma.  
Just as in France, the political composition in the State Duma in many ways determines the 
character of executive-legislative relations.  A Duma dominated by a coherent majority opposed 
to the president has the ability to significantly frustrate presidential initiatives.  Likewise a 
compliant Duma can greatly smooth the president’s agenda.  The contrast is vivid between the 
terms of President’s Yeltsin and Putin.  Yeltsin, particularly in his second term, faced determined 
opposition from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and other allied groups, while 
Putin has enjoyed a supportive majority. 
 
 
a.  No Confidence and Dissolution The president may only dissolve the State Duma following 
votes of no-confidence in the government.  This can occur under two different circumstances.  
When the president nominates a candidate for prime minister after the office has fallen vacant, 
the Duma is required to vote on the president’s nominee.  If the Duma rejects the president’s 
nominee three times, the president is constitutionally obligated to dissolve the Duma, call for 
new elections, and install the prime minister over the Duma’s objections.  This process can occur 
indefinitely—the Duma gains no immunity from dissolution following its election (Article 111).  
As a result, the Duma is in no position to block the president’s nominee.  It can only register its 
opposition with the executive and with the public—a potentially effective political strategy in 
circumstances which nevertheless heavily favor the executive.   
Additionally, the Duma may choose to vote no-confidence in a sitting government at any 
time.  If the Duma does so twice within three months, the president must either accept the 
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 resignation of the government or dissolve the Duma.  If the Duma is dissolved under these 
circumstances, it is immune to dissolution for one year following its election (Article 117).   
This indicates an interesting departure from the earlier French model.  The French president 
may dissolve the National Assembly at his own discretion, while the Russian president may only 
do so in response to parliamentary action against the government.  The government of Russia is 
also much less susceptible to the vote of censure than the government of France.  A simple 
majority vote in the National Assembly is enough to evict the ministers from their offices, and, 
therefore, the French president cannot appoint a prime minister who does not enjoy the 
Assembly’s support.  The French constitution provides the president no room for maneuver here.   
In Russia, however, the no-confidence vote is significantly watered down to protect the 
executive.  Even a strongly oppositional Duma is forced to accept the president’s nominee, at 
least temporarily, or face dissolution.  In order to remove a prime minister truly unacceptable to 
the parliament, the Duma would have to vote no-confidence at least four times and endure at 
least one dissolution and subsequent re-election.  Of course, choosing such a course of action 
would set in motion a protracted political battle in which the public would surely be enlisted.   
An unpopular president would likely be forced to cede ground to the legislature.  Similarly, the 
Duma would find it difficult to maintain such determined opposition in the face of public loyalty 
to a popular president.  Of course, the executive operates from somewhat higher ground, as the 
president’s job is not threatened in the same way as those of the legislators.   
The dissolution of parliament carries with it, as ever, the threat that individual deputies will 
not be re-elected, as well as the concern that the overall composition of the house might shift.  
Additionally, in Russia, the loss of a parliamentary seat entails the loss of immunity from 
prosecution that all parliamentarians hold ex officio as well as the loss of various government 
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 perks.  All these counterincentives suggest that Duma deputies will make use of ‘throwaway’ 
votes of no-confidence, the votes that the president and prime minister can ignore, in order to 
make a political statement or to lobby for concessions.  Yet they will shy away from casting 
definitive votes that will result in dissolution and their own re-election campaigns.  Consequently 
the Russian government is far less dependent on the parliamentary majority for its survival than 
is its counterpart in France.   
 
 
b.  Government Control? The French and Russian governments are not equivalent terms.  
The powers of the French government to control debate in the legislature and to control the 
passage of laws far exceed the constitutional prerogatives of the Russian government.  The 
Russian government lacks the powers to curb amendments and limit debate, which the ministers 
of France have found so useful.  Draft laws cannot be made ‘an issue of the government’s 
responsibility’ as they can in France.  Government bills do not enjoy constitutional precedence 
on the agenda as they do in France.  The Russian and French governments do share the right to 
issue legal decrees, and have monopolies on the introduction of bills that would result in a 
change in state revenues or expenditures.  Nevertheless, the similarities end there, and the French 
government acts as a parliamentary gatekeeper in a way that the Russian government does not.  
Thus, while the Russian parliamentarians have less control over the government than do their 
French compatriots, the Russian government exerts less influence on the parliament.   
Considered in this way, the Russian system begins to take on the appearance of a fully 
presidential system, rather than a semi-presidential one.  The executive is more unitary than in 
France, and the line between the executive and the legislature is more distinct.  The Duma will 
find it very difficult to procure a prime minister that is loyal to the parliamentary majority rather 
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 than to the president, while the president (or prime minister) will have a harder time taming the 
parliamentary majority.  The two institutions can be derived from different political majorities, 
and hence opposed in political outlook, without the prime minister going over to the parliament’s 
side.  Yet there are still good reasons to label Russia a semi-presidential regime.  The parliament 
does have the power to dismiss the government, however weakened it may be, and therefore the 
power to bargain for a more acceptable prime minister.  Equally, the president does have the 
right to dissolve the parliament, if only under certain conditions.  The dependence across 
branches characteristic of semi-presidential systems is present, albeit in a weaker form than in 
France.  And of course, the president cannot be removed from office except by impeachment and 
does possess ‘quite considerable powers.’  The differences between France and Russia are 
differences within one regime type, rather than across types.  France represents a more integrated 
subtype, where the executive and legislative branches are more closely intermingled.  Russia, by 
contrast, establishes a somewhat stricter separation of powers.  Yet each conforms to the 
definition of semi-presidentialism laid out in the introductory pages of this essay. 
The place held in by the government in France, that of legislative gatekeeper, is held in 
Russia largely by the Duma’s committees.  Proposed laws can only reach the floor of the Duma 
for a full vote after being approved in committee.  It is the Duma Council, made up of the leaders 
of all the parliamentary factions as well as the chair of the Duma, that decides which bills to send 
to which committee for consideration.  In France, the government performs this role.  While the 
French constitution mandates that there be no more than six standing committees in the National 
Assembly, the first State Duma decided to establish twenty-three, with membership ranging from 
ten to forty-three deputies.  Committee chairs and membership, prior to reforms instituted under 
Putin, were decided on a power-sharing, token-based system.48  Under this system, parties were 
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 awarded tokens based on their representation in the Duma.  Tokens could be used to ‘purchase’ 
committee memberships and leadership posts.  Even the parliamentary majority was not 
guaranteed all chairmanships or a majority on all committees under these rules.  In fact, from 
1994 to 1995, only one party went without the chairmanship of any committee, and no party held 
more than four chairmanships.49  The smaller size and greater number of the committees allows 
for greater specialization and better oversight, compared to those in France.  So, for example, 
while it is practically unheard of for deputies to defeat government legislation in France, 
ratification of the START II treaty with the United States, advocated by Yeltsin, remained tied 
up in committee for more than seven years.50  Stronger committees give the deputies the ability 
to delay or scrub proposed legislation, and provide more space for compromise and negotiation 
(and gridlock).  The Duma Council, and not the government, is in charge of setting the 
legislative agenda.  All this gives the parliament a mechanism to check the power of the 
executive, and gives the parliament a louder voice in policymaking.        
Of course, the party composition of the Duma will affect the relationship between the 
government and the deputies in significant ways.  When the majority is supportive of the 
government, as it has been under Putin, the relationship between the ministers and the deputies 
will be more collaborative.  When the Duma is in opposition to the government, as was often the 
case during Yeltsin’s tenure, the relationship will be more confrontational.  Crucially, the 
Russian government lacks all the institutional measures by which the French government retains 
control of the legislative process.  It cannot control which amendments succeed or fail, it cannot 
control which committees receive which bills, it cannot make bills an issue of confidence, and it 
cannot pass the budget by decree.  As such, the Russian government is obliged to negotiate with 
Duma leaders, whether the majority is pro-presidential or not, to advance its policies. 
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3. Boris Yeltsin and the Duma:  Decrees, Policy Initiation, Vetoes, and Cabinets 
 
 
The period of Russian history presided over by Boris Yeltsin was one of revolutionary change.  
Russian society moved from a centralized command economy to private markets, and from a 
Soviet political structure dominated by the Communist Party to a more Western form of 
democracy.  It was also a period marked by political confrontation between Yeltsin and his 
opponents.  The most confrontational episode of the era came in 1993, when President Yeltsin 
unconstitutionally ordered Russia’s legislature, the Congress of People’s Deputies, to dissolve.  
The legislators refused to disband, passed articles of impeachment against Yeltsin, and 
barricaded themselves within the parliament building.  The crisis provoked large demonstrations 
in Moscow, including an attack on the national television center at Ostankino by supporters of 
the parliament. Elements of the military, siding with Yeltsin, began to bombard the parliament 
building leading to the capitulation of the Congress.  Yeltsin submitted to referendum a new draft 
constitution, which became the foundation for the present Russian state. 
While Yeltsin twice won the presidency, he was often faced with majority opposition in the 
State Duma.  Indeed after parliamentary elections in both 1993 and 1995, liberal reform parties 
sympathetic to the president accounted for roughly a third of Duma seats.51  As a result, Yeltsin 
was obliged to deal with a powerful, but fractious opposition in his interaction with parliament.  
Despite the Russian president’s very strong position constitutionally, Yeltsin was often forced to 
offer concessions to the Duma.  This unexpected degree of compromise between branches can be 
attributed to the Duma’s surprising institutional resilience during the 1990s, but also to Yeltsin’s 
consistently low approval ratings and increasingly frail health. 
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 There are four key elements in the relationship between the president and the Duma as laid 
out in the constitution—presidential decrees versus parliamentary laws, vetoes and veto 
overrides, the composition of the cabinet and policy initiation.  These four issues represent points 
of contact between the executive and legislative branches.  By examining them it is possible to 
ascertain the relative strength of each institution during the Yeltsin presidency. 
 
 
a.  Decree Power It is impossible to overlook the president’s broad decree power when 
reading the Russian constitution.  He is empowered to make law in his own right, which can only 
be contravened by a full parliamentary law passed on that subject.  It is an impressive addition to 
the presidential arsenal, and one which allows him to dispense with parliament to a certain 
degree.  Nevertheless it should not be forgotten that parliament has the final say, and as more and 
more laws are passed covering more and more legal ground, the area subject to presidential 
decree shrinks.  Furthermore, significant policy instruments like treaties and the federal budget 
cannot be passed by decree, giving the Duma some significant leverage. 
The majority of decrees issued by the president are non-normative.  That is, they are 
administrative or executive, rather than policy-making in nature.  In fact, non-normative decrees 
signed by President Yeltsin from 1994-1998 number 4352, while normative decrees for the same 
period total only 1420, or about one-third of all presidential decrees.  By comparison, the State 
Duma produced 822 laws in the same period that were signed and promulgated by the president.  
The disparity between decrees issued and laws passed is not surprising considering both the 
relative youth of the Duma (no laws whatsoever were passed in the first three months of the 
Duma’s existence, during which time Yeltsin issued 811 decrees), and the arduous nature of the 
legislative process compared to the drafting and signing of decrees.52  While the president’s 
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 decree output from 1994 to 1998 was about sixty percent greater than the number of laws passed, 
it is important to remember that parliamentary laws always supersede presidential decrees once 
promulgated.  In the long-run, then, full-fledged laws are more durable than decrees and, once 
passed, build up an area of policy where presidential decrees no longer have any force. 
In addition, some policy areas can only be decided by a parliamentary law. Treaty ratification 
is one area where presidential decrees have no force, and the president must rely on the Duma’s 
good graces.  As an example, the START II treaty on nuclear arms limitation was signed by 
Presidents Yeltsin and Bush on January 3, 1993.  It was not ratified by the Duma until April 14, 
2000, after the election of President Putin.  More importantly, presidential decrees also have no 
authority over the federal budget.  Unlike in France, where the government can pass a budget by 
decree after seventy days’ debate in the Assembly, the Russian federal budget can only be passed 
by the State Duma.  By shielding such key elements of statecraft as the budget and international 
treaties from the presidential decree power, the constitution grants the Duma an important 
bargaining piece in its dealings with the executive.  It can hold off on passing the budget or 
ratifying a treaty in hopes of gaining concessions from the executive.  Other policy areas immune 
from the presidential decree include the minimum wage, social security, and taxation.53 
 
 
b.  Policy Initiation From January 1996 to December 1999, the most effective initiator of 
legislation was the president.  Sixty-four percent of all bills initiated by the president passed the 
Duma, received the presidential signature, and were passed into law, compared to 50.2% of 
government legislation, and only 17.9% of legislation initiated by Duma deputies.  It is the Duma 
itself, however, which blocks most of the bills proposed by deputies.  Deputies proposed 1,629 
bills in this period, of which only 488—less than one-third—were actually passed by the Duma.  
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 Meanwhile, the Duma rejected about half of the government’s proposed legislation.  Rejecting 
government bills is no small matter, and it almost never happens in France.  The Duma’s ability 
to do so highlights its independence as an institution. 
Indeed, 64% of deputy-sponsored bills passed by the Duma were signed into law by the 
president from 1994-1995, and 59% of such bills became law from 1996-1999.54  Deputy-
sponsored bills accounted for 40% of final legislation in the latter period.  French 
parliamentarians accounted for, on average, only 16% of final legislation from 1958-1988 (See 
footnote 27).  The Duma’s influence is even more noticeable in some sectors:  deputies initiated 
64% of social policy legislation and 63% of economic legislation from 1994-1995.  Those 
numbers remained practically unchanged from 1996-1997, when deputies accounted for 61% and 
63% of social and economic legislation respectively.55  Duma deputies were clearly a crucial 
source of legislation during the Yeltsin presidency.  The government cannot monopolize the 
agenda as it can in France, making the Duma a more independent institution when it comes to 
law-making. 
  In absolute terms, the president and government together initiated 492 laws, while deputies 
sponsored 292.  This seems mostly be to an effect of double veto threat that faces Duma 
legislation.  Of the laws passed by the State Duma, 196 were vetoed by either the president or the 
Federation Council.  Government legislation was vetoed only 35 times, and only six pieces of 
presidential legislation were turned down after passage by the Duma†.56  This confirms the 
powerful influence the president and government have in the legislative process.  Nevertheless, 
the Duma in the 1990s was an important source of legislation, and frequently shot down 
government bills.    
                                                 
† These six laws could have been vetoed either by the Federation Council or by the president himself, if the Duma’s 
version differed dramatically from the president’s original proposal.  The data does not specify. 
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c.  Vetoes The power to veto legislation presents another meeting-point between executive 
and legislative interests.  It is important to note that the president can attempt to bypass 
parliament entirely by issuing a decree on a subject, and then vetoing any parliamentary attempt 
to override his decree.  The success of such a strategy hinges at least partially on whether or not 
the legislature will be capable of forming the supermajorities necessary to overturn a presidential 
veto, since constitutional law stipulates that two-thirds majorities are necessary in each house of 
parliament to override a veto.  Data from 1996 through 1998 indicate that President Yeltsin made 
frequent use of his veto power to influence policy.  And while the legislature could not always 
override the president’s veto, it did show a surprising ability to assemble the necessary two-
thirds majority on numerous occasions.  In 1996, for example, the president vetoed 48 laws.  The 
Duma and Federation Council together were able to overturn 23, or 47.9%, of those vetoes.  
Overall the president vetoed 193 laws in this period, of which the Duma managed to overturn 
101.57  This does not mean that the legislature passed 101 laws over the president’s objection, 
since the Federation Council must also approve a vetoed bill by a two-thirds margin in order for 
it to pass as a law.  However, it does indicate that opposition in the Duma was cohesive and 
determined. 
 
 
d.  Cabinet Formation  As noted previously, the constitution places significant constraints 
on the Duma’s ability to vote no-confidence in the government, and hence weakens the 
parliament’s capability to demand an acceptable prime minister.  Despite this fact, however, the 
Duma was able during the Yeltsin years to use its power of confirmation to gain concessions 
from Yeltsin, and once secured a prime minister of the Duma’s choosing. 
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 The first vote of no-confidence in the new republic was held on October 27, 1994, against the 
government of Viktor Chernomyrdin.  The vote was spurred by economic woes and the 
accusation that the government was not implementing the budget approved by the Duma.58  The 
motion failed to carry, with 42.9 percent of deputies voting against the government.  
Remarkably, only 12 percent voted in support of Chernomyrdin, while 32.9 percent of deputies 
did not vote at all.  Party discipline was quite weak during this vote, with deputies from only 
three parties (the Liberal Democrats, the Communist Party, and Yabloko) voting according to 
party lines.59  Even though the vote failed, Yeltsin acted to forestall a successful second vote by 
offering a concession to the oppositional Agrarian Party. Yeltsin dismissed his minister for 
Agriculture and replaced him with a representative of the Agrarian Party.  Fresh from the 
constitutional crisis of 1993, when Yeltsin’s unconstitutional dismissal of the predecessor to the 
State Duma resulted in the use of tanks on the streets of Moscow, it appears that neither Yeltsin 
nor the Duma wished to provoke another serious confrontation.  Even though the vote of no-
confidence did not pass, and would not have resulted in the fall of the government if it had 
passed, the Duma was able to use its non-binding vote of censure to attack the president 
politically.  After the 1995 elections, the Duma would use this tactic to great effect to bargain 
with the president for policy changes and staff shakeups.   
On June 21, 1995, the Duma successfully passed a motion of no-confidence in order to 
protest the handling of the war in Chechnya.  Since the vote was conducted by secret ballot, only 
the raw outcome is available.  On this occasion, 68.9% of deputies voted against the government, 
16% in favor, with 4.4% choosing to abstain, and 24.7% not voting at all.60  By carrying one 
vote of no-confidence, the Duma raised the possibility that the president would have to dissolve 
either his government or the Duma, should the parliament again vote against Chernomyrdin.  The 
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 deputies’ main goal in this confrontation was the removal of the so-called ‘power ministers’—
the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Director of the Federal Security Service, the Minister of 
Defense, and one of Yeltsin’s Deputy Prime Ministers.61  Yeltsin responded to the vote by 
declaring, through a spokesman, that “the President of Russia believes that the Government’s 
dismissal at this time would destabilize the political situation, give rise to negative trends in the 
economy, and complicate the crime situation.”62  Yet even though, in the event of a second 
successful vote Yeltsin could have dissolved the Duma and retained his government, he still 
offered a flurry of concessions to stave off a second defeat.  Yeltsin removed the Minister of 
Internal Affairs, the Federal Security Service Director, and the Deputy Prime Minister, according 
to the Duma’s wishes.  He also directed the government to cooperate with the Duma to complete 
the 1996 budget, and permitted some deputies to join the Federation’s official delegation to 
Chechnya.  Yeltsin also promised reform of the Defense Ministry.63 
When the second vote of no-confidence was held, 42.9% of deputies voted for the 
government’s dismissal, while 26% voted to retain the government, 10.7% abstained, and 20.4% 
did not vote.  The dramatic turnaround between the first vote, where more than two-thirds of 
deputies voted against the government, and the second vote is attributable to several factors.  
Firstly, the deputies were aware that by twice voting no-confidence they would provoke either 
the dissolution of the Duma or the government.  One deputy noted that “to defeat 
Chernomyrdin’s Government implied undoing the whole hierarchy in the executive and extreme 
confrontation with the executive.”64  If the Duma, instead, were dissolved, individual deputies 
would face the potential loss of their own seats, in addition to the harm done to the national 
political and economic climates while the Duma sat vacant.  In either case the outcome would be 
political instability, which both the president and the Duma were keen to avoid. 
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 Indeed, so keen to avoid confrontation was President Yeltsin, that he offered major 
concessions to the Duma in 1997 simply because the deputies threatened to hold another no-
confidence vote in Chernomyrdin.  At the time, it should be noted, Yeltsin was still recovering 
from a major heart operation.  In exchange for cancelling the vote, Yeltsin withdrew a 
contentious tax code from the 1998 budget, postponed housing reform, signed a bill limiting the 
president’s power over the prime minister, agreed to schedule regular roundtable meetings with 
the deputies, and extended coverage of parliament on state-owned television and radio.  Yeltsin 
also dismissed his Finance Minister in favor of the chairman of the Duma’s Committee on the 
Budget, Taxes, Banks, and Finance.65 
Another enlightening episode in the history of legislative-executive relations in Russia is the 
short-lived tenure of Russia’s second prime minister after 1993, Sergei Kiriyenko.  On March 23, 
1998, Yeltsin dismissed Chernomyrdin (and, as required by law, the entire cabinet) in response 
to what Yeltsin perceived to be Chernomyrdin’s overlarge political ambitions.  To fill the post, 
Yeltsin nominated the former Fuel and Power Minister, Kiriyenko.  Kiriyenko had only recently 
been elevated to a cabinet portfolio, being plucked from the Duma only one and a half years 
before.  With Yeltsin’s health ever in parlous condition, it was conceivable that the young and 
inexperienced Kiriyenko, if confirmed as prime minister, could become Acting President if 
Yeltsin suddenly declined.  It is not surprising, then, that such a candidate would meet with some 
resistance in the Duma.  In his first confirmation vote, only 31.8% voted in favor, with 41.3% 
opposed, only 1.1% abstaining, and 25.8% declining to vote.66  The outcome in the second vote, 
held a week later, was even worse for Yeltsin and Kiriyenko.  Twenty-five percent of deputies 
voted in favor, while more than 60% voted against, 2.4% abstained, and 11.8% did not vote.67   
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 The outcome of the third and final vote is particularly revealing.  If the Duma three times 
rejects the president’s nominee for prime minister, the constitution requires that the Duma be 
dissolved and the prime minister be installed despite the Duma’s opposition.  In this vote, 55.8% 
of deputies endorsed Kiriyenko, while only 5.6% were opposed, no one abstained, and 38.7% 
chose not to vote.  This vote indicates that deputies realized that they had little to gain from 
opposing the executive a third time.  In particular the deputies elected from single-member 
districts, rather than party lists, could not be sure of their own re-election, should the Duma be 
dissolved.  The deputies used the first two votes to register their opposition and to bargain for 
time and concessions.  But the third vote presents an obstacle difficult for the Duma to surmount.  
The political cost (dissolution) was too high, and the gain (showing steely resolve and burnishing 
their oppositionist credentials) was too low.  Instead, many deputies chose not to vote.  In this 
way they avoided casting a potentially damaging ‘no’ vote, without actually supporting 
Kiriyenko. 
Yeltsin offered fewer concessions in Kiriyenko’s confirmation battle than when 
Chernomyrdin faced votes of no-confidence.  This is understandable, considering that even if the 
deputies chose to reject Kiriyenko a third time, he would be appointed all the same and the 
deputies would go packing.  Nevertheless, Yeltsin promised not to veto certain laws which were 
awaiting his signature.  He also leaned on certain other presidential prerogatives, instructing the 
President’s Administrative Office, which is in charge of distributing state cars and apartments to 
public officials, to treat those deputies favorably who displayed a ‘constructive attitude.’  He 
further threatened to change electoral law by decree once the Duma was disbanded, to eliminate 
the party-list portion of parliamentary elections.  This would leave the party leaders just as 
vulnerable to defeat as their rank-and-file members.  In response the Duma threatened to take up 
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 impeachment proceedings against Yeltsin, which would automatically grant the Duma immunity 
from dissolution.68  All in all, Yeltsin’s style of conflict management during the Kiriyenko votes 
was less conciliatory and more confrontational.  Yeltsin, and the deputies, knew that in this case 
the president had the weight of the constitution behind him.  Unfortunately for Kiriyenko, he 
took office just as Russia plunged into the financial crisis of 1998.  The Duma cried foul and not 
only scheduled a no-confidence vote, but called on the president himself to resign.  Yeltsin, eager 
for a scapegoat, dismissed Kiriyenko and his government. 
To replace Kiriyenko, Yeltsin again nominated Viktor Chernomyrdin, citing his years of 
experience as prime minister.  By this time, however, the political environment had changed.  
The deputies understood that, with the country in perilous economic times and Yeltsin’s own 
popularity low, Yeltsin could ill-afford to dissolve the Duma.  With his back to the wall 
politically, Yeltsin offered the Duma significant concessions, including the power to approve and 
dismiss individual ministers and a promise not to dissolve the Duma for one year, if the 
legislature agreed to refrain from holding no-confidence votes and impeachment proceedings for 
the same period.  Initially agreed to by all parties, the pact was broken by Gennady Zyuganov, 
the Communist Party leader, who called on Yeltsin to resign on the eve of the first vote.69  The 
deputies soundly defeated Chernomyrdin in the first two votes—55.8% and 60.7% voting against 
confirmation in each vote, respectively.70  While the coalition that Yeltsin had tried to construct 
around his offer of increased parliamentary control of the government did not hold, that the 
president made such an offer at all is telling of the Duma’s strength during this period, and 
Yeltsin’s weakness.   
The Duma, sensing that a weakened Yeltsin lacked the political resources necessary to 
dissolve the legislature, held out for a more acceptable candidate.  Nevertheless, the deputies 
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 took the precautionary step of preparing impeachment proceedings against Yeltsin and 
threatened to put them to a vote if Yeltsin renominated Chernomyrdin.  The president backed 
down.  In the third vote, held on September 11, 1998, Yeltsin nominated Yevgeniy Primakov on 
the recommendation of Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of Yabloko.  Primakov was supported by 70 
percent of deputies, with 14% voting against, 3.3% abstaining, and 12.7% not voting.  The low 
number of abstentions and non-voters seems to indicate that Primakov enjoyed wide support in 
the Duma.  He was supported by more than 75% of deputies from five parties—the Communists, 
Yabloko, Russia’s Regions, People’s Power, and the Agrarian Party.  The implication comes as 
quite a jolt.  The Duma, with its weak no-confidence power, was able to force the president to 
nominate a candidate that the Duma preferred.  
 
 
e.  Conclusions The picture that emerges during the Yeltsin years is not that of the 
monarchical president than can be envisioned from a reading of the constitution.  Particularly in 
the field of cabinet formation, President Yeltsin adopted a generally conciliatory approach to the 
Duma.  Yeltsin was obliged to offer concessions to the Duma to secure the approval of his 
nominee or to forestall no-confidence votes.  The constitution allows the Duma to make use of 
expendable, ‘throwaway’ votes of no-confidence.  While this insulates the executive to some 
degree from parliamentary influence, it also creates a political opportunity for the Duma.  
Deputies exploited this opportunity during the Yeltsin era to lobby for concessions from the 
executive and to publicly register their opposition.  They were able to secure the passage of laws, 
curb the president’s power over the prime minister, prevent vetoes, and force the president to 
dismiss cabinet members and install new ministers supported by the Duma.  In one case they 
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 were even able to repel the president’s nominee and force the president to appoint a prime 
minister that enjoyed the Duma’s confidence. 
Furthermore, the Duma emerged as a vital center of law-making, accounting for a sizeable 
proportion of final legislation in the new republic.  Presidential decrees did not significantly 
overshadow parliamentary laws, and vetoes were frequently overturned.  The Duma was able to 
stand up to the executive on numerous occasions.  For example, shortly after taking office in 
1993, the Duma used its amnesty power to pardon the leaders of the August 1991 coup against 
Mikhail Gorbachev and the leaders of the 1993 parliamentary uprising, Yeltsin’s “most despised 
political opponents.”71  The Duma in the 1990s, as these examples illustrate, became a real 
counterweight to the executive.72   
Yet the Primakov government, amenable as it was to the Duma, was not a Russian case of 
French cohabitation.  Yeltsin was able to sack Primakov in May 1999 when he perceived the 
prime minister’s increasing popularity as a threat to his power.73  Yeltsin’s next appointee, 
Sergei Stepashin was approved by the Duma, but dismissed by the president three months later.
This episode indicates that the president still enjoys primary power over the government.  In 
France, there is no mechanism for the president to dismiss an opposition prime minister, ex
to dissolve the National Assembly en masse.  Yeltsin was able to dismiss Primakov in favor of 
Yeltsin loyalist without new elections or any change in the composition of the Duma.  Mitterrand 
and Chirac never had that option.  Once a French president finds himself sharing power with an 
opposition prime minister, he must content himself with the situation until the next election. 
  
cept 
a 
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 4. Vladimir Putin and Party Politics in the Duma 
 
 
The Yeltsin era can be characterized as a period of competition between the executive and 
legislative branches, a competition which neither side could dominate.  By contrast, the tenure of 
President Vladimir Putin has been one of increased cooperation between the two branches, with 
the executive taking the lead.  The hastily-assembled pro-Putin party, Unity, enjoyed a close 
second-place in the Third Duma (1999-2003), trailing the more established Communist Party by 
only a handful of seats.  By February of 2001, Unity could claim eighty-four deputies to the 
Communists’ eighty-seven.74  Unlike Yeltsin, Putin proved adept at forming parliamentary 
coalitions.  Unity cooperated with the Communists to undo the Duma’s token-based system of 
allocating committee posts and chairmanships, which distributed parliamentary power widely, to 
the expense of the larger parties.  This move heralded a shift in the operation of the Duma, away 
from consensualism and toward majority control.   
Throughout the First and Second Dumas (covering a period from 1994 to 1999), the largest 
party or coalition in the Duma controlled a number of chairmanships almost identical to the 
proportion of seats that party held in the chamber.  In the First Duma, Russia’s Choice was the 
largest party, with 17% of seats.  Correspondingly, they controlled 17% of committee chairs.  
Likewise, the Second Duma coalition of the Communist Party, Agrarian Party, and Popular 
Power held 49% of seats and 50% of chairmanships.  After the procedural changes of 2000, 
however, the largest parties began to claim a larger percentage of committee chairs.  At the 
beginning of the Third Duma, the Communist Party and the allied Agro-Industrial Deputies’ 
Group controlled 29% of seats, but 39% of committee chairs.  In April 2002, a pro-government 
coalition comprised of Unity, Fatherland-All Russia, Russia’s Regions, and People’s Deputy 
gained the strength of numbers necessary to relieve seven Communist committee chairmen of 
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 their posts.  The coalition at that time held 52% of seats, but 68% of chairmanships.  Finally, the 
2004 parliamentary elections swept Putin’s United Russia to victory, capturing 68% of seats.  
United Russia used its outright supermajority to claim 100 percent of committee chairs.75   
Not only did the token system allow for proportional distribution of committee chairs, it 
allowed even small parties to chair important committees.  In the 1993 Duma, Yabloko 
controlled only 5% of seats, but managed to chair the committee on Budget, Taxes, Banks, and 
Finance and the committee on International Affairs.  The even smaller Democratic Party of 
Russia, with 3% of seats, chaired the committee on Economic Policy.  The 1995 Duma saw some 
consolidation of major committee chairs in the hands of the larger parties, however, the number 
of political parties present in the lower house dropped from eleven to seven, making more 
committees available for fewer parties.76   
United Russia’s landslide victory in the 2003 election earned the party more than 300 of the 
Duma’s 450 seats.  Backed by such numbers, United Russia embarked on a program to change 
the procedural rules of the Duma in favor of the majority.  United Russia deputies voted to raise 
the number of independent deputies required to form ‘groups,’ which enjoy the same privileges 
as political parties within the Duma.  Independents, finding it harder to form their own 
associations, now had greater incentive to merge with larger parties, particularly United Russia.  
The guiding Duma Council, formerly composed of the leaders of all parliamentary factions, was 
changed to represent the chair of the Duma and his deputies, with only nominal representation 
from minority parties.  This eases the legislative process for the majority, which can now better 
control which bills are accepted for consideration and which committees receive them.  A further 
rule change permitted party leaders to hold parliamentary office.  As a result, the leader of 
United Russia, Boris Gryzlov, became chair of the Duma.  The leaders of the various divisions 
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 within United Russia were each given deputy chairmanships.  As Paul Chaisty notes, “the 
relative autonomy that parliamentary leaders had enjoyed from their parties in previous Dumas 
was reversed; the leadership of the Duma was now the leadership of the dominant party: United 
Russia.”77 
The new majority also helped enable a process known as ‘zero-readings,’ wherein the 
parliamentary and executive leaders reconcile their differences on a piece of legislation before 
the bill reaches the Duma.78  Zero-readings began in the Third Duma, when the presidential party 
did not yet command a full majority.  In the Third Duma, the president relied on a ‘coalition of 
four,’ including Unity, Fatherland-All Russia, Peoples’ Deputy and Russia’s Regions, to pass 
legislation.  Leaders of these four factions met frequently with the finance ministry in advance of 
the 2002 budget, in order to negotiate a document that would be acceptable to the government 
and to the coalition in parliament.  Over the course of these meetings, according to reports, the 
government agreed to raise expenditures in areas important to the coalition, including the 
Pension Fund, highway construction, and aid to the regions.  The finance bill passed in its first 
reading with 262 votes.79   
Zero-readings removes the legislative process from the Duma, to some degree, since 
opposition deputies are not involved in the drafting or review of legislation.  Yet it also indicates 
the continued relevance of the Duma as a partner with the executive in lawmaking.  Since the 
executive cannot rely ‘legislative steamrollers’ like Article 49 of the French constitution, it must 
negotiate with even a supportive majority. 
  Legislation did not always take the form Putin wanted during his first term, and bargaining 
with even a friendly Duma was still commonplace.80  Some of Putin’s proposals, such as a law 
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 regulating the sale of land, a labor code, and a law on federal relations with the regions, were 
delayed by months or even years as negotiations continued between the relevant parties.81 
Legislative-executive relations under Putin, due to the presence of a large pro-presidential 
majority, have been far less confrontational than during the Yeltsin era.  The overall number of 
vetoes, from both the Federation Council and the president, has declined since United Russia’s 
ascent, while the share of priority legislation initiated by the executive has increased 
dramatically.82    
It is clear that as Putin has cultivated a pro-presidential majority in the Duma, the 
confrontation between the two branches that characterized the Yeltsin period has ebbed.  There is 
close cooperation between the executive and United Russia, as evidenced by the ‘zero-readings’ 
process.  Simultaneously, United Russia has moved to change the character of the Duma from a 
consensual and power-sharing body, to a more majoritarian chamber.  Yet it is important to keep 
these developments in perspective.  As a leading member of the Liberal Democratic Party of 
Russia noted regarding Unity’s rewriting of the Duma’s procedures, “In America, with just a 
majority of one the whole apparatus becomes theirs, all the committee chairs become theirs, and 
the speaker theirs, without discussion, do you understand?  With just one additional person!”  
There is nothing inherently undemocratic about procedural rules that benefit the majority.  
Nevertheless there are checks inherent in the American system that are absent in Russia, notably 
a Senate that grants more power to the political minority.  Russia’s Federation Council is not 
organized on a party basis, and if anything, treats the Putin presidency with deference.83  The 
autonomy of the upper house appears further threatened when it is recalled that half the senators 
are appointed to their posts by regional governors, who are in turn appointed by the president. 
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5. Comparing French and Russian Institutions 
 
 
The notable differences between the French and Russian semi-presidential regimes are 1) the 
strength of the presidency as an institution, apart from its political power; 2) the vulnerability of 
the government, and 3) the independence of the legislature.  These values must all be determined 
under two conditions: when the parliamentary majority supports the president, and when it does 
not.  While bearing in mind that such qualifiers as “strong” and “weak” reduce complex 
situations into a single word, it is possible to see general outlines of institutional strength and 
weakness in the various actors of the French and Russian states. 
 
 
Table 2.1 The majority supports the President 
 
Majority supports 
the president. 
President Government Parliament 
France Strong 
(Controls the 
appointment of PM, 
and hence the 
legislative agenda.) 
Weak 
(Directed by the 
president.) 
Weak 
(Controlled by the 
government, which 
takes its orders from 
the president.) 
Russia Strong 
(Decree and veto 
power plus 
supportive assembly 
mean very few 
checks on 
president.) 
Weak 
(President can 
shuffle ministers 
almost at will.) 
Moderate 
(Supportive 
majority will have 
some say in crafting 
legislation.) 
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Table 2.2  The majority opposes the President 
 
Majority 
opposes  
the 
president. 
 
President Government Parliament 
France Weak  
(loses PM, little 
legislative  
influence) 
Strong 
(Effectively controls 
parliament, most policy) 
Weak 
(Little opportunity to 
control legislation.  Can 
dismiss PM, but might 
invite dissolution.) 
Russia Strong 
(Veto and decree 
power, can install 
PM over Duma’s 
objections.) 
Weak 
(President has almost unlimited 
power to shuffle ministers.  
Protected from no-confidence, 
but relatively little legislative 
control.) 
Moderate 
(Controls its own 
agenda, but difficult to 
choose PM, faces double 
veto threat.) 
 
 
 
 
a.  Presidents    The Russian presidency comes with powers French presidents can only envy.  
Russian presidents can veto bills, introduce legislation to parliament, and pass their own 
executive decrees.  Taken together, the powers of the Russian presidency mean that even an 
unpopular president facing a hostile parliament can never be fully sidelined.  President Yeltsin 
was still an important policy initiator, even when he faced a Communist-controlled parliament.  
He could still deploy vetoes and decrees to shape policy.  By contrast, a French president loses 
control of national policy when he loses the Assembly, and must content himself with the role of 
leader of the opposition.  The Russian president has the ability to stay in the game with an 
opposition parliament that the French president lacks. 
 However, the French president is more powerful than his Russian counterpart when he 
has majority support in the Assembly.  In that case, the government’s constitutional advantages 
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 allow the executive to carry out a legislative program with less interference from the parliament, 
and less need for bargaining with deputies.  With the new five-year presidential terms 
synchronized to parliamentary terms, it is unlikely that the French president will ever be without 
a supportive majority.  Barring an ill-advised dissolution of parliament, or the death or 
resignation of the president, France is likely to be on a majoritarian and presidential track for the 
foreseeable future.   
 
b.  Governments The Russian government is in a much weaker position than the French 
government.  Ministers can be shuffled at will by the president, and an assertive parliament may 
demand some cabinet posts as well.  The Russian government is less vulnerable to censure, 
meaning that it can survive parliamentary displeasure, and that the president has a freer hand in 
nominating ministers.  But it lacks all the tools the French government uses to guide legislation 
through parliament.   
 The French government can, during cohabitation, become the leading source of policy 
direction in the country.  This is highly unlikely to occur in Russia, where the president’s powers 
and the weak confidence mechanism conspire to keep the government subordinate to the 
president. 
 
c.  Parliaments  The French National Assembly’s ability to select the prime minister is its 
one great strength.  The composition of the National Assembly is the most important determining 
factor of the direction of national policy.  A mid-term election in which the president loses 
control of the Assembly will shift policy control to the new prime minister.   
 Between elections, however, deputies have little influence on legislation.  The 
government is in control at every stage of the process—proposal, steering, amendment, and 
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 adoption—whether the government is in cohabitation or not.  The Assembly’s voice in French 
politics is strong, but infrequent.  Synchronized elections for president and parliament will 
diminish the parliament’s influence even further, by removing the possibility of cohabitation.    
Presidents still need a cooperative parliament to govern, but the sheer proximity of the two 
elections makes a split decision unlikely.  For all these reasons I have labeled the National 
Assembly ‘weak’ under both unified and divided government. 
 The State Duma is a mirror image of the Assembly.  The weak confidence mechanism in 
the Duma makes it difficult for the parliamentary factions there to claim executive power.  The 
Duma cannot force a change in national policy orientation as quickly and as dramatically as the 
Assembly can after an election.  However, the Duma is much more important in the day-to-day 
legislative process, since it can control its own agenda.  Government bills do not enjoy automatic 
precedence on the agenda, and can be delayed or voted down.  The Duma, not the government, 
controls the amendment process.  Big-ticket items like the federal budget can become focus-
points for bargaining between the executive and the legislature.  More than the National 
Assembly, the Duma constantly influences the shape of individual policies.  Even a supportive 
majority influences legislation, as the practice of zero-readings indicates. 
 
d.  Conclusions While the Russian system has been accused of being ‘superpresidential,’ 
executive power is significantly less constrained by the legislature in France than in Russia.  
Executive power may change hands in France, from the president to the prime minister.  In 
neither case, however, can the Assembly seriously influence the executive’s proposals.  French 
executives expend less time and resources making policies amenable to the Assembly, since the 
constitution empowers them to pass proposals without a vote.  Deploying Article 49 is a drastic 
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 step, and one that governments may employ only with reluctance.  But its presence affects the 
bargaining strategies of both sides.  Presidents, prime ministers, and deputies know that the 
executive has a reserve option it can rely on to get its way.  Negotiation takes place in that 
context. 
 Russian presidents, by contrast, cannot rely on constitutional provisions to secure the 
passage of legislation.  Decree power is useful, but only as a temporary measure, since decrees 
can be overridden by parliament.  Presidents cannot pass real legislation without submitting it to 
the full legislative process in parliament.  This process involves amendment, which the executive 
cannot control except by threatening to veto the final bill if it is unacceptable to the president.   
 Instead of using methods like Article 49 and the package vote, Russian presidents must 
negotiate with Duma deputies.  In this negotiation process, the Duma has numerous bargaining 
chips.  Consequently, presidents must take the Duma’s preferences into account, whether or not 
it is in opposition. 
 In sum, while both countries have powerful executives, the French government’s means 
of parliamentary control severely limit parliamentary influence in policy-making, while the 
Duma is a partner (if often a junior one) in that process.  However, the Assembly’s strong vote of 
no-confidence ensures that the Assembly is relevant during every election cycle.  This has 
important implications for the party system in each country. 
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III. POLITICAL PARTIES IN RUSSIA 
 
  
Political parties have long been taken to be essential to a functioning democracy.84  They 
perform a variety of functions, three of which are of particular importance to this study.  These 
three are: 
• To aggregate and express the interests of society; 
• To recruit the political elite, and form governments, and 
• To institutionalize an opposition. 
 
Previous studies of political parties have emphasized the first two functions.85  However, the 
overlooked third function, which I have proposed, is of no less importance. 
 All of these functions are forms of political communication which forge crucial links 
between the state and society.  “Parties are channels of expression,” Sartori writes.  “They 
transmit demands backed by pressure.  The party throws its own weight into the demands it feels 
compelled to respond to.”86  By organizing, expressing, and advancing the interests of various 
constituencies, parties keep one foot in society.  By winning votes, capturing power, and 
influencing legislation, they keep the other foot in the state.  In order to serve as a link and 
communication channel across the state-society divide, parties must be engaged in interest 
aggregation.  In order to be relevant, they must be able to capture power, and, when out of 
power, serve as a repository of opposition. 
 The extent to which a political party system as a whole fulfills these three functions is a 
factor in the overall health of democratic governance in that state.  In all categories, French 
political parties are performing their function better than their Russian counterparts.  Parties are 
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 interest-based and programmatic, and are very effective at recruiting the leadership and forming 
governments.  There is a vibrant and credible opposition.  Meanwhile, in Russia, the dominant 
party is a ‘party of power’ which is rooted, not in society, but in the state.  That party, United 
Russia, has little leverage with the executive, and as a result has scarcely been able to claim any 
ministerial posts or other political appointments.  United Russia, by competing in the electoral 
marketplace, has drawn votes from genuine, interest-based parties.  These parties, which now 
represent the opposition, have been steadily squeezed from the political arena thanks to the 
popularity of Vladimir Putin, whom United Russia unflinchingly supports. 
 The weak power of no-confidence of the Russian Duma is a significant cause of this sad 
state of affairs.  It prohibits the Duma (and by extension, parties) from influencing the 
composition of the government.  National leaders, as a result, are not dependent on parties for 
their position.  Instead, they rely on different forms of political capital, such as a personal 
association with the president.  Since national leaders are free from party influence, they are able 
to piece together their own, clientelistic party to serve their own ends.  These parties of power 
are then unleashed in the political realm, to the detriment of ordinary, interest-based political 
parties.  Real parties, unable to capture the executive and losing votes to parties of power, lack 
the pressure necessary to advocate social interests. 
 The success of parties of power, which can be traced back to the weak confidence 
mechanism, has a profound effect on democracy in Russia.  It produces a party system that is 
“seriously alienated from society,” and that “mirrors not social cleavages but the still-unsettled 
fragmentation of the near-the-power establishment.”87  Parties of power inhibit real political 
communication, and provide few real limits on the executive—two crucial elements of a 
democratic order. 
66 
 
  
 
A. INTEREST AGGREGATION IN RUSSIA 
 
 
Parties that engage in interest aggregation wind up being closely tied to segments of society.  In 
the process of aggregating interests and competing for office, parties form vital links between the 
society and the state.  Parties that actively aggregate interests respond to real cleavages in 
society, coming down on one side or another of a cultural divide.  Interest-based parties are 
essential to a working democracy. 
 Party platforms are a useful gauge of interest aggregation.  While platforms are only one 
piece any electoral struggle, they indicate what kind of voters parties intend to claim.  A platform 
that defends the interests of working-class people signals that the party is hoping to win the votes 
of blue-collar voters, not just through its platform, but through its ads and candidates’ appeals.   
 Voters’ response to those appeals is an equally important test of interest aggregation.  If 
working-class voters support the party which release a working-class program, it is safe to say 
that interest aggregation is taking place. 
Interest aggregation began to occur normally in Russia after the constitutional crisis of 
1993.  Interest-based parties found electoral success, particularly in the 1995 election.  However, 
interest-based parties in post-Soviet Russia have always faced competition from ‘parties of 
power.’  Parties of power are electoral vehicle of the current ruling elite, and are not tied to social 
cleavages.  Parties of power have been increasingly successful since the surprising showing of 
the pro-Putin party Unity in 1999.  
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 1.  The 1995 Parliamentary Election 
 
The 1995 elections sent deputies to the first five-year Duma.  The previous Duma, elected in the 
aftermath of the 1993 crisis, served for a provisional two years.  The Second Duma was 
characterized by a large and coherent Communist bloc, which served as the majority-maker in 
the parliament.  The Communist Party was highly programmatic and interest-based, while the 
second-largest party, Our Home is Russia, was neither.  Our Home is Russia was a proto-party of 
power, the predecessor of Unity and United Russia.  The third party in the Duma, the Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia, was partially interest-based, but also made vague appeals to 
nationalistic sentiment. 
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Table 3.1  The 1995 State Duma Election.  Source:  Belin and Orttung pp. 114-117 
Parties PR List % 
(Seats) 
Single-
Member 
District Seats 
Total  
Communist 
Party of the 
Russian 
Federation 
22.3% (99) 58 157  
Agrarian Party 
of Russia 
3.78% (0) 20 20  
Yabloko 6.89% (31) 14 45 
Our Home is 
Russia 
10.13% (45) 10 55 
Liberal 
Democratic 
Party 
11.18% (50) 1 51 
Independents 0 77 77 
Other left-wing 
parties 
0 30 30 
Other pro-
reform parties 
0 19 19 
Other pro-
government 
parties 
0 3 3 
Other 
nationalist 
parties 
0 7 7 
Others  7 7 
Total 225 225 450 
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a. The Communist Party     During the Yeltsin presidency, the Communist Party attempted to 
earn the votes of those most disaffected by the recent political and economic reforms.  In the run-
up to the 1993 Duma elections, the party advocated state control of the traditional ‘commanding 
heights’ of the economy, the nationalization of banks, and the prohibition of private ownership of 
land.  It also promised to guarantee welfare payments, to restore guaranteed employment,88 and 
to compensate ordinary citizens for their losses during the price liberalization of 1992.89  In its 
party program, the Communist Party launched a searing attack on President Yeltsin’s policies in 
particular as well as capitalism in general.90  The program also called for the restoration of 
elected soviets, free education and health care, and the re-establishment of a single state on the 
territory of the former USSR.91  This program was meant to appeal to pensioners and other 
welfare recipients, Communist Party members, and those who craved the stability of the old 
regime.  The party’s support in this period was primarily rooted among rural and regional voters, 
pensioners, low-income earners, workers, and the less-educated.92  Most tellingly for the subject 
of interest aggregation, support for the party program among Communist Party voters was 
significantly stronger than support for the party leader, Zyuganov.93  Voters had similar attitudes 
toward the allied Agrarian Party of Russia, which devised a party platform meant to appeal to 
those with vested interests in Russia’s large collective and state-owned farms.  It stridently 
opposed land reform that would allow the breakup of state farms, supported price controls for 
agricultural goods, and opposed the sale of any land to foreigners.  The Agrarian Party, like its 
Communist counterpart, appealed to a reliable and clearly defined constituency whose support 
was based on the party program, rather than the party leaders.94  
 
70 
 
 b. Our Home is Russia     The primary pro-government party in the 1995 election was Nash 
Dom—Rossiya, or Our Home is Russia.  Led by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, NDR set the tone 
for future ‘parties of power’ by relying on amorphous policy proposals that could appeal broadly 
without offering specifics.  The party program called for “stability and development, democracy 
and patriotism, confidence and order,” as well as “pragmatism” and “a civilized market.”  Other 
proposals were so contrived to offend no one that they appear vaguely contradictory—the party 
proposed, among other things, to encourage foreign investment while protecting Russian 
manufacturers, and to promote agricultural reform while regulating land ownership.95  As an 
early party of power, NDR established a model that would later be followed by United Russia.  
Many regional and federal elites, as well as prominent businessmen, associated themselves with 
the party, which benefited as a result from significant financial and political advantages.  The 
party was designed to protect the interests of the already-established executive and industrial 
elite.  One Russian newspaper, Nezavisimaya gazeta, suggested that the party’s initials stood for 
Nomenklaturniy dom Rossii, or ‘the Nomenklatura’s Home of Russia.’96  Since the party was 
really aggregating the interests of the ruling elite—that is, to secure the re-election of the 
president and hence defend the political status quo—rather than the interests of specific groups in 
society, NDR made only broad, mushy proposals in order to appeal to as wide an electorate as 
possible.  This behavior is typical of future parties of power. 
 
c. The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia     It is impossible to ignore the nationalist Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia, however distasteful the proposals of its leader, Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky.  The LDPR has enjoyed consistent and at times surprising electoral success.  
Zhirinovsky won six million votes in the 1991 elections for president of the RSFSR, polling 
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 third.  His electoral bloc was the second largest in the 1993 Duma, behind Russia’s Choice.  The 
party platform in the 1995 election called for the expansion of Russia’s borders and the division 
of the world into spheres of influence, a strong executive, and a reduction in the price of alcohol.  
Zhirinovsky also made efforts to stir up anti-Semitism.97  The party appealed to those whose 
sensibilities lay on the far right, who wanted to see Russia strong on the world stage and orderly 
at home.  But it also had significant appeal as a middle way between the pro-Yeltsin reform 
parties, which were tarnished by the pain of economic transition, and the Communist opposition, 
which was at least partially discredited by association with the previous regime.  As such, the 
LDPR can be seen in part as having aggregated the interests not just of nationalists, but of 
ordinary people dissatisfied with the emerging political dichotomy between reform parties 
centered around Yeltsin, and anti-reform leftists led by the Communist Party.   However, on the 
presidential campaign trail Zhirinovsky made ample use of vague appeals to patriotism and other 
non-controversial values that are the antithesis of interest aggregation.98  
 
 
2.  The 1999 Duma Election 
 
 
The 1999 elections to the State Duma were dominated by three parties which together made up 
well over fifty percent of the Duma:  the Communist Party, Unity, and Fatherland-All Russia 
(OVR).  Most surprising was the success of Unity, a pro-government, pro-Putin party.  Formed 
just three months before the election, Unity finished a close second behind the more established 
Communist Party in the party list vote.  As a party of power, Unity benefited from financial and 
other resources provided by powerful businessmen, campaign managers, and even government 
ministries.  It also received overwhelming and positive media coverage on the major television 
networks.99 
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 Table 3.2  Results of the 1999 State Duma election.  Source:  Central Electoral Commission of the Russian 
Federation 2000 (a) 121-2, 172. 
 
Parties PR List % Vote 
(number of seats) 
Single-Member 
District Seats 
Total number of 
seats 
Communist Party 24.3% (67) 46 113 
Unity 23.3% (64) 9 72 
Fatherland-All 
Russia 
13.3% (36) 31 66 
Union of Right 
Forces 
8.52% (24) 5 29 
Yabloko 5.93% (16) 4 21 
Zhirinovsky Bloc 5.98% (17) 0 17 
Our Home is Russia 1.2% (0) 7 7 
Other Parties  9 9 
Independents  106 106 
Total Seats 224 215 439 
 
   
a.  Fatherland-All Russia     Fatherland-All Russia is often described, like Our Home is Russia 
and United Russia, as a party of power.  While it is true that Fatherland-All Russia enjoyed the 
support of a significant portion of the elite, and benefited from the political, administrative, and 
financial resources associated with those elites, OVR differed from other parties of power in one 
significant way.  Unlike those parties, OVR was formed by elites in opposition to the ruling 
federal cadre—that is, against Yeltsin and his supporters.  OVR’s support was founded on 
regional elites, rather than the federal center, which resisted OVR’s rise.  The party was a 
coalition of elites seeking to capture the pinnacle of power from those already occupying it.  
Nevertheless, OVR still fit the mold of a party of power in its composition and its methods.  
Rather than providing a concrete policy program, OVR relied on vague, non-controversial and 
sometimes contradictory appeals to the median voter. 
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 OVR explicitly rejected any ideological label, claiming only to be a party of 
“pragmatists.”100  Its leading candidates were portrayed as able technocrats with years of 
experience.  This is admittedly a fine electoral strategy, but has very little to do with the 
aggregation of citizens’ interests.  OVR’s platform was tellingly brief, totaling just 575 words, 
about twice the length of this paragraph.  That platform, such as it was, claimed that, “We are
for providing decent living conditions to every Russian family, women, children, the elderly.  
Our principle of vital importance is to concentrate on concrete actions in the name of Russia and 
her people.”
 all 
 
at 
ote was 
 
imiyev, in the party. 
101  OVR wanted to maintain an “indivisible,” but still federated Russia; to create 
“the best conditions for active, talented people who take the initiative,” while “help[ing] those
who need support;” to protect private property without tolerating “unfair enrichment that goes 
against the interests of society;” to “maintain the rights of [minority] nationalities,” while 
preserving “uniform standards for citizens’ rights over the whole territory of the country.”102  
These proposals are meant to appeal to everyone and leave no one behind.  Colton and McFaul’s 
surveys find that voters’ issue concerns had no bearing on whether or not they voted for OVR.  
The party did pick up some of the protest vote against the outgoing Yeltsin administration, and 
did well among Muscovites and non-ethnic Russians.103  This tendency does not indicate th
OVR advanced the particular interests of those constituents, however.  The Moscow v
largely driven by the prominence of Moscow’s popular mayor, Yurii Luzhkov, within OVR.  
Likewise, the national minority vote was encouraged by the presence of well-known non-ethnic
Russian leaders, like Tartarstan president Mintimer Sha
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 b. Communist Party     True to form in the past elections, the Communist Party explicitly 
identified its position on a variety of campaign issues.  This time, however, the party attempted 
to broaden its appeal to non-communist voters without alienating its base.  It sought in its 
campaign materials to attract younger voters and city-dwellers.  The party moderated its 
economic positions, even going so far as to affirm the sanctity of property rights.  Nevertheless it 
continued to resist the privatization of urban utilities and farmland.  The party attempted to 
straddle traditionally conservative communists and more moderate voters by standing firm on 
key issues like farm reform, without advocating a reversal of Yeltsin’s market reforms.  
However, Yeltsin and his policies were not spared the Communists’ vitriol.  They decried 
Yeltsin for having created a culture of theft that benefited only the oligarchs at the expense of the 
Russian people.  In keeping with this populist theme, the Communists also called for reductions 
in the price of food, industrial commodities, energy and public transportation.104 
 The Communist Party flavored its concrete proposals with nationalist slogans.  The party 
accused various enemies of Russia of seeking to destroy Russian culture.  The Communists took 
particular aim at the United States, NATO, and global institutions like the World Bank, which 
the party accused of cooperating to denigrate Russia in the interests of foreign capital.  
Furthermore, the Communist Party did not distinguish itself from Unity, OVR, or the nationalist 
parties by opposing the second war in Chechnya.105   
 Voters drawn to the Communist Party were largely rural and old.  The CPRF drew its 
strongest support from the smallest communities, and from the oldest voters.  Approximately 46 
percent of voters who were born in the 1930s voted for the Communists, as opposed to only 13 
percent of voters who were born in the 1970s and 80s.  Likewise, approximately 41% of voters 
in the smallest quintile of communities voted Communist, compared to 17 percent of the largest 
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 quintile.106  Communist voters tended to be poorly-educated and low on the economic ladder.  
As a party, the Communists seem to have aggregated the interests of those most disadvantaged 
by the economic and political transformations of the 1990s, and those most critical of them.  
 
c. Liberal Parties     The liberal parties, the Union of Right Forces (SPS) and Yabloko, “went to 
great lengths to systematize their policy ideas and to hang their 1999 campaigns on them.”107  
Each party advocated policies they claimed would bring Russia in line with European standards 
in quality of life, business practice, as well as democracy and human rights.  SPS supported 
smaller government, a balanced budget, and a flat income tax.108  Yabloko promised to reduce 
taxes and create free trade zones to encourage foreign investment.  Yabloko tempered its liberal 
policies with a leftist touch, however, calling for increases in pensions, social security benefits, 
student stipends, and the minimum wage.109 
 
d. Unity Unity’s modus operandi provides the paragon for parties of power.  Unity 
published its policy ideas two months after the election.  The party, like OVR, publicly eschewed 
ideology, even ‘centrism.’  Unity claimed to be nothing more than the party of ‘consolidation.’  
Broadly, Unity’s position was pro-market and opposed any re-division of property.  It also 
promised to come down on corruption.  The party’s leaders urged patriotism and the 
development of a national, rather than political, ideology.  The party took a firmly nationalistic 
stance on Chechnya.  Unity, more than anything, portrayed an attitude.  It was pro-system, and 
supported the current regime.  At the same time, it advertised itself as a party of youth and vigor; 
an insurgent party of promise, but still allied with the current status quo.110  The party was also 
closely associated with the popular prime minister, Vladimir Putin.  Unity’s leader, Sergei 
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 Shoigu, proclaimed that “The policy of the current government is worthy of support.  This is all 
the more so now that, under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, policy has come to be so decisive 
and purposive.”111  At the same time, while supporting the government’s policy, Unity expressed 
disdain for petty politicians and careerists.  Shoigu claimed: 
Our voters are tired of endless political chirping, of public intrigues, and of one politician 
scheming ad hominem against the other…the Duma factions live in a virtual world they 
created for themselves alone.  They are driven by political sloganeering and programs 
and care only for their own image.  We are driven by a sense of responsibility, which we 
feel almost in our bones.  It is political theater which excites them.  It is the rebirth of 
Russia that excites us.112 
 
  Clearly, Unity’s appeal did not rest on a policy platform that represented the specific interests 
of large numbers of citizens.  Instead, Unity attempted to appeal to everyone, without alienating 
anyone.  Hence the absence of a party program, and the reliance on a vaguely contradictory 
attitude to earn votes.  By supporting the government’s policies, Unity maintained its mantle as a 
party of power, and held on to all the trappings such a status entails—resources, connections, 
money, media access, and so on.  At the same time, it could appeal to those who were 
dissatisfied with the status quo by claiming to be a party of up-and-comers who would do away 
with the corruption, mismanagement, and ‘political theater’ of the previous years.  That Unity 
could successfully play both angles, and refuse to produce a party program, and still be so 
enormously successful, speaks volumes about the state of party politics in Russia.  Unity owed 
its success to many factors, not least of which was its association with Putin.  Nevertheless, the 
fact that Unity became the second-largest faction in the Duma two months after its inception 
without bothering to put forward a party platform indicates that the process of interest 
aggregation was very undeveloped in the 1999 election.  Voters were not concerned that a party 
expressed their particular, issue-based interests.  Those who supported Unity were not looking 
77 
 
 for lower taxes, higher subsidies, or any other particular programmatic demand.  Instead, Unity’s 
appeal was based on a fuzzy aura that combined newness with stability and firmness of purpose. 
  
3. Subsequent Elections 
 
Subsequent parliamentary elections in Russia have expanded the influence of the party of power.  
Elections in 2003 gave a two-thirds majority to United Russia, the party formed by the merger of 
Unity with Fatherland-All Russia, after being joined by over 80 percent of single-member district 
deputies.113  United Russia won 37% of the vote, easily eclipsing its nearest rivals.114  In doing 
so, it did not deviate from its methods in 1999.  United Russia, according to Lilia Shevtsova, 
“did not participate in televised debates, it did not present its platform—it did nothing.”115  
Instead of competing for votes based on interest aggregation, the party continued to cling to the 
persona of the president. 
The most recent elections, held in December 2007, were the first conducted under new 
electoral procedures which abolished the single-member districts and raised the threshold for 
participation in the Duma to seven percent of the national vote.  As expected, United Russia won 
the vote handily, with more than sixty percent support from the electorate.  The once-mighty 
Communist Party is be the only opposition group in the legislature, but its influence will be 
much reduced after winning only eleven percent of votes.  The mostly pro-government Liberal 
Democratic Party, along with the Kremlin-backed Just Russia, just passed the electoral threshold 
with eight percent support each.116 
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 Table 3.3  National vote for the Fifth State Duma, December 2007.  Taken from the Central Electoral Commission 
of the Russian Federation.  Parties entering the Duma listed in italics. 
Party Percentage of National Vote 
United Russia 64.1 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation 11.6 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 8.2 
A Just Russia 7.8 
Agrarian Party of Russia 2.3 
Yabloko 1.6 
Civic Force 1.1 
Union of Right Forces 1.0 
Patriots of Russia 0.9 
  
 
 
The new Duma will be completely controlled by United Russia, thanks to that party’s 
large majority and the absence of any independent deputies.  United Russia’s majority was not 
achieved by appealing to the discrete interests of particular sectors of society.  United Russia did 
not cobble together a coalition of voters and interest groups the way that parties and nominees do 
in, for example, the United States.  Instead, United Russia cast the parliamentary elections as a 
personal referendum on President Putin’s leadership, and his future after 2008.  Barred by the 
constitution from accepting a third consecutive term as president, Putin agreed to head United 
Russia’s party list as a candidate for the Duma.  With the president’s endorsement, a vote for 
United Russia became a vote for Putin.  Indeed, United Russia’s campaign advertisements 
scarcely mentioned the name of the party or its proposals.  Instead, billboards proclaimed slogans 
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 like “Moscow votes for Putin!” or “Putin’s Plan—the Victory of Russia!”  Days before the 
election, The New York Times observed that “Mr. Putin has transformed the election into a vote 
of confidence on his leadership and on the nation’s economic recovery…”117  Rather than 
running a campaign based on issues, United Russia relied upon President Putin’s immense 
popularity to make a very limited case to the Russian people—that a vote for United Russia, and 
thus for Putin, was a vote for strength and prosperity.  United Russia immediately seized upon 
the results as a popular blessing of Putin and his policies.   ''The vote affirmed the main idea: that 
Vladimir Putin is the national leader, that the people support his course, and this course will 
continue,'' announced Boris Gryzlov, Duma speaker and leader of United Russia.118 
 Nationwide polling in the run-up to the 2007 Duma elections reveals that United Russia 
remains a program-averse party, at least in voters’ perception.  When asked why they intended to 
vote for United Russia, forty percent of supporters cited the party’s close affiliation with Putin. 
Nineteen percent intended to vote United Russia because it is the strongest party, and 15% 
supported United Russia because of its program.  Only six percent claimed that United Russia 
represented their interests, and another six percent believe that United Russia defends ordinary 
people.  By contrast, supporters of the CPRF were much more likely to defend their choice by 
responding that the Communist Party represented their interests (22%), defends ordinary people 
(27%), and has a program worthy of support (37%).  Respondents were much more likely to say 
that United Russia represented the interests of oligarchs, bureaucrats, and siloviki, while they 
associated the CPRF with ordinary people and “the poorest of the poor.”119  Even eight years 
after the founding of Unity, United Russia is far more associated with the persona of Vladimir 
Putin than with any program or ideology.  The Communist Party, at least in the eyes of voters, 
remains a programmatic, interest-aggregating party. 
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 power make blanket appeals and project attitudes rather than proposals.  By doing so they hope 
to win the support of large numbers of voters in order to legitimate the current elite.  Regional, 
federal, and business elites join parties of power so long as it is politically expedient, but readily 
abandon them if the parties fall out of favor.120 
 The success of parties of power in modern Russia does not bode well for the health of 
democracy there.  When votes for United Russia and Just Russia are totaled, 72% of voters in the 
Duma election cast their vote for a party of power.  Months later, in April, the chairman of Just 
Russia, Sergei Mironov, declared that the party must draft a political program and formulate “a 
strict ideology” to inform voters of the party’s socialist stance.121  Where was Just Russia’s 
platform in the 2007 campaign?  Without responding to real cleavages in society, parties of 
power are poor conduits of political communication from the bottom up.  Instead, they procure a 
semblance of electoral legitimacy for the status quo without facilitating any real dialogue 
between the elite and the populace.  
 
5.  Presidential Politics and Interest Aggregation 
 
Russia’s post-1993 presidential elections are also illuminating on the subject of political parties.  
In all four elections—1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008—the winning candidate has not been 
explicitly affiliated with any party.  In 1996, Boris Yeltsin was able to personally construct a 
winning coalition using the specter of a return to communism as a rallying point.  Victory for 
Vladimir Putin in 2000 was ensured by Yeltsin’s early resignation, which allowed Putin to 
‘campaign’ as acting president.  By 2004, Putin’s popularity was incontrovertible and he sailed 
to an easy victory.  In 2008, Putin orchestrated the succession of Dmitri Medvedev to the 
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 presidency while Putin himself took up the job of prime minister.  In all four cases, the role of 
political parties in assembling the winning coalition has been peripheral at best.  Parties’ ability 
to communicate the interests of society upward to the state is consequently hampered. 
Candidates for Russia’s highest office can engage in interest aggregation.  Significantly 
however, this aggregation can occur outside the confines of political parties.  Consider, for 
example, President Yeltsin’s campaign during the 1996 election.  Yeltsin ran a campaign that 
emphasized Russia’s ‘forced choice.’  Instead of allowing the campaign to be fought over the 
effects of Yeltsin’s policies in office (wage arrears, unemployment, poverty, crime, the war in 
Chechnya, and so on), Yeltsin turned the election instead into a referendum on communism.  He 
portrayed himself as the only viable alternative to a return to communist control—and heavily 
emphasized all the negatives of the Soviet past.  Yeltsin, without joining a party or accepting a 
nomination, heavily courted particular constituencies:  voters in key regions and the major cities, 
the young, nationalists, liberals, and, most importantly, the wealthy business and banking elite.   
In short, Yeltsin attempted to create an  
anti-communist coalition composed of those social groups who either already had 
benefited from the reforms or hoped to benefit from them, and who for ideological or 
other reason were afraid of even a partial restoration of communist-era political and 
economic systems.122 
 
And he was largely successful.  The president dominated the youth vote, polling thirty-nine 
percent of voters under the age of twenty-four.  By contrast, Yeltsin’s communist rival Gennady 
Zyuganov earned the support of only eleven percent of young voters.  Yeltsin fared even better 
among the well-educated.  Fifty-two percent of those with a university degree voted for Yeltsin, 
while twenty-three percent chose Zyuganov.  Thanks to extensive campaigning, he fared well in 
regions which had supported him in 1993, but had started to slip away in the 1995 parliamentary 
election.  Eight of fourteen such regions saw marked gains for Yeltsin.123  The president 
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 effectively aggregated the interests of these sectors, but—significantly—as an individual, not as 
a party representative.   
  Russia’s oligarchs owed their privileged positions to Yeltsin’s privatization policies, and 
feared a rollback under communist leadership.  As such, they heavily favored Yeltsin with 
financial resources and access to their media networks.124   
It is of great significance that this coalition could be forged without the support of a 
durable, well-organized party apparatus.  After rejecting his Communist Party membership in the 
latter days of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin studiously avoided affiliating himself with any political 
party.  In fact, in the early stages of his reelection campaign, Yeltsin and his advisers attempted 
to run a campaign exclusively based on patronage and administrative leverage, eschewing a party 
apparatus entirely.  Yeltsin leaned on appointed regional administrators, who could be dismissed 
by Yeltsin at any time, to stump on his behalf.  He encouraged elected regional leaders, who 
could not be dismissed, to aid the Yeltsin campaign, offering them favorable power-sharing deals 
between the center and the periphery.  This bureaucratic approach failed miserably, as most 
regional leaders defected to the sidelines, waiting to see which presidential candidate would 
emerge on top.125 
After a change in campaign management, Yeltsin’s team tried a different approach, this 
time relying on political organization rather than bureaucratic pressure.  The new team, led by 
Anatoli Chubais, formed the Social Movement in Support of the President (or, using its Russian 
initials, the ODOPP).  The Social Movement was not a broad-based political party.  Rather, it 
was a campaign organization staffed by former operatives of Our Home is Russia and 
Democratic Russia, parties whose stars had waned in the aftermath of the Communist victory in 
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 the 1995 Duma election.  The movement was generously bankrolled by the business 
community.126   
Just as significantly, the coalition quickly fell apart after Yeltsin’s re-election.  The 
ODOPP, which was organized around a single purpose, lacked the longevity of a genuine 
political party, which continues to aggregate the interests of its constituents and lobby for them 
between elections.  With Yeltsin safely in office and in the absence of an imminent Communist 
threat to hold the coalition together, ODOPP collapsed.  Within a month of Yeltin’s reelection, 
the press, politicians, and parties which had endorsed Yeltsin’s bid began once again to criticize 
him.127 
Yeltsin’s success in the absence of an entrenched, broad, and well-organized party 
apparatus stands in stark contrast to the situation for his rival for the presidency, communist 
party leader Gennady Zyuganov.  While Yeltsin effectively had no political organization capable 
of supporting a reelection bid until the creation of the ODOPP, Zyuganov had at his disposal the 
largest and best-disciplined political party in Russia.  The Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation could at the time claim more than half a million members, regional branches in every 
corner of Russia, and a loyal constituency with a propensity for high levels of turnout.128  The 
party was coming off a win in 1995, which had thrown the liberal and democratic parties into 
disarray and given the communists and their allies a plurality in the Duma.  All the same, 
Zyuganov lost the runoff election by 13 points, at a time when social and political issues tilted 
against the incumbent. 
Assured of the support of the voters who had propelled the communist bloc to victory in 
the Duma elections, Zyuganov eyed capturing the votes of those with nationalist sympathies.  
Yeltsin attempted to create a broad coalition of anti-communists; Zyuganov hoped to forge an 
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 alliance of communists and nationalists.  Indeed, Zyuganov did not run for president as the 
nominee of the Communist Party, but rather as the nominee of a national-patriotic bloc.  His 
rhetoric emphasized rodina and narod, the motherland and the people.129  Zyuganov was cast as 
a hard-working, good-hearted man of peasant stock, and the peasantry itself was extolled as a 
pillar of the state.130  Zyuganov’s program denounced Western values, called for the restoration 
of the territory of the USSR, and accused Yeltsin of abandoning 25 million ethnic Russians to 
the newly-independent republics.131  Overtly communist proposals, such as the abolition of the 
presidency, were downplayed or removed altogether, while values shared by communists and 
nationalists alike took center stage.  A strong military, higher minimum wage, and state 
ownership of the “commanding heights” of the economy, for example, were all advocated by 
Zyuganov.132 
The 1996 presidential election illustrates an important fact:  It has not been necessary for 
candidates to rely on the blessings of a political party to succeed in capturing the most powerful 
position in Russian politics.  Boris Yeltsin was able to win reelection by relying on an ad hoc 
political organization that quickly dissipated after his victory.  He was able to personally cobble 
together a temporary coalition to safeguard the reforms of the post-Soviet era.  He accomplished 
this feat through the financial blessings of the business elite, his dominance of national 
television, and a campaign strategy that successfully reduced the field to a stark choice:  Yeltsin 
or a return of Soviet-style communism.  The campaign also indicates that, at least for Yeltsin, an 
outright bureaucratic approach to campaigning would not be sufficient.  Some measure of 
political organization was necessary to carry out the campaign.  This last was a lesson well-
learned by Vladimir Putin and his team when assembling Unity on the eve of elections in 1999. 
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 6. Putin and Medvedev 
 
Putin’s campaign for the presidency in 2000 was not unlike Unity’s campaign for the Duma in it 
scarcity of campaign proposals.  He produced no written program, claiming it would be wrong to 
do so in an abbreviated campaign.133  Instead he relied on his visibility and authority as acting 
president to win support.  Putin repeated this routine in the 2004 election, declaring that “it is 
inappropriate for an incumbent head of state to be advertising himself.”134  Dmitry Medvedev, 
too, did not place much emphasis on policy when campaigning for president.  As his official 
campaign began, Medvedev gave a platform speech that was light on specifics and heavy with 
platitudes.135  Some Russian observers noted that Medvedev’s maiden speech contained 
something for everyone.  He vowed to fight corruption, gave his support to freedom, justice, and 
an independent media, and declared that what Russia needs most are a few decades of “calm and 
stable development.”136  “In general, the presidential candidate sent a message to practically all 
groups of the population - the retirees, the low-paid, the small and medium businesses, the 
political opponents and the skeptics,” observed one Russian internet news portal.137  Presidential 
politics have followed the pattern of party politics.  Presidents have been able to win reelection 
and secure their chosen successors without resorting to messy electoral politics.  Instead, they 
have been able to rely on systemic resources while using non-controversial campaign appeals to 
win votes without alienating large sections of the electorate.  This trend has only accelerated with 
time, ranging from President Yeltsin’s narrow victory in 1996 to Vladimir Putin’s smooth 
transfer of power to Dmitri Medvedev in 2008. 
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 7.  Conclusions 
 
Some political parties in Russia do perform interest aggregation.  However, such parties are 
hampered by the ability of the president and his affiliated parties to build ad hoc coalitions at 
election time.  Presidential candidates and political parties can win broad electoral support 
without actively campaigning on behalf of some particular group in society.  Since parties of 
power can be successful without aggregating the interests of particular segments of society, those 
parties cannot effectively advocate for those interests before political leaders, and have no reason 
to try.  Genuine parties lose votes and influence to the parties of power, reducing party-based 
interest aggregation to an anemic state in Russia. 
 The Duma’s weak power of no-confidence is partially responsible for this state of affairs, 
by making it difficult for parties to win executive power.  As a result, parties formed by those 
already in power have a distinct advantage in access and influence.  In 2007, 19% of United 
Russia voters supported that party because it was ‘the strongest party.’  Only 4% of Communist 
supporters took the same position.138    Real, interest-based political parties are continually 
disadvantaged by their inability to claim executive power, allowing parties of power to fill the 
void. 
 
 
 
 
B.  POLITICAL PARTIES AND OPPOSITION IN RUSSIA 
 
Political opposition in the Russian Federation may form in a variety of places—in the State 
Duma, in the regional executives and legislatures, in powerful business interests and political 
clans, or even in the street.  During the Yeltsin years the locus of political opposition was the 
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 State Duma, particularly after the victory of the Communists and allied groups in the 1995 
election.  This opposition took advantage of its own discipline and size, as well as Yeltsin’s 
political weakness, to deal the executive a few major defeats.  Over the course of Putin’s tenure, 
on the other hand, political opposition in the Duma has been largely sidelined or co-opted, 
forcing the remaining dissenters into the streets, where they have been vigorously contained by 
the security forces. 
 Political parties form an opposition by stymieing the proposals of the leading faction, 
advancing their own proposals, and by presenting a coherent alternative to the voters in the hopes 
of capturing the leading role after the next election.  Size matters in an opposition, but cohesion 
is just as (or more) important.  A hopelessly divided opposition will not have much success in 
any of these three categories. 
 In Russia, political opposition has arrayed itself against the executive along three flanks:  
market-democratic parties, such as Yabloko; nationalist-patriotic parties, like Zhirinovsky’s 
LDPR; and most importantly, the communist-agrarian left.  Even under Yeltsin, opposition from 
all three flanks was neither constant nor intractable.  Compromise and cooptation was frequent.  
However, the size of the Communist bloc in the State Duma after 1995 as well as the disciplined 
voting of its deputies enabled it to affect government policy ranging from the federal budget all 
the way to the appointment of the prime minister. 
 The Duma’s weak power of no-confidence contributes to a system which excludes 
opposition parties and advantages parties of power, by making it difficult for parliamentary 
factions to influence executive power.  Even when the opposition controlled the Duma and 
influenced the formation of the Primakov government, it was unable to fulfill its goals.139  
Blocked from winning executive power through parliament, parties exercise little influence over 
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 national leaders.  These leaders are able, in turn, to manufacture parties of power to defend their 
own interests.  Parties of power are advantaged by their access to the executive and, when 
attached to a popular leader like Vladimir Putin, can steadily push opposition out of the system. 
 
1. Fragmentation in the First Duma 
 
The First State Duma of the new republic was highly fragmented, with seats divided among eight 
significant parties, a smattering of smaller parties, and a large group of independents.  The three 
main players in the Duma were pro-government Russia’s Choice, Zhirinovsky’s Liberal 
Democrats, and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.   
 
Table 3.4  Membership of the First Duma 
Modified from http://www.russiavotes.org The Levada Center 
Party factions Seats in the First Duma (%), 1994 
Russia’s Choice 70 (15.6%) 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 64 (14.2%) 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation 48 (10.7%) 
Agrarian Party 33 (7.3%) 
Yabloko 23 (5.1%) 
Women of Russia 23 (5.1%) 
Party of Russian Unity and Consensus 18 (4.0%) 
Democratic Party of Russia 15 (3.3%) 
Small parties and others 15 (3.3%) 
Independents (at the time of election) 141 (31.3%) 
Total 450 
 
90 
 
 Opposition in this First Duma was sporadic and piecemeal.  Deputies’ voting behavior 
indicates the inability of a coherent opposition coalition to form.  Consider the voting on the 
government’s proposed budgets from 1994 to 1996.  The government passed the 1994 federal 
budget with only Yabloko and the Liberal Democrats dissenting.  Yabloko, in particular, 
displayed a low level of party discipline, with nearly half its deputies straying from the party line 
and refusing to vote.  Both the Communist and Agrarian parties supported the 1994 budget in 
large numbers.  As a result, the budget passed with 60 percent of deputies voting in favor, 18 
percent against, and 22% abstaining or not voting at all. 
 In 1995 the LDPR switched sides and supported the government overwhelmingly.  The 
Agrarian Party voted in favor of the budget with a high degree of discipline, while the 
Communist Party largely voted against.  Yabloko joined the Communists in voting against the 
budget, but with more than a third of its deputies choosing not to vote.  The 1995 budget passed 
with 63% approval, with 18% voting with the opposition.   
 The vote on the 1996 budget mirrored the 1995 vote, with only Yabloko and the 
Communists voting against.  Disciplined majorities in all other significant parties ensured the 
passage of the bill.  In all three cases the government was better able to form a coalition around 
the passage of the budget than the opposition was able to block it.  Wooing the Communist and 
Agrarian parties in the 1994 vote practically guaranteed the passage of the budget.140 
 Another test for the opposition in the early days of the republic occurred on October 27, 
1994, when a vote of no-confidence was called in the government of Viktor Chernomyrdin.  The 
vote was called in response to “the Government’s failing to carry out the 1994 budget and the 
devaluation of the ruble by 30 percent” on the so-called Black Tuesday two weeks prior.141  The 
measure did not reach the simple majority necessary to pass, although a large plurality of 
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 deputies voted in favor of censuring the government.  By contrast only 12 percent opposed the 
motion outright.  Highly disciplined votes from the LDPR and the CPRF formed the backbone of 
support for the measure, in addition to less consistent support from the Agrarian Party and 
independents.  Two parties—Yabloko and Women of Russia—were successful in instructing 
their deputies not to vote one way or another.   
The story of the First Duma is the inability of any stable parliamentary alliance to form in 
opposition to the government.  In the first budget vote only two parties defied the government—
the Liberal Democrats and Yabloko.  It would prove impossible for a cohesive opposition to 
form along the LDPR-Yabloko axis, however, as the political differences between those two 
parties are too deep for them to build an alliance with any staying power.  In the succeeding 
budget battles, the LDPR sided consistently with the government.  The inability of the 
Communists and Agrarians to vote together on the 1995 and 1996 budgets, despite their 
sympathetic ideological positions, further spelled defeat for any potential opposition bloc. 
 It is notable that in all of these cases—three budget votes and one vote of no-
confidence—the full spectrum of political opposition in the Duma failed to coalesce around one 
position.  Never did the LDPR, the Communist Party, the Agrarian Party, and Yabloko vote as 
one bloc to defeat the government.  The fractious nature of the opposition allowed the 
government to steer its policies through the Duma without much resistance.  This situation would 
change with the composition of the Duma after the 1995 parliamentary election. 
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 2.  The Second Duma and Communist Control  
 
In 1995 voters returned a Duma that was far less fragmented than its predecessor.  Only four 
political parties earned more than the 5% of the vote necessary to win representation in the Duma 
on the party-list ballot.  The largest of these was the CPRF, which won 149 seats in the new 
legislature.  The pro-government party, Our Home is Russia, came in a distant second with 65 
seats, followed by the LDPR (51 seats) and Yabloko (46 seats).  In this environment the political 
opposition found it much easier to muster the votes necessary to defeat President Yeltsin on a 
variety of issues.  This was particularly true during Russia’s economic and political crisis of 
1998.  During this period the opposition was able to secure its preferred candidate for prime 
minister over the president’s own pick, and became increasingly adept at overturning presidential 
vetoes. 
Table 3.5  Membership of the Second Duma 
Party Factions Seats in the Second Duma (%), 1996 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation 157 (34.9%) 
Liberal Democratic Party 51 (11.3%) 
Our Home is Russia 55 (12.2%) 
Yabloko 45 (10%) 
Agrarian Party of Russia 20 (4.4%) 
Independents 77 (17.1%) 
Russia’s Choice 9 (2%) 
Power to the People! 9 (2%) 
Small parties* 27 (6%) 
Total 450 
  *Parties with 5 or fewer seats. 
Modified from www.russiavotes.org  The Levada Center 
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 A major test for the opposition came in April of 1998, when Yeltsin sacked his 
overambitious prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, and nominated as his replacement the 
formerly-obscure Sergei Kiriyenko.  Kiriyenko had served a year and a half as the government’s 
Fuel and Power minister before being tapped as prime minister.  Duma deputies rebelled at the 
prospect of such a political neophyte becoming next-in-line for the presidency and began to resist 
his candidacy.  The first vote on Kiriyenko’s nomination failed, receiving only 32% support, 
with 41% opposed and 26% not voting.  The second vote, which occurred a week later, was even 
more decisive as opposition coalesced against the president’s nominee.  Sixty percent of deputies 
opposed Kiriyenko, while 25% voted in favor, and 15% did not vote.  The Communist Party, the 
LDPR, Yabloko, People’s Power, and Agrarian Party all voted against the measure with an 
impressive degree of discipline.  Our Home is Russia and Russia’s Regions supported Kiriyenko, 
but could only muster some eighty votes between them.  The government also picked off the 
support of a majority of independents.142   
 The third vote, of course, is the most important and consequential in the nomination 
process.  According to the constitution, if the Duma rejects the president’s nominee three times, 
the president is entitled to dismiss the Duma and install his nominee over its objection.  As a 
result it is not surprising that in the third round, the Duma approved Kiriyenko’s appointment.  
The third vote passed with 56% support, only 5% voting in opposition, and 39% not voting.143
 While the opposition was unable to prevent Kiriyenko’s appointment due to the 
constitutional machinery of the republic, the nomination battle marks the first major instance of 
cohesion and cooperation both within and among parties opposed to the president.  All three 
flanks of the political opposition—democratic, hard left, and nationalist—were able to control 
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 their deputies and vote as a bloc.  The united opposition was able to extract a few concessions 
from Yeltsin, but the real benefits would accrue to the party factions in another nomination fight 
four months later. 
 The escalating financial crisis destroyed what little confidence the parliament had in 
Kiriyenko’s government.  Deputies began to call for Yeltsin’s resignation, and preparations were 
made for a no-confidence vote on the government.  Seeking a scapegoat, Yeltsin dismissed 
Kiriyenko.  In his place, Yeltsin re-nominated Chernoyrdin, expecting a swift confirmation.  The 
parliament again revolted, blaming Chernomyrdin and Yeltsin for the economic policies which 
had brought Russia to the 1998 crisis.  In the first vote, 56% of deputies voted against 
Chernomyrdin, with only 21% voting in favor.  The Communists, Agrarians and Yabloko were 
particularly strident in their opposition to the nominee, while the Liberal Democrats refused to 
vote almost to a man.  Only Our Home is Russia voted for Chernomyrdin with any discipline.   
 The outcome of the second vote was better for the government, which picked up 44 votes 
in favor of Chernomyrdin.  However, the vote still revealed how far the parliament had swung 
against Yeltsin, as 60% of the chamber still opposed the nomination.  The big success for the 
government in this vote was bringing Zhirinovsky and the LDPR into the ‘yea’ column.  Forty-
eight Liberal Democrats voted for Chernomyrdin, while only two did not vote.  Nevertheless the 
alliance of Communists, Agrarians, Yabloko, People’s Power, and a majority of independents 
continued to hold.  The stage was set for the third and final vote.  The opposition had a choice:  
to accept Yeltsin’s nominee, or to defy the president and risk the consequences of dissolution.  A 
third option was also prepared in the form of articles of impeachment against Yeltsin.  The Duma 
cannot be dissolved constitutionally while impeachment proceedings are underway. 
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  Opposition leaders calculated that Yeltsin was politically too weak, and the economic 
crisis too severe, for him to contemplate dissolving the parliament and adding to the chaos.  
Kommersant, a business-oriented newspaper, reported on September 2, 1998 that,  
[Communist Party leader Gennady] Zyuganov is very well aware that the Yeltsin of 1998 
is not the Yeltsin of 1993.  He knows what it cost the President back then to bring tanks 
onto the streets of Moscow.  He is certain that the President could not repeat that episode 
today. 
 
A parliamentary dissolution, or (even worse) a standoff like that in 1993 would only add to the 
uncertainty in Russian markets, while the economy continued to founder.  Acknowledging that 
the worsening economic situation gave him no room to make a stand against parliament, Yeltsin 
accepted the deputies’ choice for prime minister.  Yevgeny Primakov, the Duma’s candidate, 
was approved by 70% of deputies.  He enjoyed vigorous support from the Communists, 
Agrarians, Yabloko, Russia’s Regions, and People’s Power.  His nomination even won the 
support of about half of Our Home is Russia deputies, with the other half not voting.  Only the 
Liberal Democrats opposed Primakov in large numbers.144 
 The crisis of 1998 also enabled the opposition to assemble majorities large enough to 
overcome presidential vetoes in significant numbers.  In fact, the opposition became increasingly 
capable after the 1995 election of generating the two-thirds majority necessary to overturn a 
veto.  In 1996 the Duma successfully voted to override 20 presidential vetoes.  In 1997 that 
number rose to 37 veto overrides.145  
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 Table 3.6  Presidential Vetoes and Overrides by the State Duma 
Year Presidential Vetoes Vetoes overridden by the 
State Duma (percentage of 
total vetoes) 
1996 48 20 (41.7%) 
1997 80 37 (46.3%) 
1998 65 44 (67.7%) 
Total 193 101 (52.3%) 
Modified from Troxel, Tiffany pp 98-99. 
 
 
 
It must be noted that the academic literature on presidential vetoes in Russia is somewhat 
vague and contradictory.  The reporting of vetoes by the presidential administration and the 
media is sporadic and irregular, unlike the procedures in place in the United States.  As a result, 
for example, Andrea Chandler arrives at a smaller number of vetoes in the period 1996-1999 
than does Troxel.  Chandler counts only 126 vetoes by surveying the publications of the 
presidential administration as well as various Russian newspapers.146 
 The data presented accounts for veto overrides by the State Duma only.  It does not 
consider overrides of the same vetoes in the Federation Council, which would be necessary for 
the bill to become law over the president’s objection.  However, whether or not any particular 
vetoed bill became law is irrelevant to the topic at hand.  It is more important to note that the 
opposition coalition was able to generate two-thirds majorities on a variety of bills. 
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 3.  Opposition in the 1990s – Conclusion  
 
Earlier I discussed these events—the appointment of Primakov and the overturning of 
presidential vetoes—in the context of political institutions.  I used the situation to demonstrate 
that the State Duma, as an institution, is capable of triumphing over the presidency in the process 
of choosing a new prime minister.  Here it is also illustrative of the potential for a vigorous 
opposition to form against the government, organized along political party lines.  The First Duma 
was too fragmented, both between political parties and within them, to mount an effective 
opposition.  Deputies’ voting behavior was undisciplined, and factions proved unable to align 
consistently to oppose the government’s proposals.  Parties in the Second Duma, by contrast, 
were able to form stable coalitions around the large Communist-Agrarian bloc.  The resurgence 
of the CPRF in the 1995 election indicates that political parties offered a credible alternative to 
President Yeltsin’s policies and the turbulence associated with them.  This coalition was able to 
behave as a genuine political opposition, which was able to assert its will even in the face of the 
president’s considerable constitutional advantages.  Of course, had Russia a strong vote of no-
confidence, the Communist Party could have claimed the premiership outright.  Despite the 
limitations imposed by the constitution, opposition was present and healthy both inside and 
outside the parliament in the 1990s.  The opposition coalition, which ranged from the far left to 
the far right, would no longer be able to perform this role after the election of President Putin and 
the ascendancy of United Russia. 
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 4.  Counter-Opposition – United Russia 
 
It is impossible to consider the state of political opposition in Putin’s Russia without discussing 
the party with which the opposition must contend.  That party, which has emerged as a political 
juggernaut, is United Russia.  Party politics under Putin is defined by the rise of United Russia, 
the country’s first truly effective party of power.  Originally organized by Kremlin insiders to 
deflect the presidential ambitions of a different set of political elites, United Russia has grown to 
become by far the most popular political party in the history of the Russian Federation.  In all the 
elections it has contested, from 1999 to 2007, it has served as the repository of votes in favor of 
Vladimir Putin, rather than advancing its own independent agenda.  From its very inception it 
was intended to stave off and eliminate political opposition, and it continues to serve that 
purpose today.   
 In 1998, Moscow’s outspoken mayor, Yury Luzhkov, formed a political party named 
‘Fatherland.’  For several years prior, Luzhkov had been laying the groundwork for a presidential 
campaign—marshalling political and economic resources, and cultivating relationships with 
business and regional elites.  His position as mayor of Russia’s largest and capital city gave him 
ready access to television as well as a network of connections and influence.  In 1999, Luzhkov 
wooed former prime minister Yevgeny Primakov, a man who was credited with Russia’s 
emergence from the economic fiasco of 1998, and hence widely popular.  The alliance between 
Luzhkov and Primakov proved compelling enough to attract many of Russia’s powerful regional 
governors.  The governors’ political vehicle, ‘All Russia,’ joined forces with Luzhkov’s 
Fatherland and formed the hyphenated political party Fatherland-All Russia.  This party would 
contest the 1999 parliamentary election in order to pave the way for a presidential run, in 
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 keeping with the understanding that parliamentary elections serve as de facto presidential 
primaries in the Russian Federation. 
 By this time, alarm bells had begun to ring throughout the Kremlin, and it is easy to see 
why.  A rival group of elites, namely the regional governors spearheaded by the mayor of 
Moscow and a popular former prime minister, had organized itself with the intention of 
capturing the summit of political power in Russia.  The new party was well-financed, well-
connected, and highly visible.  What’s worse, the rival campaign began to suggest that the 
president and his courtiers could be liable to criminal prosecution for their illicit accumulation of 
wealth and abuse of power. 147  Losing control of the presidency would put at risk everything 
Yeltsin’s inner circle had assembled.   In order to prevent such a reversal of fortunes, the Yeltsin 
‘Family’ implemented a three-prong plan to defeat Luzhkov, Primakov, and the governors’ bloc.  
First, they launched a blistering media campaign to discredit the leading figures of the rival 
camp.  Second, they cultivated Prime Minister Putin as a counterweight to Primakov.  And third, 
they formed Unity, a political party intended to siphon support from Fatherland-All Russia and 
deny Primakov and Luzhkov crucial support going into the presidential elections. 
 Media magnate and Yeltsin insider Boris Berezovsky was primarily responsible for 
Unity’s formation out of an earlier coalition of governors, which then reached out to those 
governors who had not signed up with Fatherland-All Russia.  Thirty-nine governors gave 
signatures of support to the new party.  It was understood, however, that Unity’s expected role 
was that of spoiler, not victor.  Only one governor added his name to Unity’s list of Duma 
candidates.148   
 On the campaign trail, Unity’s positions were almost identical to those of Fatherland-All 
Russia, although Unity emerged as more supportive of the free market than Fatherland-All 
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 Russia, which advocated significant state involvement in the economy.149  It was the intention of 
Unity’s founders to occupy Fatherland-All Russia’s political space, draw away the support of 
some of the regional governors, and split the pool of voters that might have cast their support for 
Luzhkov and Primakov.  By causing Fatherland-All Russia to perform below expectations, Unity 
could derail the presidential ambitions of Fatherland’s leaders. 
 The rising profile of Vladimir Putin, however, proved to be an unexpected asset.  Having 
risen from a meager 2 percent approval rating upon taking office as prime minister in August of 
1999150 to 80 percent approval by November, Putin had become a major force in Russian 
politics.151  In recognition of Putin’s sky-high popularity, Unity began to affiliate itself closely 
with the prime minister.  Putin himself endorsed Unity in late November, telling voters on 
national television that, “I personally, as a citizen, will vote for Unity.”152  Accordingly, Unity’s 
support among the populace began to take off, jumping from 9 percent the week before the 18 
percent just after the endorsement.153  The day of the election, Unity won 23 percent of the vote, 
easily outpacing Fatherland-All Russia, which took 13 percent—an astonishing collapse for a 
party which had once been slated to win the election outright.  Primakov withdrew his 
presidential bid. 
 Unity fulfilled its mission in this regard, by disrupting the rival cadre of elites aiming for 
the presidency.  But its unexpected electoral success allowed it to play a new and welcome role, 
that of presidential vehicle in the parliament.  Unity continued to act as a curb on political 
opposition in this regard.  Its size and connections to the Kremlin allowed it to become the vital 
cog in almost every winning coalition in the Third Duma.  However, the presence of other large 
parties necessitated bargaining and coalition building to generate majority votes. 
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Table 3.7  Membership of the Third Duma (2000) 
Party Factions Seats in the Third Duma (%) 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation 90 (20%) 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 17 (3.7%) 
Yabloko 21 (4.6%) 
Unity 82 (18.2%) 
Fatherland-All Russia 45 (10%) 
Union of Right Forces 32 (7.1%) 
People’s Deputy  57 (12%) 
Russia’s Regions 41 (9.1%) 
Agro-Industrial Group 39 (8.6%) 
Small parties 26 
Independents 105 (23.3%) 
Total 450 
Modified from www.russiavotes.org 
 
Unity’s share of the parliament was large, but not large enough to control the agenda or dictate 
the outcome of debate.  Immediately, Putin and his legislative liaisons (particularly chief 
political advisor Vladislav Surkov) moved to divide and co-opt the opposition.  A temporary 
alliance was forged between the two largest factions in the Duma, Unity and the Communist 
Party, to prevent the election of Primakov as Duma speaker.  The Unity-Communist alliance was 
also able to upend the Duma’s traditional power-sharing rules and distribute committee 
chairmanships along more majoritarian lines than in the past.  The Communists were 
outmaneuvered in this deal, however, as they did not gain control of any politically important 
committee chairs.  Foreign relations, defense, the budget, legislation, property and banking all 
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 fell outside their purview.  This break with tradition relegated the opposition to the back-benches 
in a way that had been unheard of in previous Dumas.   
 Once committee chairs had been so allotted, Unity broke with the Communist Party and 
began to piece together a permanent, if not entirely reliable, coalition to advance the 
government’s program.  The so-called Coalition of Four included Unity, Fatherland-All Russia, 
People’s Deputy, and Russia’s Regions, and comprised exactly half of the Duma.  The latter two 
of these groups were not parties per se, but rather deputy groups formed in the Duma.  Deputy 
groups, which must be formed by at least 35 deputies who have no other party affiliation, are 
entitled to the same privileges in the legislature as parties proper.  However, owing to their origin 
among independent deputies, they tend to be less cohesive than ordinary political parties.  
Consequently, Unity and the Putin government were still forced to resort to case-by-case 
bargaining and concessions to advance their legislation.   
The need to bargain with independents and other parties allowed the opposition, such as 
it was, to extract concessions from time to time.  Such success tended to be ephemeral, however, 
as exemplified by Putin’s land reform bill of 2001.  Led by the communists, the opposition 
forced the government to drop from the bill a provision legalizing the sale of agricultural land—a 
contentious issue in post-communist Russia.  The government abandoned the agricultural 
portion, only to pass it separately a year later.  On this and many other issues, an opposition bloc 
capable of forming a majority in the Duma could not form.  Unity had become the majority-
maker in the legislature, and the Kremlin used it to pass almost any bill it cared to propose.154  
Unity’s connection with the executive allowed it to act as the fulcrum of the Duma.  In 
September 2001, Fatherland-All Russia admitted defeat and merged with Unity outright, forming 
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 United Russia.  United Russia would go on to contest the 2003 and 2007 elections with such 
success that political opposition was practically banished from the Duma.   
United Russia won 37 percent of the vote in the 2003 election, which translated into 120 
party-list seats.  Those deputies were joined by a further 102 deputies from the single-member 
district vote, giving United Russia just control of just under 50 percent of the legislature.  Its 
nearest rival, the Communist Party, could muster only 52 seats, or 11.6 percent of the chamber. 
 
Table 3.8  Membership in the Fourth Duma (2003) 
Party Factions Seats in the Duma (%) 
United Russia 222 (49%) 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation 52 (11.6%) 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 36 (8%) 
Motherland (Rodina) 37 (8.2%) 
Yabloko 4 (.9%) 
Union of Right Forces 3 (.7%) 
People’s Party 17 (3.8%) 
Small parties 11 (2.4%) 
Independents 68 (15.1%) 
Total 450 
Modified from www.russiavotes.org 
 
 
 
After the election, 80 percent of deputies elected in the single-member districts joined United 
Russia, swelling its ranks to 300 deputies—a two-thirds majority.155  With such overwhelming 
numbers United Russia was able to consolidate majoritarian procedures even more firmly in the 
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 Duma, taking control of the Duma Council, naming its members to all committee chairmanships, 
and giving committees increased power to defeat bills.  The opposition had been routed. 
 With a newly minted and highly acquiescent super-majority Putin passed legislation to 
further centralized power in the presidency.  The parliament passed bills that 
Severely reduced the power of regional governments, limited the political rights of 
opposition groups, limited media freedom, eliminated gubernatorial elections, and altered 
the parliamentary election system so as to eliminate any local power base for deputies.156   
 
These bills all passed the Duma easily, with few United Russia deputies (if any) revolting.  
Opposition deputies could do little more than complain. 
 The 2007 election bodes even worse for opposition parties.  United Russia received a 
crushing 64.3 percent of the vote, under rules that for the first time eliminated the single-member 
districts.  The Communist Party came in second, with 11 percent.  Two other parties barely 
cleared the 7% threshold for representation:  the Liberal Democrats and Just Russia.  The 
absence of independent deputies means that these four parties alone will comprise the Duma 
until the next election.  United Russia’s overwhelming victory will give it a free hand in the 
legislature. 
 
Table 3.9  5  Membership of the Fifth Duma (2007) 
Party Factions Seats in the Duma (%) 
United Russia 315 (70%) 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation 57 (12.7%) 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 40 (8.9%) 
A Just Russia 38 (8.4%) 
Total 450 
Taken from the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation at http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru.  
Accessed January 25, 2008. 
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 The Duma, for the time being, has ceased to be a locus of any real opposition.  United 
Russia’s majority is unassailable.  Even before United Russia’s overwhelming victory, political 
opposition had been relegated to moderately-attended street protests, crushed by the police and 
denigrated in the mainstream media as assemblies of ‘provocateurs’.157     
One such protest, a so-called “Dissenters’ March” held in Moscow on April 15, 2007, 
drew an estimated 2,500 protestors—and 9,000 heavily armed riot police.158  The overwhelming 
security response demonstrates how seriously the Putin regime takes even the smallest 
suggestion of organized public opposition.  Having squeezed the opposition out of the 
institutions of government, the government fears only a large-scale popular revolt similar to 
Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.  Indeed, one of the few cases of democratic pressure forcing the 
government to change its policies occurred in 2005, when the government abolished in-kind 
social benefits, such as free public transportation for veterans and the elderly, in favor of cash 
payments.  Veterans and pensioners took to the streets across Russia.  The government quickly 
ameliorated the new law by raising monthly pensions by as much as one-third.159   
106 
 
  
Figure 3.2  Riot police overwhelm a ‘Dissenters’ March’ in downtown Moscow, April 2007.  Photograph taken by 
the author. 
 
 
5.       Party Opposition – Conclusions 
 
 
To summarize, political opposition was not particularly unhealthy in the Russia of President 
Yeltsin.  A politically viable Communist Party formed the core of a relatively stable coalition 
that was able to deal defeats to the government on a regular basis, most notably in the 
appointment of Prime Minister Primakov, but also on individual laws and annual budgets.  Since 
Yeltsin’s resignation, Vladimir Putin has become a towering figure in Russian politics, all but 
overshadowing any real opposition.  United Russia has risen to become the voice of the 
executive in parliament, and dominates that body so effectively that other parties have been all 
but driven out.   
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 Again, Russia’s weak confidence mechanism is partially responsible for the failure of 
opposition parties.  The weak vote shields the executive from party influence and excludes 
opposition parties from the realm of executive power.  As a result, leaders who rise to national 
prominence do not owe their positions to party resources and networks.  They are therefore free 
to use their own political resources to assemble parties of power in order to defend the status 
quo.  When these parties are attached to a popular leader like Vladimir Putin, they drain votes 
and influence from interest-based parties.  As a result, almost every party not aligned with the 
government has seen its electoral support collapse under Putin’s tenure. 
 
 
C.  PARTIES AND GOVERNMENT FORMATION 
 
Concerning party influence in the formation of governments, the most important episodes have 
already been discussed.  The high-water mark for political parties in that regard, not surprisingly, 
is Evgeny Primakov’s appointment as prime minister.  Overall, political parties have shown to be 
an anemic, although not totally impotent, force in the formation of governments. 
 Of course, initiative and the bulk of the decision-making power lie with the president 
when forming a government.  It is he who nominates the prime minister and the cabinet, and the 
inability of the parliament to reject the president’s nominee without inviting dissolution gives the 
president a distinct advantage.  When one considers that none of the Russian Federation’s three 
presidents have belonged to a political party or owed their election to a political party, and only 
one prime minister (the briefly-tenured Viktor Khristienko160) had a party affiliation upon taking 
office, it becomes clear that party affiliation is a secondary characteristic when constructing 
governments.  At times parties have been able to lay claim to a ministerial post or two in 
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 exchange for some favor in the legislature.  This has, however, been more of an exception than a 
rule.  Nearly all government ministers are career bureaucrats and administrators.  During Mikhail 
Fradkov’s cabinet in Putin’s second term, only five of nineteen ministers had a party 
background.161  The most important qualification for office is more often loyalty to the president 
than partisan affiliation.  Twice President Putin has nominated prime ministers from obscure 
branches of the bureaucracy, ensuring that his nominees have no basis of support other than the 
patronage of the president.  This prevents the prime minister from emerging as a counterweight 
to the president, but also underscores how little party considerations figure in the nominating 
process. 
 Even United Russia has had little success in translating its support for President Putin 
into ministerial portfolios.  Putin has appointed prime ministers based on other political criteria 
than the composition of the legislature.  For example, Viktor Zubkov was appointed to that post 
in September of 2007 not because United Russia demanded it, but in order to better prepare for 
the presidential elections of March 2008.  Both Putin and the outgoing prime minister, Mikhail 
Fradkov, announced that the shakeup was intended to “prepare the country for the period after 
the March [presidential] election.”162  Putin’s public rationale for the change was future-oriented 
and presidential, rather than in response to the demands of the present legislature.  Zubkov 
himself was an obscure bureaucrat, heading a financial crimes agency before being nominated to 
Russia’s second-highest executive post.  Zubkov had no party affiliation, but was a confidant of 
the president, having served with him in the St. Petersburg city government in the early 1990s.  
Observers in the Western media speculated that Zubkov’s appointment was meant to balance the 
Kremlin’s internal factions, or perhaps to put Zubkov in position to win the presidency in March, 
only to step down in short order to make way for a Putin restoration.163  The Russian press 
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 gravitated toward the former interpretation.  The Russian newspaper Gazeta quoted anonymous 
Kremlin insiders as saying “one should not underestimate the prime minister’s powers during a 
change of president,” while Nezavisimaya Gazeta declared that “Putin has succeeded in 
maintaining a degree of intrigue over the identity of his future successor, thus keeping the 
political situation under control.”164  Again, Putin’s considerations in changing the government 
were political, but not parliamentary.  Party considerations did not even enter the picture. 
 The Zubkov nomination is emblematic of the general pattern of United Russia’s 
relationship with the executive.  The executive proposes, and United Russia ratifies.  Given 
United Russia’s size and influence in the parliament, the party places surprisingly few demands 
on Putin or the government.  The government that was formed after the 2003 parliamentary 
election contained almost no members of United Russia, despite the public confidence of United 
Russia leaders that the government would be formed on the basis of the majority in 
parliament.165  Despite its size in parliament, the party remains largely a Putin instrument.  In 
April 2008, the party congress formalized Putin’s control by unanimously confirming him as 
party chairman.  Yet Putin and Medvedev continue to studiously avoid party membership.166   
 As in every other category, government formation in Russia is a tale of two presidents.  
An antagonistic Duma with a relatively coherent opposition coalition was able to insert some of 
its own into the government.  Ministerial portfolios were offered to the Communist Party and 
others, in order to ease the passage of a given bill or defuse a particular crisis.  The Primakov 
government, amenable as it was to the Duma, took on a semblance of a coalition government 
with the Duma’s parties better-represented than in the past.  The only party missing from the 
government was Our Home is Russia, while the CPRF, the Liberal Democrats, and Yabloko all 
found representation.167  Under Putin, parties have fared poorly in gaining seats at the cabinet 
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 table.  Under neither president, however, have parties been as successful in filling government 
posts as in France. 
 The weak confidence mechanism shields governments from parliamentary and party 
influence.  A leadership class that is non-partisan can then develop, since presidents and 
ministers are not dependent on party backing to win their posts.  Non-partisan national leaders 
are then free to assemble their own, clientelistic parties, like Unity.  These parties of power are 
advantaged by their connection to the elite and, if successful, drain votes and influence from 
genuine political parties.  The appearance of parties of power intensifies an already vicious cycle.  
“Having no considerable power, parties cannot expect to establish stable linkages with 
constituencies, but without their support they cannot expect to play a significant role in the 
political system.”168  This development is crucially important for understanding the state of 
democracy in Russia. 
 
D.  PARTIES IN RUSSIA -- CONCLUSIONS 
 
Emerging from the disarray and division of the founding of the present Russian state, political 
parties began to find positions of power and influence after the 1995 election.  Programmatic 
parties fared well, indicating that interest aggregation was occurring and that the population 
responded.  The opposition to Yeltsin emerged as a relatively stable coalition that was capable of 
defeating the president in the legislature.  That coalition proved itself capable of actually forming 
a government, by forcing the appointment of Primakov and a somewhat party-based cabinet.  
However, under Putin’s presidency the party system’s vital signs have all but collapsed.  The 
dominant party is non-programmatic, offering nothing but unabashed support for whatever the 
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 president should propose.  It aggregates the interests only of the ruling class—those politicians 
and bureaucrats already in power, who hope to maintain their position by securing successive 
electoral mandates.  The opposition has been steadily squeezed out of the parliament (and the 
television media) leaving opposition parties and candidates in the wilderness.  United Russia 
serves as a tool of the executive in an asymmetric relationship that makes few demands on the 
president, while governments are formed without paying any heed to the composition of the 
legislature.  At present, it is safe to say that Russia’s party system is elite-dominated, and shows 
“little potential to grow substantial partisan roots in the society.”169 
  The Duma’s weak power of no-confidence is central to all of the party system’s ills.  The 
weak confidence mechanism shields the executive from party influence by preventing parliament 
from choosing the ministers.  As a result, parties that emerge organically from social cleavages 
find it difficult to win executive power.  Non-partisan executives, drawn from the president’s 
inner circle and from the state bureaucracies, take up positions of national leadership instead.  
This process has been constant under both Presidents Yeltsin and Putin.  This leading class, 
unencumbered by party influence, is free to assemble parties of power as electoral vehicles.  The 
purpose of such parties is to earn enough votes to legitimate the ruling clan electorally, without 
limiting its freedom of action with campaign platforms and promises.  By being connected to 
powerful patrons a priori, parties of power benefit from money, connections, and influence that 
ordinary parties lack.  United Russia has had an irresistible draw on the elite since its founding. 
For example, United Russia was heavily favored by the business elite in the 2003 parliamentary 
campaign, receiving more than $1.2 billion in donations from business leaders.170  After the 2003 
election, eighty percent of deputies elected from the single-member districts joined United 
Russia, presumably to advance their careers, earn perks, or win influence by joining the party of 
112 
 
 power.  The other parties in the Duma consequently had a sharply reduced pool of independent 
deputies with which to build coalitions.  The mass defection of independent deputies to United 
Russia is a perfect example of the deleterious effect parties of power have on interest-based 
parties. 
Since these parties are non-programmatic and are created by state actors, they are little 
inclined to advocate the interests of particular sections of society.  As such, they block political 
communication by preventing interest-based parties from winning power, and then refusing to 
perform interest aggregation themselves.  Furthermore, parties of power decrease the 
opportunities available to the opposition to win power, by drawing votes away from opposition 
parties.   
 The relationship between national leaders and their party of power is asymmetrical.  
Leaders are not dependent on party networks for their position.  Consequently parties of power 
serve as political instruments, rather than governing partners.  This helps account for Russian 
parties’ inability to colonize the state.  Presidents and prime ministers do not need to reward 
party leaders and activists with positions in the state, since they do not owe their own position to 
party resources.   
 All this conspires to keep Russia’s leading class divorced from society.  A weak power of 
no-confidence prevents interest-based parties from winning power, and allows the elite to form 
their own, clientelistic parties.  As a result, interests are not communicated upward by political 
parties who have one foot in society and the other in government.  The opposition is further 
diminished by the electoral draw of the party of power, and its own inability to win power.  The 
success of parties of power is therefore highly detrimental to democracy in Russia, by inhibiting 
political communication and by contributing to a monolithic state that has few links to society. 
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  When the president is politically damaged, as Yeltsin was in the late 90s, parties of power 
may falter and the opposition may gain a foothold.  But when the president is popular, like Putin, 
they will naturally drain support from interest-based parties.  So long as Russia’s constitution 
prevents political parties from gaining executive power through the parliament, this pattern will 
hold.  
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 IV. POLITICAL PARTIES IN FRANCE 
 
 
 
 
While the Russian party system does generally fit along a traditional left-right spectrum, location 
along that spectrum is not the most relevant quality of a political party.  Instead, relationship to 
the elite is a more important quality.  A left-right line would see the Communists anchoring the 
far left, the LDPR holding the far right, and the various democratic (Yabloko, Union of Right 
Forces) and centrist (United Russia) parties making up the middle.  An outside-insider spectrum 
is more telling for Russian politics, however, and would see United Russia and its predecessors 
arrayed on one side against other parties positioned according to the degree to which they have 
been co-opted by established elites.  For example, the Communist Party would occupy the far 
end of the spectrum in the latter years of Yeltsin’s reign, when it embodied the irreconcilable 
opposition.  When it began to cooperate with Unity and United Russia in Putin’s first term, the 
Communist Party moved closer to the ‘party of power’ end of the spectrum.  This dimension is 
key to unraveling the Russian party system. 
 Such a dimension is not relevant in the French party system.  There, the traditional left-
right dichotomy is the defining characteristic.  Electoral rules have produced several credible 
parties which cover the spectrum from far-left, Trotskyist communists to far-right parties 
sympathetic to fascism.  The largest and most important parties include: the Communist Party of 
France (PCF), the Socialist Party (PS), the non-Gaullist right historically embodied in the Union 
pour la démocratie française (UDF), the Gaullist right mostly organized by the Rassemblement 
pour la République (RPR), and the far-right Front National (FN).  Recently, the parties of the 
mainstream right have merged to form the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP), of 
which President Nicolas Sarkozy is a member.  Other parties have also gained a foothold in the 
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 system, including far-left Trotskyite parties, a green party (Les Verts), and a sportsmen’s party 
(Chasse, Pêche, Nature et Traditions).  Mostly this analysis will focus on the major electoral 
players.  
The French electoral system allows for two rounds of voting in both presidential and 
parliamentary elections.  A candidate is elected in the first round in a presidential race if he or 
she wins more then fifty percent of votes cast.  If no candidate crosses the fifty percent mark, a 
run-off is held among the two leading candidates.  In parliamentary elections, a candidate may 
proceed to the second round of voting if he or she earned the support of more than 12.5% of 
registered voters in the first round.  This system encourages fragmentation prior to the first 
ballot, but favors consolidation between rounds.  Even small parties can put forth candidates in 
the first round with a reasonable hope of overcoming the 12.5% barrier to the second round.  The 
multiplicity of political parties in France is the result, even in the absence of the proportional 
representation that usually corresponds to multi-party systems.  The second ballot favors 
alliances between parties of similar ideological stripe.   
Consider an election wherein a Communist, a Socialist, a Guallist, and a non-Gaullist 
conservative all proceed to the second round.  The Guallist and non-Gaullist parties have an 
agreement that binds the second-place conservative to drop out of the race before the second vote 
and endorse the first-place conservative.  The two leftists have no such agreement, and both 
remain in the race.  As a result, the leftist vote is split between the two and the conservative takes 
the election.  Such a result was not uncommon in the early years of the Republic, and was a 
major stimulus for the formation of the union gauche which united the Communist and Socialist 
parties under a Common Program for much of the 1970s.  The emphasis on consolidation 
between rounds deepens the left-right divide in French politics, by encouraging alliance and 
116 
 
 compromise between ideological fellow-travelers.  Overall, the double ballot produces a system 
of fragmented bipolarity.  Fragmented, because the first round allows small parties to test their 
appeal in the marketplace; bipolar, because the second round encourages alliance and favors 
large parties.  Over time, the system has become less fragmented with the declining appeal of the 
Communist Party of France, and the consolidation of the parties of the mainstream right.171  Yet 
the system remains split into a left flank anchored by the Socialist Party, and a right flank 
dominated by the UMP. 
The French party system is healthier than the system in Russia.  Interest aggregation is 
more recognizable, and parties are genuinely able to capture executive power in the premiership 
and the presidency.  Prime ministers of France are almost always partisans of one party or 
another, and presidents after de Gaulle have all claimed a party affiliation (though he took great 
pains to appear aloof from partisan politics, the General was himself a highly involved party 
manager during his presidency172).  Even more importantly, the constitutional powers of the 
prime minister indicate that the president cannot govern without the support of a majority in 
parliament—which makes political parties a vital player in determining who controls the levers 
of power.  Parties also form the opposition in France.  Even though opposition partisans are all 
but shut out of the halls of power (except, perhaps, during cohabitation) they still provide an 
alternate program for the nation and represent an alternative from the current majority. 
French parties are able to bridge the gap between state and society because the strong 
vote of no-confidence in the Assembly makes political parties indispensable to the leadership 
class.  Leaders and parties are mutually dependent on each other for their success.   
117 
 
 National leaders cannot be shielded from party influence, as they are in Russia, since the prime 
minister must reflect the party composition of the Assembly.  This precludes the formation of 
parties of power, and makes interest-based parties the only game in town.   
 
 
 
A.  INTEREST AGGREGATION IN FRANCE 
 
French political parties respond to the social cleavages that emerged over time in Western 
Europe.  The most relevant of these cleavages tends to be the distinction between the working 
class and the bourgeoisie.  Other cleavages exist—the agricultural class against the industrial 
class, the center versus the periphery, and the religious against the irreligious—and play a role in 
the system.  But it is the working class-bourgeoisie distinction that primarily defines the split 
between left and right.  
 
 
1.  The 1970s and 80s 
 
 
A watershed moment in the history of the left political parties came in 1972, when the 
Communist and Socialist Parties agreed on a Common Program for Left Government, cementing 
an alliance they hoped would prevent the deleterious vote-splitting that had been the hallmark of 
the past.  While the alliance eventually crumbled, the program represents the middle ground 
between the two parties’ ideological foundations and can be used as a rough guide to the 
essential causes of the French left.  It called for a 37% increase in the minimum wage, as well as 
a similar increase in allowances for families with children and stipends to the elderly and the 
unemployed.173  The program also called for the nationalization of nine large industrial groups, 
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 in addition to the whole banking and financial industry.  The Communist Party, predictably, 
wanted to go even further with a nationalization program, urging the state to take control of no 
fewer than twenty-five companies, including oil, steel, and automobile concerns.174  Such 
demands were not limited to the 1970s.  Mitterrand based his 1981 presidential campaign on his 
‘110 propositions for France,’ which called (among many other things) for nationalizations, 
higher wages, a reduction in working time, and the construction of communal housing and social 
facilities.175  Both parties, as these platforms evince, are highly programmatic. 
 The Communist Party electorate was heavily blue-collar.  In the 1981 presidential 
election the Communists won the support of 30% of voters who worked in blue-collar jobs, as 
opposed to just 10% for the Gaullist candidate.  The Socialists were even more successful in this 
demographic, capturing 33% of blue-collar voters, as well as 23% of farmers (the Communists 
took only 2%).  Seventeen percent of retired voters opted for the Communists, while 28% 
supported the Socialist Party.  Together, the two leftist parties won 63% of blue collar voters, 
25% of farmers, and 45% of retirees.176  Clearly working-class voters were inclined to vote for 
leftist parties in 1981.  The two parties advocated either the outright abolition of capitalism or the 
amelioration of it in favor of the weaker members of society.  Workers responded to this 
message for much of the Fifth Republic’s history.  Indeed, in legislative elections from 1967 
through 1981, the two parties together averaged 58% support from working-class voters.177 
 Party membership also reflects the association of workers with the Communist and 
Socialist parties.  Blue-collar workers accounted for over 46% of Communist Party members in 
1979, followed by routine white-collar workers at 25%, and retirees at 15 percent.  The Socialist 
party did not fare quite so well with blue-collar members; its party membership was only 14 
percent workers, on average, from 1973 to 1985.  It made up for this deficit with a higher 
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 proportion of teachers, managers, and other intermediate professions, as well as those with a self-
described center-left ideology.178  Interest aggregation appears healthy on the left of the political 
spectrum in the 1970s and 80s, with the major parties highly programmatic and drawing crucial 
support from specific sectors of the electorate. 
 The parties of the right, by contrast, have typically benefited from the votes of farmers, 
artisans, small businesspeople, and managers.  In the 1981 presidential election, the mainstream 
rightist candidates won 69% of farmers’ votes, 64% of artisans’ votes, and 60% of managers’ 
and professionals’ votes.  A similar effect can be seen in subsequent elections, although Gaullist 
candidates have consistently earned around 10% of the blue-collar vote.179  Overall, however, 
the parties of the right are the parties of business.   
Gaullism is a broad church, incorporating numerous ideologies at various times.  Its 
central tenet has historically been a strong state at home and abroad.  This position has become 
increasingly problematic in the modern era of closer European integration.  Gaullism has also 
been characterized by a distinct free-market flavor, launched by Chirac in the mid-1980s180 and 
now aggressively championed by Nicolas Sarkozy.181  
 
 
2.  The 1990s and beyond 
 
 
From the 1990s on, the Gaullist right has drawn the majority of its support from the more 
prosperous portions of the electorate and has lost the bulk of its lower-class support.182  Many 
lower-class voters have migrated to the Front National and Jean-Marie Le Pen.  The 2002 
presidential elections in France stunned the world, when Le Pen—a confirmed extremist—
knocked out Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin in a first round characterized by low 
turnout.183  Le Pen voters tended to be workers, lower-middle class, and poorly educated.  
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 Workers and low income earners chose Le Pen over the Socialist and Communist candidates by 
convincing margins.184  Le Pen’s support in the electorate did not much exceed the 16% or so of 
voters who chose him in the first round, however, and he was soundly rejected by French voters 
in general.  Le Pen only picked up a few hundred thousands votes in the second round, while the 
whole political spectrum consolidated around Chirac as the only alternative to the extreme right.  
Chirac won 82% of the vote.185 
 Le Pen’s success in the first round indicates a new fluidity in French party politics, as the 
close affiliation of the working poor with the parties of the left was attenuated.  Instead, new 
issues like immigration and criminality rose to the fore.  Surveys in 2002 indicate that crime was 
of very high concern to voters, second only to unemployment.  On criminality, Le Pen was 
viewed as the best candidate by a narrow margin; on immigration he was by far the favored 
candidate.186  However, support for the far-right in 2002 may have been a fluke:  the National 
Front received only a million votes in the first round of the 2007 election, beating the 
Communist Party by a small margin, but falling far behind the UMP (ten million votes) and the 
Socialist Party (6.4 million votes).187   
 The 1990s was a period of change for the parties of the left.  The Communist Party had 
been seriously discredited by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and chose as a result to 
reformulate itself.  It formally embraced representative democracy and civil rights, formerly 
conceived of as bourgeois boondoggle.  It remained, however, a party of the traditional left, 
advocating an increase in the minimum wage and in welfare benefits, high corporate taxation, 
support for the 35-hour workweek, and opposition to privatization of state firms.188   
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 The Socialist Party likewise sought to affirm its leftist credentials, after a period of Socialist 
governments pushing market-oriented policies.  Prime Minister Jospin’s policy program 
emphasized equality and social justice, reduction in unemployment, and minority rights.189  
Parties on both side of the spectrum continue to seek voters on a programmatic and interest-
oriented basis. 
 
3.  Conclusions 
 
 
The left-right divide also exists in Russia, but is eroded by non-programmatic parties of power.  
United Russia is defined by its connection to the president, and this is what introduces the second 
axis of the Russian political spectrum, Putin’s own “power vertical.”  We have seen in recent 
elections that Russians are more than willing to judge parties along this axis—United Russia’s 
big win in 2007 was essentially a plebiscite on President Putin.  A popular president can often 
sweep his own party into power in the legislature in any country.  President Mitterrand did 
exactly that in 1981 and 1988.  But for a non-programmatic party to enjoy dominance of the 
legislature purely on the basis of its unwavering support for a non-partisan president is a body-
blow to party-based interest aggregation.   
In France, the lines are much more clearly drawn.  Almost all French voters, when 
surveyed, are willing to position themselves on a left-right axis, and “the great majority of 
respondents of all positions…held party sympathies and voted for candidates that were consistent 
with their positions.”190  It should be noted that other studies have found different results in this 
regard.  One 1993 survey found that only 56 percent of respondents felt loyal to a particular 
party, while 77 percent were capable of placing themselves on a left-right axis.191   
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 By contrast, almost half of Russian voters held that no party represented their interests.192  These 
floating voters are a major target of opportunity for non-ideological parties of power, and 
indicate how undeveloped interest aggregation by parties remains in Russia. 
 
 
 
 
B.  PARTIES AND OPPOSITION 
  
French parties, when they are not in government, are governments-in-waiting.  They are the 
primary vehicle of political opposition, both external (the Socialist Party versus the RPR, for 
example) and internal (Balladur versus Chirac for leadership of the RPR).  Opposition parties 
play a vital role in creating alternatives to the current government.  Indeed, French voters from 
1981 have shown a penchant for tossing out incumbents.  In 1981, the voters evicted Giscard and 
endorsed Mitterrand.  After five years of Socialist government, the voters returned a conservative 
majority, with Chirac as prime minister.  Then in 1988, the left triumphed again with 
Mitterrand’s reelection and successful dissolution of the Assembly.  In the 1993 parliamentary 
election the voters gave the majority back to the conservatives, giving Balladur the premiership 
in the last years of Mitterrand’s presidency.  Chirac had a supportive majority when he was 
elected president in 1995, but faced a leftist majority when he dissolved parliament early in 
1997.  In three cases—1986, 1993, and 1997—voters used the parliamentary elections to rebuke 
the president and hand national leadership over to the opposition.   
 Prior to the constitutional reform reducing presidential terms from seven to five years, the 
French system allowed voters to pass judgment on the governing majority twice:  once at mid-
term parliamentary elections, and once again when the president’s own term of office expired.  
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 Opposition occurs mostly in the context of campaigning prior to these elections, since the rules 
of the National Assembly preclude the parliamentary opposition from accomplishing much in the 
way of the formation or even delay of policy.  As noted in Chapter II Section A, opposition 
deputies rarely see their amendments passed, and have almost no claim on the agenda of the 
Assembly.  Their power to scrutinize the majority is also limited.  Parties must therefore aim to 
capture power in the next election, by criticizing the majority and offering alternatives. 
 The outcome of such an arrangement, as seen above, has often been a period of 
cohabitation.  During cohabitation, the opposition becomes the parliamentary majority and gains 
control of the levers of power.  The president becomes commander-in-chief of the new 
opposition.  The process of criticism from the outside begins anew, although an opposition which 
still claims a president in its camp wields more influence than an opposition which is confined to 
the parliamentary minority. 
Despite the weakness of opposition deputies in the parliament, political parties are still 
highly relevant in the establishment of an opposition.  They act as power-bases for presidential 
candidates when they are not in office, and as media for transmitting alternative policies.  In 
1976, Chirac resigned as prime minister, a position he felt did not carry enough political weight, 
to cultivate the Gaullist party.  The RPR was an essential pillar of Chirac’s political support into 
his presidency.193  Chirac’s leadership of the RPR is a case in point of the political resources 
parties can provide for presidential candidates in France.  Presidents Mitterrand and Sarkozy 
followed similar paths to power.  Aspirants to the French presidency, as well as sitting 
presidents, have found it necessary to mould and manage a party organization in order to 
advance their political agenda.  The relationship is symbiotic:  the candidate wins the use of the 
party’s resources, while the party gains influence and patronage.  By contrast, politicians in 
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 Russia tend view parties as merely instrumental, and rarely invest in maintaining party 
organizations.194  Putin himself, for example, hopscotched from one party of power to another in 
the 1990s, switching allegiance when it became politically expedient.195 
 French parties’ relevance in this regard is primarily a function of the National 
Assembly’s strong vote of no-confidence.  The vote of no-confidence means that organized blocs 
in the legislature—political parties—determine who holds the premiership.  A president must be 
able to count on a supportive majority in the Assembly in order to govern.  Good relations with a 
large and cohesive political party or coalition are therefore vital.  This imbues political parties 
and parliamentary elections with a degree of significance they lack in Russia.  A change in the 
partisan composition of the National Assembly can significantly alter government policy.  
Consider the conservative policies of the Chirac government after 1986, when Francois 
Mitterrand was still president, in contrast to the broadly liberal policies of the previous five 
years.  The about-face was possible precisely because a conservative coalition was able to 
control the Assembly.  In Russia an organized opposition in the State Duma can delay and 
obstruct policy, it can lobby for concessions, and it can on occasion triumph over the executive, 
but it cannot determine the general direction of the government.  
Since the minority delegation in parliament is relatively powerless to affect policy, the 
extra-parliamentary party structure becomes the main locus of political opposition.  Opposition 
political parties provide the connections, resources, and visibility necessary to provide an 
alternative set of proposals and establish a base from which the opposition can lob attacks at the 
government.  This process, if successful, leads to a turnover in government.   
 The reduction of the presidential term to five years, and the resulting synchronization of 
presidential and parliamentary elections, is a negative development for opposition in this system.  
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 Under the old rules, parliaments always expired before the president’s term came to a close, 
allowing the opposition party to try to claim executive power in mid-term legislative elections.  
Now, though the president’s term is shorter, presidents will almost always be assured of a 
supportive Assembly for the duration of their term in office.  The activity of parties and 
politicians will be focused on capturing the presidency.  Parliamentary elections, with their focus 
on political parties, will diminish in importance.  A supportive majority in the Assembly is still 
vital for a president, but voters will be unlikely to rebuke a president elected just days before by 
handing the parliament to an opposition party.  The opposition blocs in parliament will remain 
relatively powerless, and political parties’ main task will continue to be preparation for the next 
election.  However, the coming election will always be a presidential one, and the presidency 
will be parties’ main objective.  The goal will be to ensure that a party supporter becomes 
president, rather than to gain power directly by winning the largest share of parliament.  Parties 
will still wield some influence, but they will be somewhat diminished by the outsize personas of 
presidential candidates on the campaign trail. 
 In all, political parties are a more vibrant source of opposition in France they are in Putin-
era Russia.  French parties act as repositories of opposition when they are not in power, poised to 
become the next governing majority if given the chance.  There are parties in Russia that are 
alternatives to United Russia, at least formally.  The elections of 2007 indicate, however, that no 
party represents a credible opposition.  Members of the urban intelligentsia, typically the 
backbone of the liberal parties, often voted Communist in the 2007 legislative election, not 
because they genuinely supported Zyuganov and his ilk, but rather to protest the political 
hegemony of Putin and United Russia.196  Such voters were not voting for the Communists, but 
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 rather against the majority.  No party has yet emerged which can agglomerate the dissatisfied or 
attract United Russia voters in the numbers needed to rival that party. 
 Russia’s opposition parliamentarians are, like their counterparts in France, quite 
powerless.  They, however, are not shackled by constitutional rules but by the size of United 
Russia’s majority.  Unlike the French opposition, Russian parties are unable to act as alternative 
governments.  They are hobbled by their inability to win executive power, either in the 
parliament or through the presidency.  Two Russian presidents have been able to ensure the 
election of a hand-picked successor without relying on party mechanisms, but by relying instead 
on their own political resources.  Yeltsin appointed Putin prime minister before resigning, 
provoking early elections and giving Putin all the advantages of incumbency.  Putin used his 
immense popularity to anoint his successor, touching off an intricate succession ballet that 
allowed Putin to consolidate his post-presidential job as prime minister and leader of United 
Russia.  United Russia was marshaled to ensure a positive result in the elections, but neither 
Putin nor Medvedev have joined the party.  Political parties outside the state’s sphere of 
influence have seen their fortunes wane:  promising results for Yabloko and the Union of Right 
Forces have all but evaporated, and the once-mighty Communist Party is now the lone voice of 
opposition in the Duma.  Rodina and Just Russia, parties with ties to the state, have been 
successful without rivaling United Russia as the dominant party. 
 Allowing the Duma a stronger vote of no-confidence would be a partial cure for what ails 
Russian parties.  Parties could then win executive power directly by claiming a majority in the 
Duma.  As in pre-reform France, this would enhance the importance of legislative elections and 
greatly increase the influence of political parties.  If parties can capture executive power, they 
can act as a real locus of opposition as they compete for votes in the run-up to elections.  Of 
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 course, parties will only be able to act as true loci of opposition when they can genuinely 
compete for the real prize, the presidency.  At present, their ability to do so is limited by tight 
control of the national media and the influence of state power on the presidential succession. 
 
 
 
 
 
C.  PARTIES IN GOVERNMENT 
 
 
Parties capture high office in France in two ways:  by winning a majority in the National 
Assembly (or participating in a governing coalition there), and by securing the presidency for 
one of their own.  It is true that the president is a towering figure in French politics, but his 
independence from the party political nature of French politics is often overstated.  First and 
foremost, it is a fact of the system that presidents have only emerged, with the exception of de 
Gaulle, from the ranks of a political party.  So vital are political parties as presidential 
springboards that “They appear…to be an inevitable channel for those who aspire to become 
president.”197  For example, Lionel Jospin, prime minister during Chirac’s first term and himself 
a presidential candidate in 2002, began his political career as a hard-working party secretary with 
little publicity.198  Mitterrand was a party leader and parliamentarian in the Fourth Republic 
before assuming control of the Socialist Party in 1971.199  Chirac was the dominant figure in the 
RPR for more than twenty years.  Sarkozy left the government to take the reins of the UMP, the 
main party of the right, in 2004.  He used this position to enhance his own visibility, to choose 
parliamentary candidates, and to influence the party program and budget.200  Each successive 
president has first relied on party infrastructure to advance his political career.  Conversely, the 
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 failure of former prime ministers Raymond Barre and Édouard Balladur to reach the presidency 
is closely linked to their belief that parties were dispensible.201 
 Parties’ role as essential presidential springboard makes them powerful electoral players.  
French presidential hopefuls need the structural support of a political party to ensure a national 
presence for their campaign, and to orient themselves in the electorate’s mental map.  As a result, 
a French president is in many ways an advocate for the forces which propelled him to the top.  
Even a sitting president is by necessity a party leader, since he cannot govern without a 
parliamentary majority.   
This observation also calls attention to the fact that French parties are highly 
personalized.  In this respect they do not much differ from their Russian counterparts.  For 
twenty years the RPR loyally supported Chirac as its undisputed presidential candidate.  
Mitterrand, too, dominated the Socialist Party for almost a quarter-century, just as Zyuganov, 
Zhirinovsky and Putin have dominated their respective parties.  In Russia, however, political 
power can be captured without significant party backing.  As a result, parties have little claim on 
Russia’s leaders.   
The direct influence of the party on the French president once he is in office varies from 
president to president, but is always present.  Closely associated with the Socialist Party in the 
minds of voters and party activists, Francois Mitterrand emphasized the role of the party as a key 
institution in future power arrangements when he was campaigning.202  The Mitterrand 
presidency ushered in an era of particularly frequent contact between party officials and 
members of the government, including high-level summits to hash out policy disputes, working 
groups, annual budget meetings, and the so-called ‘elephants’ breakfast’—a weekly meal shared 
by the president, prime minister, and party leader at the Elysée palace.203  Even the de Gaulle 
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 presidency, famously wary of political parties, was characterized by informal contacts between 
party functionaries and parliamentarians, and the members of the government.  Charlot writes: 
In the course of time a whole web of relations has been woven between the Gaullist 
group and the government, a network of men on Christian-name terms with friendships 
dating back over twenty-five years… 
 
[T]he party and the [parliamentary faction] alert, by internal channels, the government to 
any errors and omissions in its policies.204 
 
Parties, as the organizational framework which launches and sustains presidential campaigns, 
continue to influence the executive in an advisory role.  After all, even a French president at the 
beginning of a seven year term (now reduced to five years) must eventually contemplate a re-
election bid or hope to ensure a successor of his own ideological stripe.  
 Parties in Russia have not yet taken on this crucial importance.  No president of Russia 
has won his position by emerging as the candidate of a popular party.  Things may change, as 
Vladimir Putin has agreed to head United Russia, not as president, but as party leader.205   Since 
the premiership is a relatively weak office compared to the presidency, Putin may feel compelled 
to turn United Russia into a genuine power base, independent from the state.  In order to become 
such a power-base, the party would have to turn towards society and begin advocating for 
people’s concrete interests.  United Russia, in that circumstance, could morph into a genuine 
political party.  At present, however, such an outcome is purely speculative. 
 Even more important from the perspective of party influence, parties in France benefit 
tremendously from the executive’s power of patronage.  Members of the party of a victorious 
president or prime minister are appointed to head ministries, to advise ministers, and to work in 
the bureaucracy and in the public sector.  “In short, parties invade the state.”206  All presidents 
have been either de facto or de jure leaders of political parties at the time of their election, and all 
prime ministers (excepting Georges Pompidou and Raymond Barre) have been party figures at 
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 the time of their appointment.  Moreover, the majority of ministers have been, not just party 
members, but parliamentarians prior to their appointment.  The first government of the Fifth 
Republic, headed by Michel Debré, reflected President de Gaulle’s skepticism of parties and 
legislatures, and set a low-water mark for parliamentary participation in government.  Still, 63% 
of ministers in the Debré government were drawn from the parliament.  Just a decade later, under 
the 1968 government of Couve de Murville, almost all ministers hailed from the parliament.    
On average, more than seventy percent of government ministers have been drawn from the 
parliament.207  By joining the government, ministers abandon their legislative position, but they 
are not obliged to abandon their party contacts and ambitions. 
 Party members are also widely appointed to lesser posts in the government and in the 
public sector.  The huge presence of party figures in administrative and executive positions has 
led those shut out of power to complain of a party-state throughout the republic’s history.  In the 
1960s, l’état-UDR (the UDR state) was criticized, followed by complaints of a UDF state after 
the election of Giscard d’Estaing.  Likewise the Socialists dominated in the early 80s, and the 
RPR during the Mitterrand cohabitations.208  This extensive penetration of the state by the 
officials of victorious parties links party and state and gives party officials greater influence over 
state decision than is apparent at first glance.   
 That winning parties are showered with the spoils of victory owes something to the fact 
that a new president or prime minister will want his appointments to come from his own 
ideological family.  But it also reflects the interdependent nature of the party-executive 
relationship in France.  On their own, parties cannot wield much influence over policy since the 
executive closely supervises the parliament.  Yet aspiring future presidents cannot win power 
without the backing of well-organized and effective political party.  President Giscard d’Estaing 
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 learned this lesson all too well, in the 1981 presidential election.  Giscard was disinclined toward 
mass parties and party organization, and as such did not begin to build a party machine until late 
in his presidency.  Jacques Chirac, by contrast, had left the premiership to build for himself a 
political party in the Gaullist tradition, the RPR.  Giscard’s UDF, a loose organization cobbled 
together out of smaller parties,209 lost a significant number of votes to Chirac’s RPR and, 
ultimately, Mitterrand’s Socialist Party.  Despite the broad powers of the presidency, Giscard 
was dethroned.  The realities of the French electoral system, in particular the two-ballot vote, 
require presidential candidates to win the backing of large, well-organized parties.  Likewise, 
once in office, a president needs the support of the parliamentary majority in order to govern.  
Successful presidents or prime ministers use patronage to reward and cultivate their party 
backers. 
In Russia, where parties are not the essential springboard of presidential politics, they 
have not been the recipients of the same degree of presidential patronage.  During Putin’s tenure, 
posts in the ministries, the presidential administration, the seven federal super-districts, and the 
public business sector have more often been given to the so-called siloviki, former members of 
the military and security services.  According to one study, military and security personnel 
occupied more than a quarter of elite posts in the Russian government as of 2002.  Almost sixty 
percent of members of the Russian Security Council had a military-security background in 2003, 
along with a third of government ministers and deputy ministers.  Both figures are a significant 
jump from the Yeltsin years.210  Under the Yeltsin presidency, three-quarters of the presidential 
administration and government had origins in the Soviet-era nomenklatura.211    Since presidents 
do not rely on parties to enter office or to maintain their power, patronizing party members is not 
as necessary as it is in France.  Parties do not colonize the state as in France, and therefore wield 
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 even less influence.  Other sectors of society, like the siloviki, fill this role instead.  Parties in 
France are instrumental in staffing governments and other elite posts.  The same cannot be said 
of Russia, where transfers of power occur without party influence. 
 
 
 
D. PARTY DURABILITY 
 
 
The longevity of parties is another characteristic difference between the French and Russian 
party systems.  Many French political parties can trace their origins back to the turn of the 
century.  The Socialist Party, Communist Party, and various Trotskyite communists can all refer 
back to the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière, formed in 1905.  The SFIO split in 
1920, in the aftermath of the formation of the Soviet Union, into Communist and Socialist 
strands.  The parties of the right have endured many name changes and shifts in alliance, but also 
have their earliest origins at the beginning of the twentieth century.  Even relative newcomers 
like the Greens or the National Front have been around since the 1970s.  The durability of parties 
in France allows them to build loyalty among voters, and to establish a more or less stable 
ideological position.  They are also able to operate as institutional players when dealing with 
political elites.  Politicians and bureaucrats operate with the understanding that the Socialist 
Party will continue to exist and provide resources and contacts for Socialist politicians for many 
years to come. 
 Parties in the relatively young Russian republic have not shown the same degree of 
durability.  The Communist Party of the Russian Federation is the only party which can trace its 
origins back beyond perestroika, since prior to the Gorbachev reforms alternative political parties 
were banned outright.  A few parties formed near the collapse of the Soviet Union have persisted 
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 to this day, notably Yabloko and the Liberal Democrats.  While the LDPR is one of only four 
parties to enter the Duma after the 2007 election, Yabloko has seen its vote totals dwindle and is 
no longer represented in the legislature.  Too often parties are created, not organically in 
response to genuine social cleavages, but by fiat from above—Our Home is Russia, Fatherland-
All Russia, Unity, United Russia, and Rodina are all important examples.  Parties that have fared 
well in one election have all but disappeared by the next, depending on prevailing mood at the 
top.   
Consider the fate of Russia’s Democratic Choice, an early party loosely affiliated with 
Yeltsin and led by former prime minister Yegor Gaidar.  A reform party, Russia’s Democratic 
Choice began to whither when the establishment focused more attention on the proto-party of 
power, Our Home is Russia.  Russia’s Choice won more than 15% of the vote in 1993, but only 
3.9% in 1995, and did not contest and further elections.  Our Home is Russia fell from grace 
even more precipitously, when its leader, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, was sacked in 1998.  
Chernomyrdin’s party won 10% of the vote in 1995, but only 1% in 1999.  A centrist women’s 
party, Women of Russia, won 8% of the vote in 1993, but had disappeared by 2003.  In 1999, 
Fatherland-All Russia won 13% of the vote in the first election it had ever contested.  Even more 
spectacular, Unity won 23% of the vote when that party had been created out of thin air just a 
few months before the election.  Rodina, a left-of-center nationalist party created at the 
Kremlin’s behest, won 9% of votes in 2003, when it too had not existed in any serious form prior 
to the election.212  The ad hoc nature of party formation in Russia makes it difficult for voters to 
form party attachments.   
Since many Russian parties do not correspond to social cleavages, elites’ party 
attachment is fluid and is based on which parties offer the best chance of advancement.  Between 
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 the election to the Third Duma in 1999 and its first sitting in January 2000, 147 deputies (almost 
one-third of the Duma) changed their party affiliation.  The entire delegation of Our Home is 
Russia, seven deputies, disbanded; its leader, Viktor Chernomyrdin, joined Unity.213  In the 
Fourth Duma, 80% of independent deputies knew which way the wind was blowing and joined 
United Russia (See footnote 107).  Party-switching erodes accountability and highlights the 
instrumental and clientelistic nature of many Russian political parties. 
Parties are notoriously mistrusted in Russia.  They have consistently ranked last in a 
survey which asked respondents whether or not they trust a variety of institutions (Boris Yeltsin 
outdid them in 1998 and 1999, when only 2 percent of respondents placed their trust in the 
presidency).  On average, only 5% of respondents have expressed any trust in political parties 
from 1997 to 2004.  By contrast, support for the armed forces averaged 30%, the media at 24%, 
and the post-Yeltsin presidency at 56 percent.  Similarly, when asked “Which of the currently 
existing parties and associations to the greatest extent reflects the interests of people like you?” 
the broad majority of respondents answered “None” or “Don’t know.”  Even in 2004, just after 
United Russia’s victory at the polls, only 24% of respondents answered “United Russia,” while 
49% chose None/DK.214  That all but a few parties in Russia have lacked real staying power has 
weakened the party system generally.  Ephemeral parties cannot influence those in power, while 
national leaders can create parties solely to advance their interests.     
Surveys have, however, found even more dispiriting results among French voters.  When 
asked “Do you feel that you are well represented by a political party?” from 1989 to 2000, the 
French answered resoundingly in the negative. 
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 Table 4.1  French opinion of political parties 
Year 1989 1990 1995 1997 2000
Not well represented by a party (%) 54 74 65 64 74 
From Andrew Knapp, Parties and the Party System in France, page 348. 
 
 
This of course does not mean that French voters do not identify with a particular family of 
parties:  the left, the right, or the center.  The French do broadly tend to vote within the 
ideological family in which they feel most at home.  The stickiness of ideological affiliation can 
be witnessed in voters’ behavior in the two-ballot system.  Very few voters switch sides between 
ballots (although some do).215  
 Elite-party behavior that resembles the formation of a party of power superficially can be 
seen in France as well.  Parties’ names and alliance partners shift as elections come and go.  
Most recently, several strands of French conservatism merged in 2002 to form the Union pour un 
Mouvement Populaire (UMP), which has successfully become the dominant party of the 
moderate right.  After the legislative and presidential elections of 2007, it controls the National 
Assembly by an absolute majority (313 seats)216 and its candidate, Nicolas Sarkozy, is the sitting 
president.  However, UMP differs from a Russian party of power in important ways.  First, it was 
created by merging several conservative parties that had long histories in the Fifth Republic.  
Second, while its creation was eventually endorsed by President Chirac, the impetus for the 
formation of the UMP came from within the pre-existing parties themselves, not from the 
incumbent elite.217  Lastly, the UMP is identifiably a party of the moderate right.  It is not 
ideologically amorphous as parties of power tend to be. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
 
 
French parties are, for the political elite, “long-term necessities.”218  Presidential aspirants who 
have spent years building party organizations have been successful in realizing their ambition 
(Mitterrand, Chirac, Sarkozy), while those who have tried to eschew party-building have failed 
(Barre, Balladur and, to an extent, Giscard d’Estaing).  As a result, French elites reward party 
organizations with political patronage, from the premiership to the bureaucracies to the public 
sector.  French parties are therefore able to influence the state from the inside, as well as from the 
outside.  As a long-term necessity, French parties have a staying power that their Russian 
counterparts largely lack.  As they persist over time and compete for votes, French parties forge 
connections with voters and particular segments of society.  These interests are then 
communicated to the elite in the pursuit of greater electoral success.  Such political 
communication can be seen in the informal contacts characteristic of the de Gaulle presidency to 
the ‘elephants’ breakfasts’ of the Mitterrand years.  Furthermore, since parties are the building-
block of a political career, they are the primary repository of opposition in the system.  
Alternation in government has been frequent, with leaders using parties as a base of support from 
which to attack the current majority.  Parties’ success in all these crucial fields stems from the 
strong vote of no-confidence, which obliges the French president to maintain good relations with 
his party, and allows parties to put their representatives in the highest offices. 
 
 
 
137 
 
  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
The comparison between the French and Russian constitutional systems is an enlightening one.  
Both are semi-presidential states with strong executives.  Yet in one case democracy has 
derailed, in the words of some commentators219, while in the other case the democratic train is 
running smoothly. 
 Comparing the two states reveals that the French legislature is a poor check on the 
executive, since the executive is armed with constitutional provisions that allow it to dominate 
the legislative process without the need for much bargaining.  By contrast, the State Duma has a 
constant influence on policy, since the executive must rely on a supportive majority, not 
constitutional machinery, to pass laws.  The rules of the game oblige the president to negotiate 
with even a sycophantic party like United Russia.   
 Despite its disadvantages, the Duma emerges as an effective counterweight to a strong 
executive.  As the Duma continues to build up a body of law, decrees will become less and less 
influential.  Big-ticket items like treaties and the annual budget require the Duma’s assent, while 
in France the budget can be passed by decree.  Even the weak vote of no-confidence allows the 
legislature to censure the government as a political attack, rather than as a ‘nuclear option.’  The 
Russian constitution, in many areas, provides more room for compromise and negotiation than 
does the French constitution, which emphasizes government control. 
 Despite parties’ importance in passing legislation in the Duma, they have not become the 
essential stepping-stone to the heights of political power.  The inability of political parties to win 
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 executive power through control of the legislature creates a leadership class whose political 
capital is not drawn from political parties.  This leadership class is free, as a result, to create 
clientelistic parties of power that enjoy the benefits of a close connection with the elite without 
having to forge genuine links to society.  This alienates the state from society and inhibits the 
development of real political parties.  Additionally, the presence of pliant parties of power in the 
system has a knock-on effect on the parliament.  Even a modest-sized party of power delegation 
in the legislature, such as Unity in the Third Duma, gives the executive more support for its 
policies and more freedom to maneuver.  A dominant party of power, like United Russia in the 
Fourth and Fifth Dumas, further diminishes the parliament’s independent influence.  Democratic 
consolidation in Russia is, as a result, severely hobbled. 
 An analysis of political institutions in France and Russia is not sufficient to completely 
explain the failure of democracy to take root in Russia.  There are many other factors at work, 
including sociological and historical trends.  However, institutions help shape the organization, 
use, and pursuit of political power.  Though the National Assembly has little influence on policy, 
the French constitution encourages strong political parties, which in turn reinforce the ties 
between state and society.  The party system informs state action, both in an advisory role and 
directly through the capture of high office.  The situation in Russia is a mirror image.  There a 
potentially strong legislature is enervated by a weak political party system that arises out of the 
legislature’s crucial weakness.  So long as Russia’s constitution stacks the deck against genuine, 
socially-oriented political parties, Russia’s top leaders will remain unencumbered by democratic 
pressure from below, despite a more independent legislature, save in the form of large-scale 
popular protest. 
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